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Abstract  
 
 
Deriving momentum from ðổi mới-an economic reform launched since 1986, Vietnam 
has to adjust its general foreign policy, especially its policy behaviors toward the great 
powers. This thesis aims to examine determinant factors leading to significant changes 
of the in Vietnamese foreign policy since 1986, and strategic approaches which Hanoi 
has been pursuing in dealing with the present-day great powers (the United States, 
China, the European Union, Russia, Japan and India). I argue that Vietnamese foreign 
relations toward the great powers since ðổi mới can be configured by a mixture of two 
theoretical paradigms: realism and liberalism. Hanoi’s pragmatic approaches are aims 
to serve for the cause of national modernization and industrialization. This case study 
about Vietnam attempts to give an example of understanding how small and medium 
sized states in South East Asia respond to the present-day great powers in the post-
Cold War era. And how mainstream approaches in Western theory of international 
relations make sense in identifying foreign relation pattern of a South East Asia 
country-Vietnam. 
***** 
 
Ausgehend von der ðổi mới Poltik - einer Wirtschaftsreform die 1986 begann - hatte 
Vietnam seine grundsätzliche außenpolitische Linie, im speziellen sein politisches 
Verhalten gegenüber den Großmächten, anzupassen. Diese Arbeit möchte die 
entscheidenden Faktoren, die zu großen Veränderungen in der vietnamesischen 
Außenpolitik seit 1986 führten und die strategischen Ziele die Hanoi in den 
Beziehungen zu den Großmächten verfolgt (USA, China, Europäische Union, 
Russland, Japan und Indien), analysieren. Ich behaupte, dass die vietnamesische 
Außenpolitik gegenüber den Großmächten seit ðổi mới sich aus einer Mischung von 
zwei theoretischen Paradigmen zusammensetzt: Realismus und Liberalismus. Die 
pragmatischen Ansätze Hanois sind Mittel zum Zweck um der Modernisierung und der 
Industrialisierung des Landes zu dienen. Diese Fallstudie über Vietnam versucht ein 
Beispiel dafür zu geben wie klein und mittelgroße Staaten Südostasiens auf die 
heutigen Großmächte, in der Zeit seit Ende des Kalten Krieges, reagieren. Ebenso wie 
die bekanntesten Zugänge westlicher Theorien im Bereich der internationalen 
Beziehungen dazu dienen, die Außenpolitik eines südostasiatischen Landes, in diesem 
Fall Vietnam, zu erforschen. 
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***** 
 
Kề từ khi tiến hành công cuộc ðổi mới-Chương trình cải cách kinh tế từ năm 1986, 
Việt Nam ñã phải thực hiện việc ñiều chỉnh chính sách ñối ngoại của mình, ñặc biệt là 
chính sách ñối với các nước lớn. Luận án này nhằm mục ñích tìm hiểu những nhân tố 
quyết ñịnh dẫn ñến thay ñổi quan trọng trong chính sách ñối ngoại Việt Nam từ năm 
1986, ñồng thời tập trung phân tích những chiến lược ñối ngoại quan trọng mà Hà Nội 
theo ñuổi trong quan hệ ngoại giao với các cường quốc (Mỹ, Trung Quốc, Liên minh 
châu Âu, Nga, Nhật Bản và Ấn ðộ). Luận ñiểm của tôi cho rằng việc ñánh giá quan hệ 
ñối ngoại của Việt Nam với các cường quốc từ năm 1986 ñến nay có thể ñược tiến 
hành dựa trên phương pháo áp dụng  mẫu lý thuyết của hai trường phái, ñó là: chủ 
nghĩa hiện thực chính trị và chủ nghĩa tự do. Hà Nội hoạch ñịnh một phương châm 
ngoại giao thực dụng với mục ñích phục vụ sự nghiệp công nghiệp hóa và hiện ñại ñất 
nước. Qua việc nghiên cứu cụ thể về trường hợp Việt Nam, luận án nhằm ñóng góp 
một phần nhỏ trong việc giải ñáp hai câu hỏi: Trong thời kỳ hậu Chiến tranh lạnh, các 
quốc gia vừa và nhỏ ở ðông Nam Á phải có phương sách ứng phó ra sao với các 
nước lớn hiện nay?. Liệu các quan ñiểm thuộc các trường phái phương tây về quan hệ 
quốc tế có thể ñược áp dụng trong việc phân tích và xác ñịnh mô hình quan hệ ñối 
ngoại của một quốc gia ðông Nam Á như Việt Nam? 
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CCP   The Chinese Communist Party  
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U.S   The United States of America  
EU   The European Union  
UN   The United Nations  
USSR  The Soviet Union  
DRV   Democratic Republic of Vietnam  
GDR              The German Democratic Republic  
S.R.               Socialist Republic of Vietnam  
P.R China     People Republic of China   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 “After war, the people you meet differ so from former times” 
 Nguyen Trai (1380-1442)1 
 
Looking like an “S” shaped letter with over 2000km coastline along the East Sea 
enriched by fishery, small peaceful villages behind the ranges of green bamboos and 
flat golden ripe rice fields. A fierce ranging of B52 Bombs all over, Agent Orange 
covering all Truong Son jungles unstill they had no leaves, children and women cried in 
smokes and flames. Houses and streets were left with ruins. Long waiting refugee lines 
waiting for helicopters roaring... Those who are interested in history of a country in 
Indochina would absolutely not forget these familiar scenes. It must be no doubt that it 
had happened in Vietnam. Sorrowfully, the image of this country is often worldwide 
known with the name “Vietnam War” rather the country itself. “Good morning 
Vietnam!”2 or Good night?, the answer for the questions remains open.  
 
Nguyen Trai wrote “after war, the people you meet differ from former times”. And 
nowadays everyone should know that Vietnam is a country with new images, not a war. 
And, alike, after the war the foreign policy behaviour of a country also looks different 
from former times. The year 1986 remarked a turning point in evolution of the country, 
when the Communist Party of Vietnam announced a decisive policy “ðổi mới” 
(economic reform policy)3. Vietnam inclined to choose gradualist approaches but not 
shock-therapist approaches4 like the countries in the Eastern Europe after the collapse 
                                                 
1 Nguyen Trai was a prominent Vietnamese politician, poet and Confucian scholar. He wrote “Bình Ngô 
ðại Cáo”, an independence declaration of Vietnam after hundreds year of persistent struggling against 
Chinese occupation.  
2
 “Good Morning, Vietnam!” was a comedy- drama film produced in 1987 during the Vietnam War.  
3
 About ðổi mới, please see detailed writing in Chapter 5 
4 See Guo (2006). Table 1.2 Comparison of Gradualist approaches and Shock-therapist approaches, in: 
The Political economies of Asian Transition from Communism. p.2. Guo’s assessment concentrates 
main characteristics of Gradualist approaches included: concentration on agriculture reform, and 
gradual opening of the  previously closed economy. Reform was partial, incremental, and often 
experimental. Caused no initial downturn and avoided declining incomes and high unemployment. 
Making no use of large scale privatization, gradually reformed prices and trade control; maintaining 
exchange controls; and adopted active state industrial policy while keeping the party-state control. The 
result of these approaches is that these Asian countries continue to remain Leninist one-party states, 
embrace an eventual goal of communism and move towards market socialism. For the Shock-
therapist approaches are endeavors to replace the traditional central planning economy with a market 
economy in a single burst of reforms, a rapid, all-out programs, including as many reforms as possible 
in a shortest possible time; caused initial economic downturn, declining incomes and high 
employments: made use of mass privatization of SOEs through voucher or sale-out programs; rapidly 
lifting state control over the major  factors of production and exchange while maintaining minimal 
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of the Soviet Union in 1989. This decision opened a new pathway from isolation to 
integration, achieving success but also facing with full of challenges.  
 
After different war images, Vietnam is known through enormous amounts of 
publications about ðổi mới. However, writing about economic reform is just like 
mentioning one side of a country story. Great powers often play important role, if not as 
dominant roles in different aspects of international politics, especially in the issues of 
War and Peace. History of Vietnam, through out its more than four thousand years, has 
witnessed the intrigue influence of the great powers’, most notable was politics in the 
Cold War. Nonetheless, not much about Vietnamese Foreign policy is published in 
foreign languages, except the two comprehensive researches, one is an edition by 
Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer (1999), and the other is by Alexander L. Vuving 
(2005). A comprehensive study with overview about foreign policy and foreign relations 
of Vietnam toward the great powers from transition to present day becomes my 
motivation. Therefore, my thesis about “Vietnam and the Great Powers: Vietnamese 
Foreign Policy since ði mi” came into being.  
 
There is one old Vietnamese saying “when buffalos are fighting, mosquitoes are dying”. 
In bipolarity world order, this old saying depicts somewhat the influence of the 
superpowers in the international politics. Like Heraclitus, a Greek philosopher said 
“Panta rhei- everything is in a state of flux”. The doctrine of change is still regarded as 
core essence of universe. As it construes, Globalization becomes “today’s most 
fashionable catchword”5 which effects us in every aspects of life and leads to almost 
radical social, political, economical, military changes, even human psychological 
change. Consequently, in today international relations, nation-states (big, medium or 
small) and even non-state actors have to step up efforts in changing their strategies. 
Examining about policy behaviour of a nation is, therefore, a necessity in the post cold 
war time. Who ever read about history of Vietnam, can not deny external influences of 
great powers and their interactions on the country. And shaping of Vietnamese foreign 
policy, like the case in other states, is obviously determined by both internal and 
                                                                                                                                                         
macro-economic control. Consequently, Leninist one-party states and central planned economies 
collapsed in Russia and Eastern European countries. And these countries moved towards market 
capitalism.  
5
 Kirt, R (2005) “Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization: Does Globalization Constrain Nation States’ 
Sovereignty in Conceiving and Maintaining their Foreign Policy?”, in: Günter Bischof / Anton Pelinka / 
Michael Gehler (Hrsg.), Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context. New Brunswick/London: 
Transaction Publishers. pp. 246-263 
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external environments. Yet, other factors like leadership, personality and ideology etc. 
should not be set aside.  
 
1. Aims of the thesis 
 
My thesis paper is not only limited in the topic about ðổi mới, it also seeks to examine 
determinants which make a shift of the Vietnamese foreign policy toward the present-
day great powers. What challenges does a third world country like Vietnam has to face 
in its transitional foreign policy towards the great powers? Time framework for analysis 
of foreign policy of Vietnam would be since 1986 to present. Temporally, the process 
will be divided into different periods: 1986-1996; 1996-2006; 2006 to present. When 
analyzing Vietnamese foreign relations toward great powers.  
 
Being a Vietnamese student studying in Austria, I have largely convenient access to 
different sources of theories of international politics which has been viewed in the eyes 
of Western scholars. My thesis, furthermore, aims to test some certain assumptions of 
the two Western theories: 1. Theory of foreign policy analysis.  2. Theory of 
international relations in examining the foreign policy and foreign relations of a 
Southeast Asian country-Vietnam.  
 
This thesis is also an attempt to provide understanding contemporary challenges of the 
Vietnamese foreign policy; different factors which shape Vietnamese foreign relations 
with the great powers. The case study of Vietnam hopes to give and example of how a 
small and medium country coped with greater powers and how shift in international 
balance of power are translated into changes in its foreign policy. Last but not least, 
writing this thesis is regarded as an academic project which helps me to improve my 
knowledge on a specific subject, analysis methodology and comprehend my academic 
writing skills.  
 
2. Research questions and methodology 
Reserch questions:  There are two main questions posed for my thesis to deal with: 
 
1. What are determinant leading to essential changes in the Vietnamese 
foreign policy since ðổi mới (1986)?  
2. What are main implications of S.R. Vietnam toward the present-day great 
powers and how are Vietnamese foreign relations with these great powers 
characterized?  
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In order to response these two core research enquiries, each part of my thesis 
endeavours to answer the following questions. At the end, some remarks on 
perspectives of Vietnamese foreign policy will be summarized in the Conclusion.  
 
1. Who are the great powers in the post-Cold War era? 
  
2. What are the main contents of two Western theories of foreign policy analysis 
and international relations which will be utilized to explain Vietnamese foreign 
policy?  
 
3. What is ðổi mới and how was the economic reform policy realized? 
 
4. What are determinants leading to changes of Vietnamese foreign policy in the 
new context of ðổi mới?  
 
5. How was Vietnamese Foreign Policy changed to serve ðổi mới and the 
modernization and industrialization process? 
 
6. What type of international relations theory which conforms to identify the 
patterns of Vietnamese international relations since 1986?  
 
7. What are the strategic approaches which Vietnam applies toward the present-
day great powers? 
 
8. To what extend does Vietnam have to compromise its political ideologies in its 
relations with the great powers? 
 
 
Methodology: 
 
My thesis is not only a humble contribution to the general theory but rather an empirical 
test of several hypothesises by applying certain contents of two Western theories: 
Foreign Policy Analysis and International relations in analyzing Vietnamese foreign 
policy and its foreign relations toward the present-day great powers since 1986. 
Qualitative method applied for my thesis is, therefore, more salient than quantitative 
approach.  
 
Basically, both historical and political approaches will be utilized as I have a great 
chance to access and understand different sources of secondary literature in German, 
English and Vietnamese. Furthermore, number of both printed and electronic scholarly 
works, articles, papers from Vietnamese and foreign languages will be scrutinized. 
Together with finding-outs by Western scholars, I also choose to look closely on the 
documents, papers and books published by the Communist Party of Vietnam, research 
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institutes and other official Vietnamese sources in order to achieve both subjective and 
objective assessments.  
 
Investigating foreign relations of a country for some decades is an ambitious project, 
therefore, I would constrain relevant historical events to analyze. In addition, 
comparative politics method will be certainly not excluded.  
 
3. Hypothesis 
 
By examining the past evolution and current strategic orientation of the Vietnamese 
Foreign Policy since 1986, my paper attempts to demonstrate the following hypothesis: 
 
Vietnamese foreign policy toward the great powers since 1986 has achieved significant 
structure changes and has been applying different pragmatic approaches which derive 
momentum from ðổi mới policy and practically serve for the present cause of national 
modernization and industrialization. The changes in Vietnamese foreign policy after 
1986 does not affect the state’s behaviour of maintaining statue-quo power the 
Vietnamese Communist Party. 
  
4. Thesis design 
 
The thesis will be divided into seven chapters and a Conclusion: 
 
Chapter 1: introduces the man aims of the thesis; the research questions and 
methodology; proposed hypothesis and thesis design. 
Chapter 2: presents theoretical background of the thesis in which comprises general 
perception of the great powers in the Post-Cold era, and assumptions of the Western 
scholars on theory of foreign policy analysis and theory of international relations which I 
consider relative to the analysis of foreign policy and foreign relations of Vietnam.  
Chapter 3: provides a comprehensive background of Vietnamese history in brief and 
political system of today Vietnam.  
Chapter 4: covers a brief overview about Vietnamese foreign policy in the Cold War 
and some main features of Vietnam’s great power relations 
Chapter 5: gives an overlook on ðổi mới policy (since 1986). This chapter is a 
response to questions: what is ðổi mới and how has it been done? This economic 
reform is regarded as a decisive domestic factor which leads to radical changes in 
Vietnamese foreign policy later on. 
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Chapter 6: concentrates on the “great shift” in Vietnamese foreign policy since 1986. It 
investigates the determinants for changes and main contents of adjustments presented 
in Vietnamese foreign policy strategy.  
Chapter 7: empirically describe Vietnam’s strategic approaches towards the great 
powers: the U.S, China, Russia, the European Union, Japan and China from 1986 to 
present. In each part, main implications in Vietnamese foreign policy will be summed 
up. At the same time, some selected diplomatic activities of Vietnam toward each great 
power will be analyzed in order to point out the certain theory assumptions which are 
mentioned in the Chapter of the theoretical background.  
Conclusion: this session concludes with finding-outs and remarks on perspectives for 
the Vietnamese Foreign Policy 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical background 
 
In today globalization of international politics, increasing interactions between nations, 
international organisations and non-state actors make interdependence of nations more 
intensive. Studying about foreign policy (FP) plays an important role than ever because 
foreign policy of a country affects indirectly and directly almost every aspect of our daily 
lives. The development of a country is much impacted by how a country interacts to the 
rest of the world.  
 
Keep this in mind, when studying about the Vietnamese foreign policy towards the 
great powers since 1986. It is crucial for my thesis, to clarify the three theoretical 
questions: Who are “great powers” in the post-cold war?  What are the fundamental 
theories of international relations relevant to study of the Vietnamese foreign policy? 
What are essential approaches of foreign policy analysis?  
 
2.1. Who are the “great powers” in the post-Cold War era?  
 
I do not have ambition to have a long theoretical explanation about polarity theory in 
this part. I rather tight up the definition of “great powers” which considered by western 
authors and Vietnamese international relation specialists. Addressing this question 
would help my thesis constrain the topic on analysis of Vietnamese foreign relations 
toward identified great powers.  
 
The term “great powers” has been actually not a stable one. During the first and second 
World Wars, this term shifted with the time and has been used in scholarly discourses 
since the post- Napoleonic war congress of Vienna in 18156. History has shown that for 
five centuries, the world most powerful states - the Portugese, Spanish, and Italian in 
the 16th century, the Swedes and the Danes in the 17th century, the French, Germans 
and the British in the 18th century. (Griffiths, O’c Callaghan and Roach, 2002:134). 
 
In the Cold War, the international relations are mostly influenced by the two super 
powers. The term “great powers” nearly replaced by the term “superpowers” with the 
highlight of the United States and the Soviet Union because their material capacities 
                                                 
6
 Danilovic, V. (2007). "When the Stakes Are High—Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers", 
University of Michigan Press , p. 27 
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(nuclear weapons) are much more stronger than those of next ranking “great powers”- 
initially Britain, later, Japan, Germany, France, China (Morgenthau, 1978:349). “The 
concept of polarity could be applied: bipolarity meant superpowers and multi-polarity 
meant great powers” (Buzan, 2004:58).  
 
To have better understanding about the polarity, let’s have a look at overview of the 
international system which is viewed by (Pfetsch, 1994:38)7 from the 1940s to the 
years of 1990s: 
 
 
                                                 
7
 This citation is also found in Filzmaier, Gewessler, Höll and Mangott (2006). International Politik. 
Vienna: Facultas Verlags-und Buchhandel AG. p.23.  
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Studying more about “classical” writing about “great powers”, there have been many 
attempts to formulate the criteria to distinguish the great powers with other states in 
international system. Mearsheimer writes about “great powers”:  
 
Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military assets 
to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful 
state in the world. 
          (Mearsheimer, 2001:5) 
  
This statement by Mearsheimer, however, faces troublesome, since in today world 
globalization, the great powers are not only identified by their military powers and “put 
up a serious fight”8 but also their influence capacity of soft power.  
 
One of the most representative realist tradition definitions is from Waltz (1979). Waltz 
(1979:131) emphasizes that “the economic, military and other capacities of nations can 
not be sectored and separately weighed. States are not placed on the top rank 
because they excel on one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score all 
of the following terms: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capacity, military strength, political stability and competence…Ranking states, however, 
does not require predicting their success in war or in other endeavours. We need to 
rank them roughly by their capacity.”  
 
Waltz’s definition mentions a comprehensive requirement of criteria for being a great 
power. But one should not forget the role of great powers in determining issues 
affecting security of international system as a whole. They accept the duty and, are 
thought by others to have duty, of modifying their policies in the light of the managerial 
responsibilities they bear (Bull,1977: 200)9.  
 
Toynbee has distinguished a great power with a regional power when underlying 
possession of actual influence throughout the scope of the prevailing international 
system. He writes:   
 
                                                 
8
 Lemke, D. (2004). Great powers in the Post-cold war world: A Power transition perspective. In Paul, 
T.V., Wirtz, J.J. and Fotman. M. (ed.). Balance of Power: Theory and Pratice in the 21st Century. 
California: Standford University Press. p. 55 
9
 Bull, H. (1977). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politic. This book was with forewords 
by Hoffmann, S. and  Hurrell, A. (2002).New York:  Palgrave Macmillan. 
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Great power may be defined as a political force exerting an effect co- extensive 
with the widest range of the society in which it operates. The Great powers of 
1914 were 'world-powers' because Western society had recently become 'world-
wide'. 
 (Toynbee, 1925: 4) 
 
As the 21st century unfolds, it appears unlikely that the United States will be able to 
sustain its present lofty status. Other great power will emerge and it the question is if 
they co-exist in way that promote or undermine international order. Besides, concerning 
criteria of great powers, one can not ignore the standard great-power designation is 
offered by the Correlates of War Project list10. According to this list, the great powers 
after the Cold War are: Britain, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United 
States. 
 
In foreign relations with other nations, each state has its own priority and strategy in its 
foreign policies. For the Vietnamese international relations specialists, Nguyen Xuan 
Son and Nguyen Van Du (2006:15) like Buzan (2004:86) remark the today world order 
is that: one super power and several great powers. Since the end of the Cold War, 
the United States has been the dominant power in the world politics. The others great 
powers like the European Union, Russia, Japan, China and India are attempting to 
maintain the multi-polarity (Nguyen Xuan Son, and Nguyen Van Du, 2006:23).  
 
Nguyen Hoang Giap (2007: 328) also emphasizes that Vietnam needs to enhance 
diversified relationships with the great powers like the EU, Japan, Russia. Never forget 
to foster the traditional relationship with China. Flexibly dealing with the US, and 
promoting a new stage in the relation with India. Vietnamese foreign relations with 
those countries affect directly on Vietnamese economic development and national 
security.  
 
In foreign relations, one can be its strategic partner today but can be its cooperative 
partner tomorrow. It is also very complex to give out a set of defined characteristics of a 
great power. I agree with Waltz when remarks about great powers  that “an empirical 
one, and common sense can answer it”11.  Based on the above description, my thesis 
concentrates on analyzing the Vietnamese foreign relations with the US, China, 
                                                 
10
 This list is available at http://pss.la.psu.edu/intsys.html 
11
 Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, p. 131  
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Russia, the EU, Japan and India. Other than that, an insight into Vietnam’s relations 
with some international organizations will be partly scrutinized.  
 
2.2. Theory of foreign policy and foreign policy analysis  
 
       2.2.1. What is foreign policy?  
 
Making a definition of a political concept can not be avoided with ambiguity and it is 
often interpreted in different ways, a concrete concept of foreign policy is difficult to 
define and consist of various meanings. In order to have a comprehensive 
understanding about the foreign policy concept, it is necessary to look at more than one 
definitions from different realist and liberal-pluralist scholars summarized by McGovan, 
Cornelissen and Nel (2006) in the following table12:  
 
Realist (state-centric) definitions Liberal-pluralist (multi-centric) 
definitions  
These definitions are liked to “world of 
states” and reflecting the key 
assumptions of realism which view FP as 
official interest-driven response of the 
supposedly rational and unitary state 
actor (and its government) to its 
external or inter-state (for inter-
government) environment. 
• FP is ‘the system of activities evolved 
by communities for changing 
behaviours of other states and for 
adjusting their own activities to the 
international environment’ (Modelski, 
1962:3).  
• FP ‘consists of decisions and actions 
which involve to some appreciable 
extent relations between one state 
and others’ (Frankel, 1963:1). 
• FP is ‘those official actions (reactions) 
which sovereign states initiate (or 
receive and subsequently react to) for 
the purpose of altering or creating a 
condition (or problem) outside their 
territorial-sovereign boundaries’ 
(Wilkenfeld et al., 1980:22).  
The liberal-pluralist definitions challenge 
the notion that the state is principle, 
unitary and rational actor. This is done 
by extending foreign policy making to 
include non-state actors in the mix- actors 
environment and by making greater 
allowance for the domestic sources 
and non-rationality of foreign policy  
• FP “consist of those ‘actions’ which 
expresses in the form of explicitly 
stated  directly and performed by 
government representatives acting on 
behalf of their sovereign communities, 
are manifestly directed towards 
objectives, conditions and actors, both 
governmental and non-governmental-
which clearly lie beyond their sphere 
of territorial legitimacy’ (Carlsnaes, 
1986:70). 
• Foreign policy analysis consists ‘on 
intentions, statements and actions of 
an actor- often but not always, a state-
directed towards the external world 
and the response of other actors to 
these intentions, statements and 
                                                 
12
 See Box 6.1 in Mc Govan, P.J., Cornelissen, S., & Nel, P. (eds.)(2006). Power, Wealth and Global 
Equity: An Internatonal Relations Textbook for Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press  
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• FP is ‘that area of governmental 
activity which is concerned with 
relationships between the state and 
other actors, particular other states, in 
international system’ (White, 1989:1). 
• FP is ‘general principles by which a 
state governs its relationship with 
international political environment’. 
‘from the perspectives of individual 
state, the essence of its foreign policy 
is to pursue, and, hopefully, fulfil to 
composite its needs and aspirations, 
what we have called its value sythesis’ 
(Said et al., 1995:30,26). 
• FP is ‘compose of goals sought, 
values set, decisions made and 
actions taken by states and national 
governments acting on their behalf, in 
the context of external relations of 
national societies. It constitutes an 
attempt to design, manage and control 
the foreign relations of national 
societies’ (Webber & Smith, 2002:9-
10). 
actions’ (Gerner, 1995:18). 
• FP is ‘the sum of total of all activities 
by which international actors act, 
react, interact with the environment 
beyond their national borders’ (Vale & 
Mphaisha, 1999:89). 
• FP is ‘the sum of official external 
relations conducted by an 
independent actor (usually a state) in 
international relations (Hill,2003:3).  
 
 
Nevertheless, a very simple explanation about FP’s concept has been viewed by a 
conservative American think tank of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) 
should be taken into account. It says that “a country's foreign policy, also called the 
international relations policy, is a set of goals outlining how the country will interact with 
other countries economically, politically, socially and militarily, and to a lesser extent, 
how the country will interact with non-state actors. The aforementioned interaction is 
evaluated and monitored in attempts to maximize benefits of multilateral international 
cooperation”13. Foreign policies are designed to help protect a country's national 
interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can occur 
as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through exploitation. In 
International affairs no one is permanent friend and permanent enemy. What 
permanent is National Interests of a country”14. 
 
According to Meyers Lexikon, foreign policy is defined as follows. I would keep the 
original German version of the definition:  
 
                                                 
13
 See http://sciencestage.com/g/955279/foreign-policy-research-institute.html 
14
 Foreign Policy (n.d.). Retrieved from Wikipedia. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy 
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Die Gestaltung der Beziehungen eines Staates zu anderen Staaten und zu 
internationalen Organisationen, besonders die Herstellung zweiseitiger 
(bilateraler) oder mehrseitiger (multilateraler) politischer, militärischer, 
wirtschaftlicher, rechtlicher oder kultureller Beziehungen. Die Außenpolitik wird 
durch geografische Lage, Größe und strategische Position eines Staates im 
internationalen Kräfteverhältnis, v. a. aber durch seine innenpolitische 
Verfassung und Organisation bestimmt. Zu den Mitteln der Außenpolitik 
gehören Diplomatie, Verträge, Bündnisse, Außenwirtschaftspolitik, aber auch 
die Androhung oder Einsatz militärischer Gewalt. Träger der Außenpolitik sind 
die mit der Wahrnehmung der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten betrauten 
Staatsorgane, internationale und supranationale Organisationen sowie 
Nichtregierungsorganisationen.15 
 
Based of all above assumptions, some characteristics about the concept of FP are 
summarized as follows:  
Firstly, in the new international politics, FP is not anymore privileged and targeted at 
states and governments like some realist definitions mentioned but it goes beyond ‘the 
world of states’ to the mix-actors environment of the ‘multi-centric world’. It is also 
formulated and implemented by other international actors.  
Secondly, FP is not only “external” but also lies “at the hinge of domestic politics and 
international relations” (Hill, 2003:22). Other than that, foreign policy embeds the 
internal (domestic) domain. Domestic sources reflect how and what foreign policy is 
striving for.  
Thirdly, in foreign policy making, national interest is always considered a highest 
priority: security, economy, ideology, culture protection etc. These national interests are 
culminated and vary differently in different historical period of time. 
 
2.2.2. What is foreign policy analysis (FPA)?  
 
Foreign policy analysis is a branch of political science and a subfield of International 
Relations (IR) and it is also usually taught within the discipline of political studies. The 
difference between the international relation theory and FPA is the subject of study: 
international relation theory concentrates on actor-general but PFA focuses more on 
actor specific (Breuning, 2007). FPA deals with theory development and empirical 
study regarding the processes and outcomes of foreign policy. Neustadt and May 
(1986)16 emphasize the aims of the FPA as follows:  
 
                                                 
15 http://lexikon.meyers.de/meyers/Au%C3%9Fenpolitik 
16
 Also cited in Breuning, M. (2007). Foreign policy analysis: A comparative introduction. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
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This is what foreign policy aims to do: to systematically contrast and compare. 
Although decision makers drive knowledge from their experiences, they often 
interpret the lessons narrowly, fail to reexamine their gut reactions, and they 
compare precious and current crises only superficially. In doing the latter, 
leaders make analogies on the basis of superficial commonalities while 
ignoring significant differences between situations. 
     (Neustadt and May, 1986) 
 
In another simple expression: FPA is a subject focusing on how to analyze and 
evaluate foreign policy of one actor or many international actors. Snyder, Bruck and 
Sapin (1969) point out that the goal of FPA is to gain generally applicable knowledge 
about how foreign policy decisions are made; why leaders make the decisions they 
make, why states engage in specific kinds of foreign policy behaviors, as well as to 
access the opportunities and constraints presented by international system. FPA also 
assumes that foreign policies are usually determined by the complex interplay of 
multiple factors (Breuning, 2007:21).  
 
Before moving to different approaches on how to analyze and evaluate foreign policy, 
let me start with the importance of studying foreign policy and a short brief history of 
FPA. 
 
To answer the question why to study FPA, the importance of FPA can be noted with 
following essentials: 1. FPA of other countries and international actors serves as 
approach for decision makers to map out appropriate national policies both internal and 
external. 2. FP is not identical to international relations. And FPA is an important 
process which contributes to comprehensive analysis of international relations. 
Eventually, contents and changes in international relations are consequence of foreign 
policy implementations. 3. FPA contributes to study domestic policies of other states 
and international actors: understanding their demand of cooperation and challenges, 
hence, enable policy makers to design their own appropriate internal policies. 4. FPA 
helps clarify how foreign policy of each actor effects the international environment, and 
global politics, from which one might choose properly “for” and “against” behaviour.  
 
Those theoretical assumptions will be proved in practice the case of foreign policy 
analysis of Vietnam in further parts of the thesis. 
 
History of the FPA started with its first appearance in 1950s when the preoccupation 
of classical realists like Hans Morgenthau who attempts to explain external state 
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behavior from a scientific perspective; the Cold War with its crises posed quest of 
necessity to make sense of state behavior before states (and the superpowers in 
particular) destroyed the international system. However, it was then oriented to sharpen 
its scientific pretensions but more importantly - by orientating the study towards human 
behavior, decision-making and consequent action - it provided a lasting perspective 
from which to attack the simplicities of state-centric, rational actor analysis and the 
straightjacket of realist theory (White, 2003)17. 
 
In the 1970s, the notion of complex interdependence was developed by neo-liberals 
like Keohane and Jo Nye. This brought an introduction of new non-state actors. 
Together with interdependence and transnationalism processes, they have made 
challenges to a state-centered FPA. The years of 1980s have seen the new 
development of FPA in the context of a neo-realism which concentrates on the system 
rather than its constituent units as the determining dynamic of IR. By the 1990s, there 
appeared crisis for FPA. White (2003) describes those challenges as: 1. At the end of 
cold war: a new period in which the traditional foreign policies of states appearing less 
pressing and less less urgent as a focus of study, particularly in the context of a host of 
new actors and issues that crowded onto the post cold war agenda. 2. ‘One pillar of the 
neo-neo consensus may have been the common recognition that states are the most 
important actors in IR, but this did not mean that the ‘neos’ were prepared to privilege 
the state or the state as actor. Whether structure meant the international system or 
other institutional arrangements, neoliberals and neorealists offered variants of a highly 
influential structuralist approach to IR that did further damage to the perceived 
importance of an FPA approach’. 3. ‘The broadly based attack on the neo-neo 
consensus that gathered pace in the 1990s together with the more philosophical turn in 
IR theory appeared ironically to leave FPA adrift in the mainstream orthodoxy with 
nothing to contribute to the so-called positivist/post-positivist debate’. 
 
2.2.3. What are key approaches of FPA? 
 
Foreign policy analysis is an important component of the academic discipline of 
International Relations. In nearly all states and non-state actors, the practice of 
                                                 
17 White, B. (2003). “Foreign policy analysis and European foreign policy”. Available at 
http://www.fornet.info/documents/White_presentation%20November%202003.pdf 
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foreign policy is a very important political activity. The structure of world politics is 
often reflected by foreign policy actions and discourses. The main character of FPA is 
its actor-specific focus. It is the intensive study of process, effects and outputs of 
foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific manner. In 
order to have an insight in to FPA, this part will look at the different stages in the 
making of foreign policy; Key approaches which needed for a foreign policy analyst. 
First let’s have a look at the general concept of decision-making approach in 
international politics. According to statement made by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1969), 
the formulation of actions-reactions-interactions is important. They emphasize an 
assumption of “the state as Actor in a situation” which will be illustrated by the 
hereunder diagram. The importance of defining situations is pointed out by Snyder, 
Bruck and Sapin as follows:   
 
Basically, actions exist (analytically) when the following components can be 
ascertained: actors (actors), goals, means, and situation. The situation is defined 
by actor (or actors) in terms of the way the actor (or actors) relates himself to 
other actors, to possible goals, possible means, and in terms of the way means 
and ends are formed into strategies of action subject to relevant fectors in the 
situation. 
 
         (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1969:202) 
 
Analyzing this hereunder diagram shows us that the three authors do not avoid the 
existence of non-governmental factors. International politics is considered as processes 
of state interaction at the governmental level. However, there are non-governmental 
factors and relationships which must be taken into account by any system of analysis, 
and there are obviously non-governmental effects of state action. Domestic politics, the 
non-human environment, cross culture and social relationships are in this connection. 
Actors (decision-makers) act upon external and internal settings (Snyder, Bruck and 
Sapin, 1969:203).    
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Diagram 1: State “X” as an actor  
 
 
The diagram also demonstrates the central decision making focus, the integration of 
numbers of actors which might explain state action, reaction and interaction. It indicates 
the relationship among empirical factors and empirical processes: in both governmental 
and non-governmental level. At the same time, the diagram is designed to recommend 
analytic and theoretical relationships. The boxes suggest way of specifying relevant 
factors in state behaviors which help to handle with different empirical phenomenon 
and their inter-relationships: decision-making, action, setting, situation, society, culture 
etc. It is regarded at the same time as a basis for liking groups of theories in 
international politics and at the same time in the approach of foreign policy decision-
making. 
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Which are applicable methods used to analyze a foreign policy? How to evaluate a 
foreign policy? These are often questions posed by any foreign policy analyst. It is folly 
to believe that there is a single key to or one particular or preferred method of foreign 
policy analysis (Jones, 1970:153). There have been various framework developed. 
There are two distinct approaches: traditional approach and alternative approach. The 
alternative approach evolved through at least two distinct generations of ideas and 
scholarship: comparative and critical foreign policy (Neack et al., 1995:02). 
 
Based on the work by McGovan, Cornelissen and Nel (2006), this part attempts to 
identify some current foreign policy analysis models. The traditional approach will be 
specifically scrutinized, since it which would be a basis for case study of Vietnamese 
foreign policy latter on.  
 
The traditional approach (Rational actor model) 
The rational actor model is based on rational choice theory. Traditional foreign policy 
analysis focuses on fundamentals of state-centric realism. The model adopts the state 
as a rational, unitary actor. State is also primary unit of analysis, and inter-state 
relations (or international relations) as the context for analysis. States have coherent 
foreign policies, governments have predetermined goals and objectives which guide 
their policies, and governments calculates particular courses of actions and the 
consequences of those actions in a rational manner. In effect, foreign policy is seen as 
the product of rational behavior (White, 1989:10-12). According to the rational actor 
model, a rational decision-making process is used by a state. A rudimentary analytical 
framework by McGovan, Cornelissen & Nel, (2006:127) mentions the four questions. I 
will try to demonstrate it in the following diagram: 
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Diagram 2: The analytical framework of foreign policy 
 
 
 
The analytical framework of foreign policy includes four basic techniques. To answer 
the question: why the particular foreign policy? It is necessity to make assessment 
of the international and domestic political environment, as well as operational (physical) 
and psychological sources. International and domestic political contexts are the 
essential factors to determine which foreign policy should be chosen. These 
assessments help to explain why a state chooses this specific foreign policy but not 
others in certain period of time.  
 
The traditional approach  
of Foreign Policy Analysis  
Why the particular foreign policy?  
The importance of environment: international (external) and 
domestic (internal); operational (physical) and psychological  
Who makes foreign policy? 
 
Institutional or bureaucratic framework of foreign policy making 
How is foreign policy formulated? 
 
Analysis of policy process, meaning foreign policy decision-making 
within a foreign policy system 
How is foreign policy implemented? 
Dealing with four techniques (Instruments): political, economic, 
psychological (propagranda) and military 
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Who makes foreign policy? This refers to bureaucratic framework of foreign policy 
making. Besides, other questions need to be taken into account: Do leaders shape 
foreign policy? Are they alone making foreign policy? Institutional framework includes 
head of state or/and government, the ministry of foreign affairs, the diplomatic service, 
government departments, subsidiary support and advisory services such as intelligence 
service, communication (propaganda) services, the research and academic community 
and economic agencies the legislature, interest and pressure groups, and public 
opinion (McGovan, Cornelissen & Nel, 2006:127).  
How is foreign policy formulated? This question requires an explanation of how 
decision makers translate foreign policy inputs (support, demand) into output (actions 
and resource allocation) (McGovan, Cornelissen & Nel, 2006:128). Rudimentarily, it is 
necessary to identify the decision-makers’ determination of policy options. 
 
How is foreign policy implemented? When answering this question, the foreign 
policy analyst must look into the practice of diplomacy. It will give a comprehensive 
analysis on the implementation of chosen policy option. 
In sum, the rational actor model provides basic instruments for analysis of foreign 
policy which concentrate more on single state, It answers mostly basic questions: 
Why? Who? How? What? The representative scholars of the rational actor model are 
Hocking &Smith (1990), Said et a. (1995), Holsti (1995), Webber & Smith (2002), Hill 
(2002). However, this model has been subject to criticism. It tends to neglect a range of 
political variables like Michael Clark (1989:27-59) points out in his work: non-political 
decisions, bureaucratic procedures, continuations of previous policy, and sheer 
accident. Since the traditional approach lacks comparative advantages, it is more 
suited to single state analyses (McGovan, Cornelissen & Nel, 2006:129).  
Other than that, I might add two questions in requirement of FPA. What goals are set 
by the foreign policy? And what are consequences of foreign policy actions? Goals 
setting – there can be a grand goal and multiple foreign policy goals. A state or a non-
state actor must determine which goals. They might have multiple foreign policy goals. 
Which goal is reserved a priority. Assessment of consequences is often seen under 
the form of reports, special reports, evaluation meetings etc. in governmental level 
which will be served for the next foreign policy making process.  
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The comparative approach:  
The comparative foreign policy is one branch of the alternative approach. It started in 
the 1950s when the decision-making approach was introduced to foreign policy. Snyder 
et al. (1962) then suggested three components: decision, decision maker and the 
decision-making process.  This model based more on ‘empirical gereralisations’18. This 
was carried out by using social science techniques and comparative analyses, in the 
process, concentrating on models of foreign policy behaviors, quantitative methods, 
positivist methodologies and the use of event date to link foreign policy behaviour and 
ideal type of states. (McGovan, Cornelissen & Nel, 2006:129).  
White (1989:1-2) remarks about this approach as follows:  
….this approach views foreign policy as a series of decisions made by a group of 
decision-makers within the structured environment of the state, and not as a 
respond to external stimuli. The emphasis shifted from objective reality of the 
external environment to domestic sources of foreign policy and to the subjective 
perceptions decision-makers had of their environment19.  
Main contribution to this analytical framework are the scholars such as Snyder et al. 
(1962, Rosenau (1966), Brecher (1969, Wilkinson (1969), East et al. (1978) Wilkenfeld 
et al. (1980) and Carlnaes (1986). Generally, this generation attempted to show a 
framework, in which the system analysis of foreign policy (decision-making) is the basis 
of the framework. This also includes multi-varied and multi-level explanations of foreign 
policy behavior, action and events20. Nevertheless, this approach might not be a 
suitable one for the developing countries who have their own foreign policy issues and 
dynamics of foreign policy making. The small countries, in international politics, can not 
avoid the effects of superpower’s interactions. The Vietnam War (1956-1975), the 
Korean war (1953-1954) are the obvious evidences.  
          The critical approach 
The scholarship of the critical approach is more aware of the new trend in the 
international relations where such phenomenon should not be ignored: class and class 
conflict, the play of market and economic forces, the politics of dominance and 
                                                 
18
 Also explained in Mc Govan, P.J., Cornelissen, S., & Nel, P. (2006), eds. Power, Wealth and Global 
Equity: An Internatonal Relations Textbook for Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press, p.129 
19 This statement has also been cited in Mc Govan, P.J., Cornelissen, S., & Nel, P. (2006). Ibid.  
20
 See Mc Govan, P.J., Cornelissen, S., & Nel, P. (2006), p.131. Ibid. 
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exploitation produced by dependency relationship, feminism and its impacts.  Therefore 
the following alternative accounts are recommended: alliance behaviors, security 
dilemmas, deterrence, bargaining, integration, hegemons and challengers, 
dependency, imperialism, and core, semi-periphery and periphery relationships 
(McGovan, Cornelissen & Nel, 2006:131). According to Gerner (1995:70) “this 
approach represents a movement away from earlier attempts to build a grand theory 
that explain all aspects of foreign policy for all countries at all in time, towards more 
limited theories that are empirically grounded, culturally sensitive, and issue specific. 
The critical approach, however, still in its consolidation. In the new time of globalization, 
it is noteworthy to take into account that the decision making body is steadily effected 
by many non-governmental actors, civil societies or the media. 
             Examining grand strategy and its implications for foreign policy  
Alexander L. Vuving (2005) identifies other paradigms in foreign policy analysis when 
he suggested a close look at concept of “grand strategy” because “foreign policy is 
derived from grand strategy, which refers to the full package of a state’s domestic and 
foreign policies”. 21  
 
Vuving lists up the conventional explanation of foreign policy-making follows:  
1. source of international level: based on balance of power  
2. source on domestic level (regime and societal level): foreign policy is designed 
because of regime security and economic development  
3. Individual level: the role of leader’s personality (ruling elite)  
 
But he argues that these explanations of foreign policy-making are “mostly inadequate” 
and “mostly incoherent”22. He highlights it is necessary to see that grand strategy 
needs to answer four concrete questions:  
• Worldview: What is the nature of the world? 
• Self-perception: Who are we? 
• Ambitions: What do we want? 
• Strategic orientations: How to achieve our goals? 
 
It is obviously that Vuving concentrates much more on elite’s grand strategy rather than 
a state’s grand strategy. Vuving proves that the grand strategy of Vietnam is 
determined by interplay between two grand strategies which are based on different 
vision of the world. The foreign policy makers of Vietnam are therefore divided into 
                                                 
21
 Alexander L. Vuving (2005). Shaping of foreign policy: Vietnamese foreign policy after the cold war. 
Available at ……. 
22
 Vuving (2005) 
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two camps (those who are for the Anti-imperialist Grand Strategy and the others stand 
on the side of Grand Strategy of Modernization). A very interesting metaphor brought 
by Vuving that:  
Let us imagine foreign policy as a journey and the state as a ship. The 
Vietnamese ship has two captains with two different maps and two different 
destinations. These destinations are in themselves not incompatible. But in a 
situation when the key external resources necessary to domestic 
modernization are centered in the hands of the biggest capitalist powers, the 
goals of anti-imperialism conflict with those of modernization. As a result, the 
captains have to renegotiate their destinations. In fact, neither relinquishes his 
destination, but they agree on a compromised direction. The ship thus 
approaches neither of the shores the captains want it to land on. The captains’ 
dilemma is that if they want to reach their respective destination, they have to 
split their team (supposed that to split the ship is not an option), but if their 
team is divided up, a third party may take over the lead.” 
 
 (Vuving, 2005:193) 
 
For my observation, Vuving captures very essential character of Vietnamese political 
situation. This due to the fact the Vietnam is a totalitarian state, where the leading role 
of the Communist party is considered as central. The policy decision-making of 
Vietnam depends much on the ruling elites rather than others factors. But how should it 
be explained when the changes of Vietnamese foreign policy when Hanoi decided to 
joined ASEAN (1995) and joined WTO in (2006)? Is it only because of the will of the 
ruling elites of Vietnam or also influence of the external environment?  
It is always hard for foreign policy analysts to figure out which approach among these 
multiple choices should be selected. Because analysts often face difficulties in clarify 
their roles and responsibility. They often move back and forth between scholar 
community, policy-making community and think-thank community (Stuwart, 2008:578). 
My thesis is rather in an advocate of scholarly community. For the case of Vietnam, 
based on the above mentioned approaches, and considering this guidance “decision, 
behaviors, outcome” as a “red-thread”, the following questions should be taken into 
account by a foreign policy analyst when analyzing the Vietnamese grand strategy23:  
1. Why the particular grand strategy? (These include: Influence of International 
environment; Influence Domestic environment: economic status, ruling elites, 
think-thank, internet ect)  
2. Who makes the grand strategy? (ruling elites, State, Non-state actor?) 
3. What goals of the grand strategy? 
                                                 
23 These questions will be responded in details at the Chapter 6 of the thesis  
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2.3. The theories of International Relations (IR) 
 
IR as a field of study also has a ground - the “ground” means conceptualization of 
fundamental or foundational level at which phenomena of the field of study occur. In IR, 
all that occurs between nations or across nations is grounded in human decision-
makers, acting singly or a group (Hudson, 2007:3). It is necessary to grasp the main 
themes of the most influent IR theories which I hope to test these western perceptions 
in explaining the Vietnamese international relations towards other states. My question 
is what type of international relations theories which will conform to explain patterns of 
Vietnamese international relations since 1986?  
 
The main theories I choose to consider are: Realism and Neo-realism; Liberalism 
and Neo-liberalism, since they will shed much light on my latter analysis of Vietnam-
great powers relations. This summary bases mainly on the work on IR by Carlnaes 
Risse and Simmons (2001), Baylis and Smith (2005), Filzmaier, Gewessler, Höll and 
Mangott (2006). Thayer (2008) and Vuving (2006). 
 
2.3.1. Realism and Neo-realism 
 
Dunne and Schmidt (2005:161) remark that Realism is the dominant theory of 
international relations. Hans J. Morgenthau and E.H Carr are the earlier famous 
realists. In his work, Morgenthau (1948:25) argues that international politics, like all 
politics, is a struggle for power, he goes to great lengths to demonstrate the 
qualitatively different result this struggle has on international politics as compared to 
domestic politics. Morgenthau also highlighted the importance of “national interest” 
which can be seen as cornerstone in examining foreign policy of a state.  
 
Latter on, in any realist’s argument states overwhelm other actors in international 
politics. They are the principle actors in world politics, unitary and rational, regardless of 
its domestic political forms. But realists go even further when they claim that states are 
self-interested and how to pursue national interest always tops their national agenda. 
Security is the top concern and priority of states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993:46).  
 
Realism stresses the role of international system in determining states’ behaviours. In 
the condition of anarchy, (ie. The lack of a world government to maintain order and 
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settle disputes), no one can rely on others to protect their own security and sovereignty. 
Therefore, states must rely on power, seeking to maintain or even increase their power 
position to other states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 51).  
 
Offensive realists, most notably Mearsheimer (2001), even go further regarding the role 
of anarchical international system and aggressive nature of states as determining and 
conditioning states’ behaviours. That system in his viewpoint, is characterized by five 
assumptions: 1)states are the key actors in world politics and they operate in an 
anarchic system. 2) great powers invariably have some offensive military capability. 
3)states can never be certain whether other states have hostile attentions towards 
them. 4) great power place high premium or survival. 5, states are rational actors who 
are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival 
(Mearscheimer, 2001: 363). 
 
It is hard to say that Realism is perceived as a single coherent theory. Since in different 
period of time, the concepts of Realism varied differently. Dunne and Schmidt (2005) 
pose a question of “one Realism, or many?” They make a significant taxonomy of 
Realism as follows24:  
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 Cited from Dunne, T. & Schmidt, B.C. (2005). Realism. In Baylis, J., Smith, S. (eds.) (2005). The 
Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
P. 165 
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Different types of Realism basically are divided to classical Realism and structural 
Realism. Structural Realism divides into two camps: defensive and offensive Realism. 
We have recently seen the appearance of Neoclassical realists who attempt to bring 
individual and unit variation back to theory and Rational choice realists, who recognize 
the importance of international institutions (Dunne & Schmidt, 2005). For most 
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academics, neo-realist refers to Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International politics (1979). 
He claims that the structure of the international system is the key factor in shaping the 
behavior of states. The fundamental assumptions of Neo-realism can be summarized 
as follows25:  
 
 States and other actors in interact in an anarchic environment. 
This means that there is no central authority to enforce rules and 
norms or protect the interests of the larger global community.  
 States see all other states as potential enemies and threats to 
their national security. This distrust and fear creates a security 
dilemma, and motivates the policies of most states.  
 The structure of the system is a major determinant of actor 
behavior. 
 States are rational actors, selecting strategies to maximize 
benefit and minimize losses  
 States are self-interest oriented, and an anarchic and competitive 
system pushes them to favour self-help over cooperative 
behavior. 
 The most critical problem presented by anarchy is survival.  
 
To sum up, each independent sovereign state seeks to maximize their security and 
chances of survival which are compacted in the “national interest”. A former British 
Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston said: “We have no permanent allies, we have no 
permanent enemies, we only have permanent interests.” Cooperation between states 
should be explained as functional to maximize their security. States, according to most 
realists, are power-seeking rational actors and self-interested. To explain in another 
way, Dunne and Schmidt (2005) point out the essential Realism by describing the 
“three Ss”: Statism, Survival and Self-help26. Vu Duong Huan (2007) points out that it 
is noteworthy to use the assumptions of “realism” in examining Vietnamese foreign 
policy and foreign relations, whereby the concept of “national interest” plays an 
important role as a tool of analysis and essential factor in foreign policy making.  
 
There are certain critics on Realism and Neo-realism. These critics emphasize that in 
the time of globalization, there are prevalent types of international relations that are 
cooperative in nature. Both states and non-state actors are important and there exist 
the bi-directional influences of domestic and international politics in modern IR. States 
                                                 
25
 See Lamy, Steve L. (2005). “Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism” 
in: Baylis, J., Smith, S. (2004). The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to    International 
Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.210. 
26
 The „three Ss“emphasized by Dunne &Schmidt (2005:178). Ibid. 
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are neither universally rational actors or unitary. There are many complex concerns 
which states have to deal with and many of which do not concern power.  
 
2.3.2. Liberalism and Neo-liberalism  
 
Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham were two of the leading Liberals of the 
Enlightenment. Liberals pay much attention to organizational and institutional 
entities rather than states as main actors in international politics. While realists place 
high premium on violent change in world politics, liberals stress on the possibilities of 
peaceful change in international system. Their argument is grouped into three 
followings camps: 1) the democratic theory or the democratic liberalism, 2) the 
commercial liberalism based on the theory of economic interdependence. 3) the neo-
liberalism or the neo-liberal institutionalism (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 231-232).  
 
First, the democratic peace theory argues that democratic states never fight with each 
other. This argument is sharp contrast with realists, who claim that states will go to war 
regardless of its own regime type. Democratic liberals argue that peace is the longing 
of all mankind and in democratic societies; popular wills must be reflected in the states’ 
policies, so the public opinions may play a role of a break on any move toward 
international confrontation and outbreak of hostilities. 27 
 
Second, commercial liberals argue that the increase in economic changes will help 
enhance the possibility of peace in countries’ relationships for two main reasons: 1) as 
trade volume between countries grows, it will increase proportion of foreign factors in 
domestic national economy. Therefore, if these countries go to war against each other, 
it is likely that each economy will suffer more seriously. 2) the expansion of international 
economy makes it more costly for states to go to war. As economic interdependence 
increase there will be a disinclination to cut profitable economic ties28 
 
Third, neo-liberal institutionalists stress the importance of international institutions in 
affecting states’ behaviours. They claim that state’s actions depends, to a considerable 
degree, on existing institutional arrangements which affect 1) the flow of information 
                                                 
27
 For a thorough analysis of democratic peace theory, see Brown, Michael E/ Lynn-Jones, Sean M./ 
Miller, Steven E. (1996),”Debating the democratic peace: An International security Reader” (Eds). 
Cambridge: The MIT Press   
28 See analysis in Viotti and Kauppi (1993: 231), ibid.  
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and opportunities to negotiate; 2) the ability of government to monitor others’ 
compliance and to implement their own commitments-hence their ability to make 
credible commitment in the first place; and 3) prevailing expectations abut the solidity of 
international agreement (Keohane, 1989: 2).  
Basically, the core assumptions of neo-liberalism (neo-liberal Institutionalists) 
include29:  
 States are key actors in international relations, but not the only 
significant actors. States are rational or instrumental actors, 
always seeking to maximize their interests in all issue-areas 
 In this competitive environment, states seek to maximize 
absolute gains through cooperation. Rational behavior leads 
states to see value in cooperative behaviors. States are less 
concerned with gains and advantages achieved by other states in 
cooperative arrangements.  
 The greatest obstacle to successful cooperation is non-
compliance or cheating by states. 
 Cooperation is never without problem, but states will shift loyalty 
and resources to institutions if these are seen as mutually 
beneficial and they provide states with increasing opportunities to 
secure their international interests.   
 
In conclusion, the debate about realism and liberalism has been dominating 
mainstream in western international relations. They share many assumptions about 
actors, values, issues and power arrangements in the international system. Meanwhile, 
Neo-realists and neo-liberals study different worlds. Neo-realists study security issues 
and are concerned with issues of power and survival. Neo-liberals study political 
economy and focus in cooperation and institutions.  
 
2.3.3. Foreign policy strategic approaches  
 
In examining foreign policy of states, there has been long-lasting debate among 
scholars about how states in Asia Pacific region are responding to superpower (the 
United States), great power (European Union) and especially rising power like China 
and India. Which are strategic approaches a state might choose in dealing with them? 
Taking a reference on papers by Brawley (2004), Vuving (2006) and Thayer (2008), I 
would like to identify the foreign policy strategic approaches in the following 
summarized table: 
 
                                                 
29 See Lamy, Steve L. (2005). p.214 
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Theory of IR 
 
Choice of strategy 
 
Opponents of reactions 
External balancing  • Find allies or join weaker 
alliance against a potential 
adversary;  
• Strengthen oneself and one’s 
allies through trade, exclude 
enemies  
Internal balancing  • Strengthen oneself through 
economic development (self-
reliance, national cohesion)   
• Arm race  
Bandwagoning  • Develop ties with potential 
adversary (or dominant power)  
in order o ward off possible 
coercive measures 
• Involve in seeking economic 
gain by being on the ‘winning 
side’. 
Buck-passing  • Free ride -increase one’s wealth, 
not power in short run  
• Neutrality   
 
 
Realism  
Appeasement  • Make concessions meanwhile 
building oneself up for the long 
run  
Engagement  
 
 
 
 
Hedging 
• Opening up multifaceted 
relations with other states 
• state uses inclusion and 
rewards to attempt to socialize 
a dissatisfied power into 
accepting the rules and 
institutions of the pre-existing 
international order (Roy, 2005) 
• keeping more than one option 
open 
 
Liberalism  
 
 
Interdependence  
 
Omni-enmeshment  
• the process of engaging with a 
state so as to draw it into deep 
involvement in international or 
regional society upon economic 
interdependence and the 
interlocking of political interest 
• enveloping it in a web of 
sustained exchanges and 
relationships, with the long-term 
aim of integration: international 
institutions, supranational 
cooperation (Goh, 2007,2008) 
• regarding economic issues are 
classic security issues  
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Asymmetry  Deference • Weaker state  pursues its 
interests in a manner that 
corresponds to the stronger 
side’s superior status 
• Avoiding tensions, make 
concessions 
Socialist-
internationalism  
Solidarity  • Based on Marxism-Leninism 
ideology  
• Struggle between “socialism” 
and “imperialism” 
• Question of “who defeats 
whom?” 
• Who are friends and who are 
foes? 
 
Which strategic approaches in foreign policy Vietnam would choose in responding to 
the great powers: the U.S, China, the European Union, Russia, Japan and India? This 
above summary is a fundamental basis for identifying applicable approaches for the 
case of Vietnam. The responses will be in clarified details in the Chapter 7 of my 
thesis.   
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Chapter 3: Vietnam - a country profile 
 
3.1. A historical overview 
 
Looking at the map, Vietnam (in full name, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) is a 
country shaped like an enormous letter “S” total area of 331,688 km². It is almost the 
size of Germany. The country extends from the border of China in the north to the Cà 
Mau peninsula in the south with a distance of 1,650 km. Laos and Cambodia border it 
to the west. The coastline is 3,260 km long and the inland border is 4,510 km. Vietnam 
is also a transport junction from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. The population 
of Vietnam today is 86 millions. Vietnam is relatively homogenous, since 90% of the 
whole population are Kinh (Viet people) and the rest is enriched with diversity of 54 
ethnic groups. Because of historical reasons, Vietnamese population is exceptionally 
young, half of Vietnamese are under 30 years old30.  
Administratively, Vietnam is divided into 58 provinces “Tỉnh” and 5 centrally controlled 
municipalities (Thành phố trực thuộc trung ương): Hà Nội, Hồ Chí Minh, Hải Phòng, ðà 
Nẵng, Cần Thơ. Those cities have the same level as provinces. Provinces are 
subdivided into provincial municipalities (Thành phố trực thuộc tỉnh), Townships (Thị 
xã), counties (Huyện) and then further subdivided on to towns (Thị trấn) or communnes 
(Xã). The centrally controlled municipalities are divided into districts (Quận) and then 
subdivided into wards (Phường). 
 
This following brief overview would not be enough for studying about important topic of 
a country’s history. However, it attempts to convey some sense of historical momentum 
which strongly related to the Vietnam’s present. It will look at the early history until the 
country’s unification in 1975. 
 
3.1.1. Early history and the Chinese conquest 
Vietnam’s history is a long and fascinating one, with the oldest archaeological findings 
showing that civilization there existed as far back as the Bronze Age31. The early 
Vietnamese people of the Red delta area may have been among the first East Asians 
                                                 
30 Datas can be found in the website of  General Statistic Office of Vietnam: 
http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=494&itemid=2030 
31
 See also confirmed information by Duiker (1995). Vietnam: Revolution in Transition. Boulder/San 
Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press. p. 15  
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to practice agriculture. According to ðại Việt Sử ký toàn thư (Dai Viet’s great 
History)32, among the southernmost of the Viet peoples who were called Lac Viet who 
lived in the area of Red River delta. The Lac Viet united other Viet peoples in order to 
establish small state called Au Lac with its capital in Co Loa, belongs to the city of 
Hanoi. The state Au Lac was derived from a semimythical Hồng Bàng dynasty, which 
has ruled over an ancient kingdom of Van Lang for more than two thousand years, 
beginning in 2878 B.C. 
Vietnam's early history is characterized by a nearly continuous struggle for autonomy. 
Its history runs with rampant with numbers of dynasties, these included Văn Lang, Âu 
Lạc nation, Champa Nation, Ngô Dynasty, ðinh Dynesty, Pre-Lê Dynasty, Lý 
Dynesty, Trần Dynesty, Hồ Dynesty, Later Trần Dynesty, Lê Sơ Dynesty, Tây Sơn 
Dynesty, Nguyễn Dynesty. For entire millennium (111 B.C.- 938 A.D. The country had 
been struggling with different periods of Chinese dominations. Nevertheless, the 
Chinese rule had not been able to discard the will of the Vietnamese. Revolts 
constantly took place to strive for independence, and to pull out the foreign invaders.  
The Chinese conquest had lasting consequences for Vietnam. Duiker (1995:18) 
remarks the Chinese assimilation efforts as follows: 
…Vietnam exposed to a concentrated policy of political and cultural   
assimilation. The Chinese written language was introduced and became the 
official language of assimilation and literary expression. Chinese rituals and 
customs replaced the relatively informal social mores practiced by the local 
Vietnamese. The Confucian classics became the foundation of the educational 
system in Vietnam. Chinese art, architecture, and music were imported and 
served as models for Vietnamese creative workers.  
3.1.2. From French colonialists to Vietnam War  
 
External control was imposed once again in the 19th century, when Vietnam was 
occupied by the French. France stopped Vietnam in its tracks and replaced the 
distant order of the Chinese empire with the intrusive presence of colonists, 
missionaries, and solders. French occupation made Vietnam as being fully exploited. 
                                                 
32
 ðại Việt Sử ký toàn thư (Dai Viet’s great History) (2003). Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản văn hóa-thông tin 
(Culture and Information Publishing House). Band 1.  
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Anti-colonial sentiment began to emerge. After a tradition of centuries of tough 
resistance to the invasion of the north, the Vietnamese did not accept the new rule of 
the West. At the same time Vietnam faced the serious internal problem: the internal 
division and tensions within the ruling elites, the peasant unrest because of official 
corruption and concentration of land in the hands of the wealthy. 
 
In 1930 the revolutionary Ho Chi Minh formed an Indochinese Communist party. The 
party was at a significant juncture in the colonial era. In 1940, however, Japan 
demanded and received the right to place Vietnam under military occupation, 
restricting the local French administration to figurehead authority. Under Japanese 
occupation, Vietnamese farmers had to work hard to produce rice and grain stores to 
serve the Japanese army. The result was the Tonkin famine of 1943-1945 which 
made more than one million people die of hunger in the north. The Vietminh (short for 
Việt Nam ðộc lập ðồng minh Hội, or League for the Independence of Vietnam) 
emphasized moderate reform and national independence. Viet Minh’s efforts were to 
control famine in late 1945. They led the August Revolution with strong support of the 
Vietnamese people and when the Japanese surrendered to the Allies in August 1945, 
Vietminh forces arose throughout Vietnam and declared the country’s independence 
in Hanoi in 2nd September 1945.33 
 
The French, however, were unwilling to concede independence and in October drove 
the Vietminh and other nationalist groups out of the south. The first Indochina War 
broke out in December 1946. The United States feared of the spread of communism 
following by the Truman’s doctrine and had backed up the French in this war. France 
was then decisively defeated in Dien Bien Phu (1954) and the Geneva Accords left 
Vietnam a division at the 17th Parallel into North and South. By this time, the US 
replaced France to strongly support any anti-communist government. In Saigon, Ngo 
Dinh Diem, a catholic, anti-communist politician replaced Bao Dai, the last King of 
Vietnam. With constant financial aids and military support by the US, Diem refused to 
hold general election and committed to destroy Communist influence in the South. 
Meanwhile, the Democratic Republic Vietnam under leadership of Ho Chi Minh 
attempted to build up the North under the Model of Soviet Union and with continuous 
support of China.     
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 See Thai Khac Vien. Vietnam. p. 242  
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Diem’s regime was run under nepotism, corrupted and suppressed religious groups, 
faced with the failure of social and economic programs. At this time, Communists 
decided it was time to resume their revolutionary war to unify the country. In the fall of 
1963, Diem was overthrown and killed in a coup launched by his own generals.  
 
Motivated by Einsenhower’s Domino theory, US president Lyndon Johnson chose to 
prevent the collapse of the Saigon regime. In 4th August 1964, after Tonkin Gulf’s 
event, the U.S. President Lyndon Johnson approved regular intensive bombing of 
North Vietnam and sent officially the U.S. combat troops into the South of Vietnam. 
 
The northern Vietnamese army under direction of General Vo Nguyen Giap sent 
regular units through Ho Chi Minh’s trails to support the revolutionary Viet Cong (the 
southern Communists). The Tet-offensive was a shock to the new Saigon regime and 
led Johnson administration to a negotiated settlement since they faced sharp critics 
and distrust inside and anti-war movements in many countries in the world. New U.S. 
president Richard Nixon gradually withdrew U.S. troops from Vietnam and start 
“Vietnamization of the war”. In January 1973 the war temporarily came to an end with 
the signing of a peace agreement in Paris. The settlement provided for the total 
removal of remaining U.S. troops, while Hanoi tacitly agreed to accept the Nguyen 
Van Thieu regime in preparation for new national elections. The agreement, however, 
soon fell apart. In early 1975 the Communists continued to launch a military offensive. 
In six weeks, the resistance of the Thieu regime collapsed, and in 30th April 1975 the 
capital of the south, Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese.  
In 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was born with unification of the North and 
the South. In the region, border tension with the Communist government in Cambodia 
escalated. Vietnam’s insistence on the “unshakeable militant solidarity” of Indochina 
was taken as a threat by Cambodia. And clearly Vietnam had to choose between the 
Soviet Union and China now that the necessity of military co-sponsorship was 
passed34. In 1979, Vietnam was itself attacked by its Communist neighbor and former 
benefactor, China. China experienced the last war in 1949, but forgot that Vietnam 
had just fresh stepped out a long  struggle with the U.S. Chinese military attack in the 
north of Vietnam aimed to “teach Hanoi a lesson” but China itself learnt this time for 
his own a lesson. Vietnam’s military presence in Cambodia last from 1979 to 1989 
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 Womack, Brantly (2006). China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. Cambridge University Press. 
p.75 
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and may have been necessary but was not regarded as a heroic act.35 For the 
Vietnamese side, “illusion of victory” was dominant. The Political Report of the Central 
Committee remarked with “striking characteristics: collective mastery. Labor zeal, 
socialist partriotism, and proletarian internationalism”36. This “victory illusion” was later 
considered as partly reasons of severe economic and social problems in the postwar 
time. Explaining this situation, Ashwill and Thai (2005) write: “A two-thousand-year 
history of foreign invasion, occupation, and wars have deeply influenced the 
Vietnamese character. The Chinese, French, and U.S. Americans have all left their 
cultural thumbprints behind, but at the same time the struggle against those who would 
impose their will on Vietnam has infused in the Vietnamese people a fierce spirit of 
nationalism, ready to defend themselves if necessary and caution in their dealings with 
foreigners.” 
No country in South East Asia has a long history of suffering from different hard-fought 
wars like Vietnam. The country went through different foreign interventions (China, 
Japan, France, the USA etc), but the Vietnamese people have never given up resisting 
and struggling for their national liberation and independence. The smoke of bombing 
and gunfire ceased almost more than thirty years ago, Vietnam nowadays still struggle 
with its scars in the past and faces with new challenges of “soft attacks”37 in the 
process of national building and development in the era of globalization.  
 
3.2. Political system of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam  
 
“Vietnam is one of few surviving communist party-states…Other important forces, the 
government, the army and the bureaucracy, are all subordinate to it”. (Ford and 
Goldstone, 1995:99). Kerkvliet (2001: 268) reviews that political system of Vietnam by 
using the term “dominating state” with the core role of the Communist Party of Vietnam. 
Thayer (1995) calls Vietnamese political system as “a mono-organizational socialism” 
where the party exercises hegemonic control over state institutions, the armed forces 
and other organizations in society through the penetration of these institutions by 
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party cells and committees38. Although Vietnam remains a single-party state, for most 
Vietnamese leaders and people, economic development is more important than 
ideological orthodoxy. The foreign policy after the long war-torn time is rather for the 
motive of “first food and then democracy”39. 
 
The current political system of Vietnam composes of such institutions as the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), the State comprises of political organizations: the 
National Assembly, the Government, the State president, the People’s army of Vietnam 
and mass associations. I try to sum up this system in the diagram 3 40 and attempt to 
explain briefly about each of them: 
 
3.2.1. The Communist Party of Vietnam (ðảng cộng sản Việt Nam)  
 
In fact, until 1988, there was more than one party existing in Vietnam, beside the 
Communist Party of Vietnam, there were the Socialist Party (SPV) and the Democratic 
Party (DPV) but in October 1988, these two Parties became part of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (CPV). 
 
The CPV was established on 3 February 1930 and has been the only leading force in 
the country since the unification of North and South of Vietnam. With more than 4 
millions members41, the CPV holds Party Congress every five years to outline the 
country's overall direction and future course as well as to formalize policies and direct 
government policy on a day-to-day basis. Democratic centralism is the principle 
governing the organization and activity of the CPV. The Politburo includes 14 
members is elected by the Central Committee (150 members), generally at the Party 
Congress. The present General Secretary was elected at the 10th Party Congress in 
2006 is Mr. Nông ðức Mạnh.  
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The organizational structure of the CPV is established in line with the State 
administrative apparatus from Central level to provincial, city, district, and communal 
levels as well as in administrative bodies, schools, enterprises, 
political/social/professional organizations, army units and police forces. The Party cells 
are the Party's grassroots foundations42. 
Oskar Weggel (2007)43 writes about the CPV as:  
 
Politik des dreifachen Nein“ (kein Meinungspluralismus, keine  
Oppositionspartei, keine formelle Opposition). 
 
Since its foundation, the CPV has held 10 National congresses. Looking back at 
Vietnam’s history, one can not deny its leading role in national liberation and national 
defense: It was the CPV who successfully led the Vietnamese people in the August 
Revolution to defeat the Japanese to declare national independence in 2 September 
1945; the defeat of French in Diện Biên Phủ to terminate completely brutal colonialism 
lasted over 100 years in Vietnam. And it was also the CPV who mobilized people of 
different forces to strive for unification of the North and South in the fight over 20 years 
against the USA and the US-backed South Vietnamese regime. Due to this historical 
achievement, the CPV gains its legitimacy. Fforde and Goldstone remarks:  
 
In many ways, Vietnam is a special case among the surviving communist 
regimes. Unlike the personality-based regimes of Cuba and North Korea, it has 
a long commitment to the system of collective leadership which has survived 
intact through years of war and often unpopular social experiment. Unlike its 
Chinese counterpart it has not been discredited by turning on itself or turning the 
army on the people. Like China and Cuba, among the other survivors, the party 
has its indigenous roots. It achieved power not under the auspices of the Red 
army but through a war of national liberation. At present it has no rival for power. 
  
    (Fforde and Goldstone,1995:100) 
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Diagram 3: The political system of Vietnam  
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The collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern block, additionally the interior economic 
crisis have been very important factors in “waking” up the country from long sleeping 
with victory. Changes have been seen in different directives and policies since the 5th 
National Congress of the CPV, the 6th congress was considered as a turning point 
when ðổi mới (economic reform) has been introduced44. What about political reform? 
This question has been since then posed. The evidence has shown that the 
Vietnamese state has been turned from “hard authoritarian to “soft-authoritarian” 
(Thayer, 2009)45. This means the “rule of law” is put in the discussion and slowly in 
practice: see article 4 of Constitution 1992 and different administration reform in 
Vietnam46. 
Vietnam has had four constitutions, adopted in 1946, 1960, 1980 and 1992. In Article 4, 
Chapter I of the 1980 Constitution state that “The Communist Party of Vietnam, the 
vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, the faithful representative of the rights and 
interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole nation, acting upon the 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh's thought, is the force leading the State and 
society”. What is new in the 1992 constitution was redefining the relationship between 
party and state, in which state institutions have greater autonomy and the party is to be 
subject to the law. “The CPV is now “the leading force of the state and society. All Party 
organizations operate within the framework of the Constitution and the law.”47. 
3.2.2. The state system 
 
Vietnam is a single-party state, where Party subscribes to Marxist-Leninist and Ho Chi 
Minh Thought - a communist state. Not like “the personality-based communist regimes 
of North Korea and Cuba, the Vietnamese regime is characterized by a long 
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commitment to collective leadership48. It means that highest guideline-makers are in 
the Politburo comprised of 14 members who are elected from the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party (160 members). Though there is certain overlap between 
Party and Government, there have been substantial changes in Politburo, the Central 
committee and the Secretariat since the Party has renovated its organization and 
elements of the governing structure such as the National Assembly (Parliament) is 
now more open for comments and contestation. (Dixon, 2004:20). This positive 
change is also remarked in the “Evaluation of European Commission’s cooperation 
with Vietnam (2009):  
 
While decisions made by the politburo still have the power of law to a great 
extent, a more assertive National Assembly is emerging, and the pressure on 
the party and ministers to be more accountable is growing.49 
 
The state system of Vietnam is divided into central level (The National Assembly 
(Quốc hội), the State president (Chủ tịch nước), the Government (Chính phủ), the 
Supreme people’s court (Tòa án nhân dân tối cao), the Supreme people’ Procuracy 
(Viện kiểm sát nhân dân tối cao) and the local level: municipalities/provinces, district 
/county and   communes/wards. 
 
3.2.2.1. The National Assembly (Quốc Hội) 
 
The National Assembly (Parliament), as “highest organ of state power”50 which 
includes 493 members (elected to the 12th Congress of National Assembly in 2007), 
meets twice a year. The National Assembly (NA) elects the President (head of state), 
the Prime Minister (head of government), the Chief Justice of the Supreme People's 
Court of Vietnam, the Head of the Supreme People's Procuracy of Vietnam (or 
'Supreme People's Office of Supervision and Inspection'), and the 21-member Cabinet 
(the executive). However, the CPV has great influence over the executive and 
exercises control. 90 percent of the National Assembly members are party members. 
                                                 
48
 Evaluation of European Commission’s Cooperation with Vietnam (2009)-Volume 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2009/1269_vol2_en.pdf 
 
49
 Evaluation of European Commission’s Cooperation with Vietnam (2009)-Volume 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2009/1269_vol2_en.pdf 
50
 Comfirmed in Article 5 of the Constitution of S.R.Vietnam, available at website of the National 
Assembly of Vietnam 
http://www.na.gov.vn/htx/English/C1479/default.asp?Newid=24766#R8IuJNsp1NDm 
 48 
Members of the party hold all senior government positions. The recent survey also 
shows that 473 members of National Assembly have graduated higher education51. In 
the Mid-1980s, 90% of army officers and about one-third of the rank and file are 
estimated to be party members (Fford and Goldstone, 1995:99). 
 
Basically, the NA has the following functions52:  
• The Legislative function: draw up, adopt and amend the constitution and to make 
and amend laws; define the functions of the People’s Councils and People’s 
Committees (the local government entities), the Supreme People’s Court, and the 
Supreme People’s Organs of Control. 
• The function of deciding the important issues of the Nation: the NA makes 
decision on the socio-economic development plans of the country; on the national 
financial and monetary policies and on the estimates of the national revenue and 
expenditure plans. It also decides the State budget, approves the national revenue 
and expenditure balance of account, and levies, amends and abolishes taxes.  
• The supervision function: The National Assembly exercises the supreme power 
of supervision over all activities of the State.  
There has been significant change in the 10th National Congress in 2006 when the first 
time in history, the CPV accepted 10% of non-party members. Among those are 
businessmen and businesswomen. The principle of the NA is that the composition the 
National Assembly based on the structure which reflects of gender, ethnic affiliation, 
occupation or regional origin. Since 2002, 26% of her seats for women and 17% of the 
seats reserved for to the representatives of ethnical minorities. Remarks about the NA 
of Vietnam, Dr. Willibold Frehner53 remarks that:  
In Vietnam gibt es noch keine echte Gewaltenteilung und damit noch keine 
Demokratie nach westlichem Verständnis. Lange war die vietnamesische 
Nationalversammlung lediglich ein weiteres Organ, das getroffene 
Entscheidungen der KPV formell absegnete.“ 
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…. 
 
„Obwohl die KPV noch immer der dominierende Akteur im politischen System 
Vietnams ist, hat die Nationalversammlung eine zunehmend wichtigere Rolle 
im politischen Entscheidungsprozess eingenommen. Gerade was ihre 
legislative Funktion angeht, hat sie an Bedeutung gewonnen. Sie hat in 
jüngster Vergangenheit aber auch ihre Kontrollfunktion über die Ministerien 
aktiver wahrgenommen. Trotzdem braucht Vietnam weitere Veränderungen im 
politischen Bereich und dringend eine weitere und fundierte Unterstützung bei 
der Professionalisierung der Nationalversammlung. 
 (Frehner, 2007) 
3.2.2.2. The State President (Chủ tịch nước)  
 
The State President is the Head of State but the functions of the President often 
ceremonial. The President is elected by the National Assembly from among its deputies 
to represent the Socialist Republic of Vietnam internally and externally.  
According to Article 103 of the 1992 Constitution, the President has major executive 
and legislative power54:  Has overall command of the armed forces and holds the office 
of Chairman of the National Defense and Security Council; Appoints or proposes the 
appointment of, releases from duty, dismisses the Vice-Presidents, Prime Minister, 
Chief Judge of the Supreme People's Court, Head of the Supreme People's Procuracy. 
In many discussion of the NA, a question has been posed that should the General 
Secretary of the CPV, in the future, also holds the task of the State President like in 
China? This question will be carefully discussed in the next National Congress of the 
CPV in the year 2011. Since Vietnam learns much from China from its political system, 
this is possibly feasible.   
3.2.2.3. The Government (Chính Phủ)  
 
The Government is the executive organ of the National Assembly, and the supreme 
state administrative agency of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
The Government is in charge of tasks assigned by the State in the fields of politics, 
socio-economy, national defense, security and external relations; maintains effective 
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operation of the State apparatus from the central to grassroots levels; ensures the 
respect for, and implementation of the Constitution and laws; promotes the people’s 
sense of mastery in national defense and construction; ensures stability and improves 
the people’s material and spiritual life55. 
Components of the Government are: Prime Minister who is elected by the National 
Assembly at the State President’s request. Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng was 
elected since 2006. There are 5 Deputy Prime Ministers, and 22 Ministers and Heads 
of ministerial-level agencies. 
Under the central level, there are local authorities. They are divided 64 provincial and 
cities operated under provincial People’s councils and People’s committee, Chairman 
of People’s Committee. The local authorities also include district and communes/wards 
level. 
3.2.2.4. Vietnam People’s Army (Quân ñội Nhân Dân Việt Nam)  
There is rarely an army force in the region who plays very significant role in history of 
national liberation and development like Vietnam People’s Army (VPA). About the VPA, 
the Communist Party of Vietnam remarks in its resolutions as follows: 
Time will pass but the victory of our people in the anti-US war of resistance for     
national salvation will forever be recorded as one of the most brilliant chapters in 
our national history and as a shining symbol of the total triumph of revolutionary 
heroism and human intellect. It will go down in world history as a great exploit of 
the 20th century and an event of enormous international importance marked by a 
profound epochal character.  
 (Resolution of the Fourth National Congress of the CPV, 1976)  
The VPA was found in December 1944. It was first called as the People’s Liberation 
Armed Forces. During the First Indochina War (1946-1954) it was often referred as Việt 
Minh. Later, in the Vietnam War against USA (1956-1975), the army was referred to 
North Vietnamese Army. The main forces of the VPA include ground forces (including 
VPA Strategic Rear Forces and Border Defense Forces), navy, air force, and the 
Vietnamese People's Coast Guard. The regional or local force comprised infantry 
companies, and the militia/defense force which is organized along with administrative 
lines or economic lines (commune, factory, work site). As in other socialist countries, 
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the VPA structure is fully integrated into system of control: the state and the communist 
party. At the head of the state are the Ministry of Defense, the National Defense 
Council, the Office of Commander in Chief and five military directorates.  
 
The constitution 1992 recognizes the VPA as the backbone “to defend the 
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the homeland, national 
security and social order and safety, to defend the socialist regime and the gains of the 
revolution, and to join the entire people in building the country”56. 
 
Historically, the VPA did not meet many criteria of a “professional” army, but it was 
absolutely world famous for its guerilla tactics and its profound triumphs in national 
defense. These have been illustrated by the wars against France (1946-1954), 
subsequent wars against the United States and Ngo Dinh Diem regime (1956-1975), 
and the military conflicts with Cambodia and China (1977-1989). General Võ Nguyên 
Giáp was the first Commander and commander-in-chief of VPA and the fourth Minister 
of National Defence. He was principle commander in one of historically significant battle 
in ðiện Biên Phủ (1954). ðiện Biên Phủ victory make complete end to 100 years of 
French colonialism in Vietnam. 
The VPA has so far remained one of the few armies in Southeast Asia that has not 
engaged in bloody suppression of domestic political forces to buttress incumbent 
governments like the case in Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar. Its record is far better 
than its Chinese counterpart (Vasavakul, 2001). 
Vasavakul (2001:338) argues that since Vietnam adopted the policy of ðổi mới (reform) 
since 1986, the VPA’s contribution to state building has shifted from national 
reunification and defense to maintaining domestic stability and promoting “socialist 
oriented” market economic development. Nevertheless, I am still convinced that the 
VPA plays an influence political role in the system, especially, when sustained disputes 
between China and Vietnam in the East Sea and border issues, the fear of sovereign 
lost would make Vietnam increase their military strength more than ever. This would be 
further analyzed in the part Vietnam-China relation. In the time of knowledge economy, 
the VPA, like many other armies must seek way to up-grade its quality but not quantity. 
It attempts to pursue the principles of “Khôn Khéo” (skillfull) and “Mềm dẻo” (supple or 
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flexible). Force should be avoided, and if it had to be used it should be limited in scale 
(Tran Minh Thiet, 1997 & Nguyen Kim Ton 1997).  
3.2.3. Mass organisations (Các tổ chức quần chúng)  
Civil society was not a familiar concept to Vietnamese context but mass 
organizations. Because of different historical background, the name mass 
organizations became significant in political system.  
Thayer (2009)57 emphasizes the functions of the political civil society: 
Political civil society refers to non-violent political, advocacy labour and 
religious organizations and movements that seek to promote human rights, 
democratization and religious freedom in authoritarian states. The term 
“political” has been included to capture the activist nature of civil society in 
Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s when citizens became active in 
creating organizations outside of state control in order to influence the 
conditions in which they lived, including political pressure on the state. 
 (Thayer, 2009:1-2)  
Yet, the perceptions of civil society by foreign scholars are different with those about 
civil society in Vietnam. Mass organizations in Vietnam would not be understood as a 
purely independent civil society. They have traditional role of “mobilizing mass” in 
doing certain activities. These organizations played an important role in the struggle for 
national salvation. In the new cause of renovation, industrialization and modernization, 
they have continued to contribute to the implementation of the Party’s guidelines and 
the Government’s policies58. Obviously, the CPV still have strong influence in these 
mass organizations. But since introduction of reform (ðổi mới), they have been given 
an opportunity to effectively achieve poverty reduction (Sakata, 2004).    
 
The mass organizations Vietnam are divided into two types:  
 
• Social-political organizations: The Vietnam Fatherland Front (Mặt trật tổ quốc Việt 
Nam)-is an umbrella organization; Labor Confederation (Liên ñoàn Lao ñộng Việt 
Nam); Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (ðoàn Thanh niên Cộng sản Hồ Chí 
Minh), Vietnam Students Association (Hội Sinh viên Việt Nam), Women’s 
Association (Hội Liên hiệp Phụ nữ Việt Nam); Veteran’s Association (Hội Cựu 
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Chiến binh); Farmer’s Association (Hội Nông dân Việt Nam); Vienam Writter’s 
Association (Hội nhà văn Việt Nam) etc. These organizations usually have very 
strong network, a four-layered organizational structure from central, provincial, 
district, to commune level in order to effectively transmit decisions and instructions 
made at the central level. 
 
• Socio-economic organizations: Economic institutions, The Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (VCCI), Vocational training institutes, Vietnam Young 
Entrepreneurs Association (Hội doanh nghiệp trẻ Việt Nam), Non-profit 
organizations etc.  
According to CIVICUS (2005)59 Civil society has been defined as the arena outside of 
the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common 
interests. In Vietnam, civil society is broad and open, and it emphasizes the fuzzy 
borders between civil society and the various sectors, which is of central importance 
in a country like Vietnam where the associational sector closely interacts with the 
state. Norlund (2007) is right when she describes that civil society in Vietnam is not 
separate from the state, as some definitions suggest. It also aims to take account of 
the functions of organizations rather than their forms, which is to say that it includes 
any efforts to support activities and values promoting the well-being of the citizens 
through charity, philanthropy or other means. The definition is broader and more 
flexible than others that only include organizations or associations as the core of civil 
society because informal groups and coalitions are also counted. This expands the 
definition of civil society beyond a purely associational sector to include broader 
activities “to advance common interests”60. 
The fuzzy boundary of civil society is illustrated by Irene Nørlund (2007) as follows: 
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If making comparison with the outset of civil society mentioned by Thayer (2009), a 
question is raised that whether the civil society model can apply to Vietnam, a country 
strongly influenced by Confucianism and based on highly centralized political system, 
whether this is likely to be a force for political change in Vietnam. Dalton and Nhu 
Ngoc (2003), by their number of surveys and sophisticated analysis have come to 
conclusion that:  
 
…. our findings suggest that the social capital syndrome--high levels of group 
activity and high levels of social trust occurring together--that is found in long-
term democracies is not as clearly apparent in Vietnam. Perhaps, as the 
residue of the political mobilization of the past, levels of social capital and 
social trust are relatively high among the Vietnamese public, especially in 
comparison to nations at the same level of economic development. But it is not 
necessarily the same individuals who are active and who are trustful. Instead, 
participation in relatively more autonomous groups in a non-democratic setting 
may instill caution toward others because participants realize their values may 
be inconsistent with the dominant social and political paradigms. 
           (Russel J. Dalton & Nhu-Ngoc T. Ong, 2003) 
 
Thayer (2009:22) argues that it is a misleading when Vietnamese “nongovernmental 
organizations” are identified with civil society because Vietnamese NGOs are largely 
extensions of the state. And they are often excluded when they advocate democratic 
political change.  
This preceding argument reflects, however, partly about the situation of Vietnamese 
society. For my point of view, mass organizations in Vietnam play very important role 
in the past in national defense. In the new time, they make not only significant 
contribution in national poverty reduction61 and economic development, but also, in a 
long run, considered as contributive factors in making State adjust foreign policy and 
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democratization process of the country.62 Even in some cases policies were initiated 
from below, with the party-state following the lead of the people (Koh, 2001b:285). 
 
…the Vietnamese political system as a normal one in which objectives and   
understanding of the issues by leading personalities, competition for leadership 
positions, advocacy of particular goals of social and state institutions, 
hierarchical process and expressions of interest by various social groups, all has 
role to play.  
  (Dang Phong and Beresford, 1998:1) 
3.3. Summary 
 
Clearly, the Vietnamese system is characterized by some substantial contradictions; in 
some areas, there are signs of dysfunctionality. However, it would be dangerous to 
suggest that these issues can only be addressed by moves towards some form of 
Western-style multiparty democratic system. The Party-state is well aware of its own 
internal problems and contradictions, and many well proved capable of containing or 
resolving them (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001: 23-4, 125)63. 
   
Talking about political changes, Vietnam researchers like Gainsborough (2002:707), 
Ljunggren (1993:29-30), suggest a likely prospect that political change come from 
within institutions of the state rather than through the ‘assertive rise of civil society’. 
It means its democratization will be carried out within the existing system. Vietnam 
might yet adopt a less authoritarian, less centralized and more responsive version of 
the Singaporean single-party system (Dixon, 2004: 26).  
 
Many studies see the Vietnamese political system and state structures as changed 
almost beyond recognition since the beginning of the reform process (Fforde & Adam, 
1995:100). As a result of reforms, the Vietnamese state has become more or less 
unified and authoritarian, and has been depicted as multifaceted, multisegmented, and 
multilayered, featuring significant local power structures and inconsistencies (Heng, 
2001; Koh, 2001: 291). Overall, Vietnamese state is recognized as “liberalizing” but not 
fully “democratizing” (Thayer, 2009:63) 
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Chapter 4: Vietnam’s foreign policy in the Cold War 
 
 
Since my thesis focuses much on Foreign policy after 1986. This part, based on 
previous analysis by other authors, will present overall foreign policy of Vietnam and 
some main characteristics of international relations between Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union, the USA and China during the cold war. I have no ambition of going through the 
whole history of the Vietnamese foreign relations in this period, since there have been 
enormous numbers of publications about Vietnam War and Vietnamese policy 
behaviours to the great powers64. However, in order to give a background for coming 
analysis, I rather try to highlight the significant implications of Vietnam towards these 
mentioned States.  
 
The cold war started after the Second World War since 1945 and continued until 
1980s. For over 40 years, the confrontations between two superpowers, the USA and 
the USSR in all spheres spread throughout the world. It was political, strategic, 
economic, cultural and ideological struggles, except direct military confrontation 
between the two powers. Instead, numbers of “client states”, or sometimes they are 
called “satellite states” were set up to fight for their beliefs. Proxy war, nuclear arms 
race, propaganda, and economic and technological competitions etc. were the follow-
up exposures. The most notable result was Korean War (1950-1953), Vietnam War 
(1956-1975) and the War in Afghanistan (1980-1989). The Cold war dominated 
international affairs and at the meantime, domestic and foreign policies of every state 
were affected by this bipolarity world order. And Vietnam was not an exception. 
 
4.1. Some remarks on Vietnam’s foreign policy in the cold 
war  
 
Vietnamese foreign policy during 1950 to 1986 is basically characterized as follows:  
 
• Period 1950-1975 
In this period, foreign policy of Vietnam was determined with an ideological perception 
that the world is divided into “two distinct camps”. The Democratic camp headed by 
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the Soviet Union and comprised the socialist countries in Europe and Asia. The other 
camp was headed by USA, “ringleader of imperialism”65. This contradiction between 
socialism and imperialism could only be solved by a struggle “who will win” (ai thắng 
ai). Also like China, Vietnamese leaders looked at the world in terms of four 
fundamental contradictions66: 
  
1. The contradiction between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp; 
2. The contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist 
countries; 
3. The contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialists; 
4. The contradiction among imperialist countries and among monopoly capitalist 
group. 
 
 Following this perception, Vietnam adopted a framework which the CPV called “three 
revolutionary currents” (Ba dòng thác Cách Mạng)67. Vietnam decided to be ally of 
Soviet Union and considered as one of their “cornerstones”68. In its foreign policy, 
Vietnamese policy makers had to clarify, who is “friend” and who is “enemy”. Ideology 
decided the strategy.  
 
Vietnamese foreign policy was to serve to achieve this goal: National defense, 
national liberation and national reunification. The determination of the Vietnamese 
people was manifested in Ho Chi Minh’s declaration that “Vietnam is one, the 
Vietnamese nation is one. Rivers may run dry, mountains may wear out, but that truth 
will never change” and “even if we have to burn the whole Truong Son Range, we will 
do it for national independence”69. Diplomacy was considered as important as military 
struggle.70  
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• Period 1975-1985 
 
The victory of 30.4.1975 has brought unification of North and South Vietnam. Vietnam 
shifted to a new phase, national reconstruction. The 24th Plenum of the CPV adopted 
a resolution which defined the direction of the country as follows:  
The revolution in Vietnam has shifted to a new phase from war to peace, from 
half of   the country being separated and dominated by neo-colonialism to all the 
country being independent and unified, from having two strategic tasks-national 
and people’s democratic revolution and socialist revolution- to having only one 
strategic task-socialist revolution and socialist construction.71  
 
In this period, it is noteworthy to see that realism dominated Vietnamese foreign 
relations. “Classes struggle” is still considered by the CPV as a continuous one. 
“Hanoi’s leader also viewed Indochina as strategic entity and sought to develop an 
integrated alliance system with Laos and Cambodia.” (Thayer, 1999:2). Split between 
The USSR and China brought about much of difficulties in balancing policy for the 
Block members. Vietnam continued to regard Soviet Union “cornerstones” and applied 
the policy of “nhất biên ñảo” (leaning to one side). Vietnam expected to receive as 
much political, economic and military support from the Soviet Union. Due to “neglect” 
reaction of Vietnam toward China and the practiced policy toward Cambodia, Vietnam 
was then isolated from many other countries. 
 
4.2. Vietnam and the great powers in the Cold War  
 
4.2.1. Vietnam - Soviet Union relations  
 
The Soviet Union has played a very significant role in the CPV affairs and also in 
Vietnam War. From 1950s to 1960s, the relationship of the two countries was regards 
as “comrades and brothers”. The Soviet Union sent both military and economical 
assistance to Vietnam. This was due to the fact that both Vietnam and the USSR 
shared the same ideological standpoint: Against imperialism. For Vietnam, the support 
of the allies like Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries made an important 
contribution in struggles against French Colonialist and American aggression.  
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The Sino-Soviet split challenged the Vietnamese policy behaviours to both. Like 
mentioned the general goal of Vietnam in wartime was: national libration and national 
reunification. Hanoi sought to retain the equilibrium of its wartime relations with both 
China and the Soviet Union, but mounting tensions with Beijing, culminating in the 
loss of Chinese aid in 1978, compelled Hanoi to look increasingly to Moscow for 
economic and military assistance.72 Beside military aid, the USSR later also became 
Vietnam’s biggest economic and trade partner.  
 
In 1980s, the relationship of two countries was remained sound but sometimes with 
strain. These strain behaviours resulted in economic relations, when the Soviet 
Union reducing aid to Vietnam because of doubting economic inefficiency in Vietnam. 
Vietnam was supported by the Soviet Union in Cambodia issue. This is also part of 
reason for the tension between Vietnam and China at the time. In short, Vietnam 
chose the Soviet Union as a friend, comrade, ally and a great donor. This came from 
its ideological standpoint but most importantly form the domestic strategy of national 
salvation. The Soviet Union basically supported Vietnam because of its maintenance 
of a set of alliances with South East Asian countries in unofficial and indirect 
confrontation with the USA, at the same time limiting the influence of China in the 
region.  
 
4.2.2. Vietnam - China relations  
 
History of Vietnam- China relations implies very complex characteristics. Relationship 
of the two sharing same nature of political regimes is regarded as critically important for 
both sides. Two nations have experienced the “up and down” in bilateral relations 
through out history and it will continue to fascinate many observers and scholars in the 
future. Each period of time the relation between Vietnam and China marked with its 
own characteristics. 
 
• Period 1950-1975 
 
This is the era which witnessed a very strong intimate cooperation between Vietnam 
and China. Someone has even depicted this relationship in poetry like “Mối tình hữu 
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nghị Việt Hoa, vừa là ñồng chí vừa là anh em” (Friendship between Vietnam and China 
is like comradeship and brotherhood). 
 
The comradeship in this period was described “as close as lips and teeth” (gắn bó như 
môi với răng). Party-to-Party relations between Vietnam Workers Party (VWP)73 and 
the Chinese Communist Party formed the core of the relationship. The VWP leaned 
heavily on Chinese support and there was no alternative comparable to Chinese 
support. China supported necessities of life and the means of struggle. (Womack, 
2006:162-163). According to Womack, Chinese “aids to Vietnam was its most 
important sustained foreign policy commitment from 1952-1975, and the survival and 
success of VWP was crucial to China”74. This was due to the implications of China that 
1. Promoting a socialist internationalism with China-centered inherent image. 2. The 
threat of spreading influence of the USA in the region and risking national security of 
China. 3. Domestic resonance to Mao’s implementation of Cultural Revolution.  
 
For Vietnam, national liberation and national reunification was still the most important 
revolutionary task, therefore Vietnam attempted, in period of 1953-1965, to make use 
of international aid, and tried to keep solidarity with both China and USSR75. Vietnam 
considered the support of China as of very significance and tried to be not alone in the 
struggle with the US, these included both financial and military aid from China. China 
did not hesitate to send 320.000 military related personal in 1965-1969 to Vietnam 
(Womack, 2006:176). Mutual benefits had been put in scale for both Vietnam and 
China.  
Nevertheless, Vietnam had to face the position on the Sino-Soviet split (1960-1963), 
meanwhile North and South of Vietnam was still separated. Womack 
(2006:177)remarked about the situation as follows “…from Vietnam’s perspective the 
Sino-Soviet split was most regrettable, and even when it sided with China before 1965 
it did not encourage international divisiveness.” Vietnam at the time had to choose a 
neutrality policy or a “leaning on one side”. 
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 Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) was the old name since 1951. Since 1976 VWP changed its name as Communist 
Party of Vietnam.  
74
 Womack, B. (2006). China and Vietnam: the Politics of Asymmetry. Cambridge University Press. p.163 
75
 Vu Duong Huan (2002). Ngoai giao Việt Nam hiện ñại vì Sự nghiệp ñổi mới 1975-2002 (Modern 
Diplomacy for the cause of ðổi mới 1975-2002). Hanoi: Institute for International Relations. p.39   
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• Period 1976-1985 
 
In 1972 Richard M. Nixon visited China. This visit marked a rift in both country 
relationship and meant to Vietnam as a betrayal. It was a very critical situation for 
Vietnam and also marked beginning tensions, and later on led to direct 
confrontation-military clash in 1979. Initially, China encouraged the US to restored 
economic relations with Vietnam76 and called for peaceful negotiations between 
Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge77. Yet Vietnam acted radically declaring its 
determination against Chinese hegemony in the Constitution 1980 and Document of 
the 5thParty Congress (Vu Duong Huan, 2002:51). Vietnam decided to incline to 
“leaning on one side” (nhất biên ñảo) policy and considered Soviet Union as 
“cornerstones”78 because China supported the Khmer Rouge. At the meantime, Soviet 
Union was standing firmly behind Vietnam in solving issue with Cambodia. Other than 
that Vietnam had high expectation about continuous aid of Soviet Union and other 
countries in the socialist block after the wartime.  
 
After the great victory in 1975, the “illusions of victory” overwhelmed the atmosphere in 
the whole country for a long time. “The context of the “outer sleeve” of diplomatic ritual 
and historical common sense was changed completely by victory, and the enforced 
intimacy of wartime has suppressed rather than neutralized concrete problems in the 
relationship.”79 This “leaning on one side” policy of Vietnam was later on assessed as a 
mistake by the CPV80. China started to set sanctions against Vietnam. Followed up this 
reaction were the rhetoric propagandas against each other. Both Vietnamese and 
Chinese living on the borders were suffered from daily agitated propagandas on radio 
speakers. Hostile atmospheres dominated the two countries   from 1976-1979, and 
until lagging on until normalization in 1991. Deng Xiaoping’s intension to “teach Hanoi a 
lesson”81 was then realized by China’s invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. This 
invasion of China in Vietnam was explained by China with four explicit issues: 
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 Ross, S. R. (1988). The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam policy,1975-1979. New York: Columbia 
University Press. p.15. Also quoted in Womack (2006) 
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 Qiang, Zhai (2000). China and Vietnam wars, 1950-1075. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
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 Womack, B. (2006). China and Vietnam: the Politics of Asymmetry. Cambridge University Press. p.189 
80
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 See Chen, Jian (1995). “China’s involvement in Vietnam War, 1964.69.” in: The China Quarterly, No. 
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Vietnam’s alliance with Soviet Union; the occupation of Vietnam in Cambodia; territorial 
disagreement, and the mistreatment of Vietnam towards ethnic Chinese. The short 
bloody border war taught not only Vietnam but also China had to learn for itself a big 
lesson: security in the region and solidarity with the periphery and neighboring country.  
 
4.2.3. Vietnam - U.S relations 
 
The relationship between Vietnam and the USA is substantially different from that of 
Vietnam and other super powers. History of America in the cold world has marked a 
black spot when the North of Vietnam claimed Spring Victory in 30.4.1975. This end the 
America’s longest war (1950-1975)82“. Robert S. Mc Mamara (1995) has regretfully 
said about Vietnam war:  
We all make mistakes. We know we make mistakes. I don't know any military 
commander, who is honest, who would say he has not made a mistake. There's 
a wonderful phrase: 'the fog of war.' What "the fog of war" means is: war is so 
complex it's beyond the ability of the human mind to comprehend all the 
variables. Our judgment, our understanding, are not adequate. And we kill 
people unnecessarily.83 
 
Vietnam War is a name known worldwide, also called as “Cuộc kháng chiến chống ðế 
quốc Mĩ của nhân dân Việt Nam” (Vietnamese struggle against American Imperialists) 
or the Second Indochina War. Whichever name it is called, this was the most painful 
and bitter era for both peoples and nations. It left Vietnam with massive destruction, 
cost millions of lives and burdens of victims of Agent Orange for generations of 
Vietnamese. The war has not only divided the American society but also has been an 
obsession for even today American survivors.  
 
Vietnam War was considered as product of Cold War, the ideological contradiction 
between the Capitalists and Socialists. Analyzing it in this sense, Vietnam War was 
seen a “proxy war” between the United States, its Western allies (the war was 
supposed to be one of their efforts to prevent the spread of communism in the Third 
World) and Soviet Union and China (those who supported Vietnam with a perception of 
protecting Socialism and against Imperialism). But for many Vietnamese, the war was 
their “just war” to secure their basic rights of independence, freedom and national 
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 This is also a title of the book by Herring, G.C (1979). America’s longest war: The United States and 
Vietnam, 1950-1975. New York/Chichester/Brisbane/Toronto: John Wiley & Son  
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 Also quoted in http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/07/robert-mcnamara-an-architect-of-
vietnam-war-dies-at-93.html 
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integrity, not a proxy war between Communists and the Capitalists. Forced into an 
asymmetric war with a superpower, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its 
people smartly conducted a people’s war which took advantage of the Cold War 
situation to win from its communist allies. That is why the victory of Vietnam was not 
the defeat of the American’s military strength, but the defeat of their “will of 
aggression”.   
In short, the time of 1950-1975 has been seen as the darkest period in the history of 
relations between Vietnam and the U.S. After 1975, The United States continued to 
apply hostile and restraint policies. Economic blockade and trade embargo was not 
released until the year 1994.  
 
The period 1975-1985 witnessed a continuity of stalemate relationship and 
characterized with a mixture of both struggle and cooperation between two countries. 
Due to its economic downturn, military failure in Vietnam and lost of public’s trust, the 
U.S had to readjust its global strategy. Vietnam set up its priority for a national 
reconstruction strategy. The 24th Plenum of the Party Central Committee, September 
1975 reaffirmed:  
To complete national reunification, to bring all the country rapidly, steadily, and 
firmly to socialism, the North must continue to push forward the construction of 
socialism and the improvement of the socialist relations of production; the South 
must carry out socialist reforms at the same time with the socialist 
construction.84  
 
Following this ideology, Vietnam was clinched to Soviet Union and still considered U.S 
as a “basic long-term enemy”. However, both sides attempted to sit on table for 
negotiations on issue of POW/MIA (Prisoners of War and Missing in Action)85. This 
action showed the adjustment of Vietnam in its foreign policy toward America but above 
all it is tolerance of the Vietnamese people who never forget the past but looking 
forwards to a new future. The question still remained: how many lost Vietnamese 
citizens will be found? 
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 According to database from Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personal Office (DPMO), around 1740 
American solders were believed missing in Vietnam War. Since 1985, Vietnam has officially allowed 
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numbers of American lost soldiers were found and brought home to the U.S. 
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4.3. Summary  
 
At the beginning of Vietnam War, main essence of Vietnamese foreign policy was 
principally determined by both national interests: national liberation and reunification 
and at the same time serving the international socialism. “Like domestic policy, foreign 
policy required the reconciliation of ideology and nationalism.”86 Vietnam had tried at 
most in the period of Cold War to National security has been always at Vietnamese 
primary foreign policy concerns. As proved above, Realism could be seen as dominant 
theory in Vietnamese foreign relations towards the super powers. In this context, 
“external balancing”87 has been regarded as mostly practiced strategy. 
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 In his article about “Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China policy”, Alexander L.Vuving (2006) 
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Chapter 5: What is ðổi mới88 and how has it been 
done? 
 
5.1. Determinants leading to ðổi mới? 
 
“Domestic agendas now have a large impact on the foreign policy choices of all the 
great powers….. Foreign policy choices seem likely to be dictated by domestic 
concerns.” (Giffiths, O’Callaghan, Roach, 2002:135). Foreign policy reflects domestic 
policy, and in many cases, foreign policy is to serve domestic policy. In order to 
understand about Vietnamese foreign policy since 1986, it is always noteworthy to look 
at the domestic policy of the country. 
 
The purpose of this part is to provide an adequate explanation for a phenomenal 
experience in Vietnam: ðổi mới since 1986. What is “ðổi mới”? Why Vietnam adopted 
economic reforms and made their transition to market-based economy? How has it 
been carried out?  
 
First of all, let’s have a look at the fundamental characteristics which lead up Vietnam to 
the reform. I will divide them into domestic situation and international factors.  
 
5.1.1. Internal economic situation  
 
ðổi mới means “renovation” or “reform” in Vietnamese.  It should be first understood 
with “reform of rethinking” and starting with reform of national economy. Domestic 
problems of Vietnam have been seen by Le Huu Tang and Liu Han Yue (2006:3-37), 
due to:  
Firstly, an underdevelopment of economy and huge difference between the North 
and the South in terms of economic institutions. After Vietnamese reunification in 
1975, an economic crisis and serious food shortages became increasingly problematic 
for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The inflation is even reaching 300%. By 
then it had become clear, that “the root of economic success” was qualitatively different 
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from the “root of victory in the war” (Van Arkadi and Boi, 1992). Vietnam has won the 
war but the country stood in front of much ruins and challenges for national 
reconstruction. This was mainly due to the fact that the country has been strongly 
destroyed by many long-lasting conflicts. The U.S.-imposed trade and aid embargo 
until 1994. The other difficulties are that the government had converting the agricultural 
sector to socialist collectivism. The following remarks by Le Huu Tang and Liu Han Yue 
(2006:3-37) show a clear picture of Vietnamese economic situation.  
 
 Vietnam remained a backward agricultural economy participated 
by 80% of the population with 70% of the labours living mainly on 
agricultural production in rural areas. They largely relied on 
traditional manual techniques, which resulted in low labour 
productivity. The yearly agricultural output was not enough for 
subsistence. Average food per capita (calculated according to the 
amount of unhusked rice) was around 300 kilograms per person 
per year. Year after year, the State had to import hundreds of 
thousands tons of food, but many peasant families still suffered 
continuous food shortage. Vietnam was one of the world’s 
poorest countries in the world in 1990 with GDP (General 
Domestic Product) 
 Per capita figures of about 200 US dollars. 
 The incompetence of the economy was shown primarily in the low 
gross product per capital. 
 The economy did not produce enough food for the subsistence of 
the population, let alone the possibility that it could accumulate for 
extensive reproduction.  
 The underdevelopment and incompetence of the economy 
inevitably led to a small and week foreign trade, and constant 
trade deficit. International trade relations were largely performed 
with socialist countries entirely on State-to-State basis of trade 
agreements, protocols on exchanges of goods and payments, 
agreements on loans and aids. Price of goods and services was 
determined on principle of agreements between 
governments….This situation was one of the causes leading to the 
increase of foreign debts; at the beginning of the 1980s, total 
foreign debts were already equivalent to annual GNP.89 
 
Secondly, mechanism of central planning was considered as a big mistake and 
main contributor to low economic development. This mechanism has three common 
features: 
 The ecomony based on the regime of public ownership of the 
means of production 
 The State, instead of market, decided the whole production 
process (What, how and for whom to produce). Applied the policy 
                                                 
89 See Le Huu Tang and Liu Han Yue (2006). Economic reform in Vietnam and China: A comparative 
study. Hanoi: The Gioi Publishing House. pp. 3-37 
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(Block the river and ban the market). It means each province 
produce and consume their own products, there is absolute no 
exchange or trading.  
 Wealth was distributed according to labour contribution.  
 
Apparently, State held monopoly over managing and performing all means of 
production and foreign trade activities. The relation between State and economic 
establishment was that of allocation and delivery. Private economy is completely 
eliminated. There are only two types of ownership: one is national ownership (State 
businesses) and the other is collective ownership (cooperatives. Market and price 
were removed from the process of making production decision. As a consequence, 
Vietnam experienced a galloping inflation which reached over 700%. Many northern 
provinces in Vietnam suffered from hunger. The country stepped out of a long wars, 
now faced another enemies, which Ho Chi Minh called: “hunger and illiteracy” (Giặc ñói 
và Giặc dốt) 90. And Thayer and Seth Mydans called it as “winning the war and loosing 
the peace”91 The country’s backwardness set at the time a crux for the CPV.  
 
5.1.2. Influence of international factors 
 
Besides the internal problems, changes in external environment was also decisive 
factors. The hereunder mentioned notable international events are regarded as motives 
leading to ðổi mới:  
 
Firstly, the Perestroika (reform) and Glasnost (transparency)92 in the USSR was a great 
encourage on the cause of reform in Vietnam. Perestroika set up bold political and 
economic reforms that significantly changed the fundamentals of the socialism of the 
past (Tsuboi, 2007). It was considered as by Le Huu Tang and Liu Han Yue (2006: 32) 
as the “spirit” which at least helps Vietnam endeavour to look for solutions to the 
deadlocks arising from the realities.  
 
Secondly, the economic crisis of the countries in Eastern Europe in the 1980s was the 
result of previous years of ineffectiveness and stagnancy of these economies. This 
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consequence had made them step up with ideas of economical reforms Poland, 
Hungary, GDR etc. The spirit of NEP (New Economic Policy) was notably taken into 
account.  
 
Thirdly, the economic reform in China93 has obviously strong impact on Vietnam. 
Starting ten years earlier than Vietnam, China gradually found its own way of 
development which meets requirement of Chinese situation. Vietnam, up to now, still 
attempts to draw as many lessons for itself from each move of the giant neighbour. 
Both successes and mistakes of China are carefully studied by Vietnam. This is due to 
the fact that the two Asian countries share lots of common cultural identities. Both are 
agriculture country with over grounded population.  
 
Seen in this light, it can be said that while casting a sidelong glance at the 
developments that could be seen in China and the Soviet Union, which were ahead of 
Vietnam in terms of socialism, Vietnam’s ðổi mới Policy was commenced 
subsequently (Tsuboi, 2007). 
 
History of international politics has shown us that interdependence between states of 
today’s world is different than those in the Cold War time. The difference in the 
bipolarity world order is that one had to clearly choose on which side it would stand 
along. In other words, Ideological paradigm played important role in decision-making of 
a state. Interactions and reactions of the great powers made member country held the 
breath, when the first time in history nuclear weapon was put on the military race. But 
when this ideological paradigm was broke up, it left much to do for the countries, those 
who were once on the side of the Soviet Union. And Vietnam was, by no means, could 
get away from this circle of impact. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
block in 1989-1991 had forced Vietnam to decide to stand on its own feet. 
 
5.2. Economic reform: how has it been done? 
 
It was in December 1986, at the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam that 
the CPV has decided to launch ðổi mới. Before ðổi mới, Vietnamese economy 
operated under a central planning mechanism, the country suffered strongly from 
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economic crisis, the question raised for the CPV was that: Transition to what 
system? An important summary by Guo (2006) about transition of political and 
economic systems in Vietnam should be paid much attention: 
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The 6th Congress  of the CPV (1986) has highlighted the followings: 
Reform of the economic system: from a centralized economy to a multi-sectoral 
economy, through which the inherent capacity of each sector would be released. 
Transition to „socialist-oriented market economy under State 
management“94 
 
A comprehensive agenda of ðổi mới summarized by Le Huu Tang and Liu Han Yue 
(2006:117) shows us details of the implementation of economic reform in Vietnam.  
 
 
Reform: A Comprehensive development agenda 
 
1. Main goals and directions:  
• Transforming the command economy to a market economy following socialist 
orientation under State management;  
• Building a democratic society ruled by law; in that society, the State is owned by, 
decided by, and working for the people;  
• Implementing the open-door policy, intensifying cooperation and developing 
relations with countries in the spirit that Vietnam wishes to become friends of all 
nations for mutual benefit of development.  
The three goals and directions were the foundation for determining the specific 
priorities and development targets of the country in the last 15 years. 
2. Central development tasks:  
• Carrying out industrialisation and modernisation  
3. The cornerstones of the development strategy 
• Developing the economy fast and solidly  
• Keeping political and social situations stable  
• Speeding up liberalisation and strengthening international integration.  
 
 
Basically, the priority target of the Vietnam’s reform at initial stage was to get out of 
economic crisis and narrowing the gap between Vietnam and the countries in the 
region. One of the most important characteristics of the reform was the acceptance of   
                                                 
94
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Chính trị quốc gia (National political Publishing House).p. 88 
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Multi-sectoral economy which composes of 5 different groups: state sectors (Kinh tế 
nhà nước), private sectors (Kinh tế tư nhân), collective economy (Kinh tế tập thể), 
state capitalist economy (Kinh tế tư bản nhà nước), joint venture sectors (kinh tế 
có vốn ñầu tư nước ngoài"):  a mixture formed economy. 
  
Vietnam in an agriculture country in which more than 80 percent of economy stems 
from agricultural production. A very decisive policy in ðổi mới was set forth is Land 
reform. There is not any more the time when state gave order to each province what 
sort of products they should produce. A farmer can now choose what crops he is going 
to grow, and he will decide this based on the availability, price, and demand of the seed 
(Nugent, 1996:67). The farmer also now knows that the more crops he grows the more 
profit he will be able to keep for himself (Nugent, 1996:67). The overall effect is that 
the farmer is now working for himself, and not for the state (Nugent, 1996:67). 
Another arguable positive factor is the increasing rates of farmers buying mechanized 
equipment such as mechanized ploughs, and threshing machines that produce higher 
yields (Nugent, 1996:70). Land law was issued: Agricultural policies that allowed for 
long term land use rights and greater freedom to buy inputs and products offered by 
markets. 
 
Another new character in Economic reform was also the decentralization of state 
economic management, which allowed state industries some local autonomy. 
Elimination of the State's monopoly in foreign trade was suggested and Administrative 
reform was very rash implemented.  
 
Let’s have a look at the Reform Schedule from 1979 to 2000 by Le Huu Tang and Liu 
Han Yue (2006:118-119) which will depict very details of reform programs and 
achievements gained in each period. 
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Year  Main reforms  Major developments and 
achievements  
1979 The three-part planning 
regime was applied to state 
owned enterprises (SOEs)  
The autonomy of the SOEs increased on 
the basis of market relations  
1981 The regime of Contract 
No100 (Khoán 100)95 was 
applied to  farming 
households  
Farmers were given some autonomy but 
responsible for their final products  
1985 Monetary reform  Inflation galloped; the two-price 
mechanism and the regime of price fixing 
according to plan gradually lost effects. 
1986 The 6th Congress of the CPV 
announced ðổi mới policy  
Inflation galloped at 774% 
1987 - Foreign investment 
law and land law 
were issued;  
- The regime of market 
price started effect  
Inflation continued to galloped at more 
than 400% 
1988 - Two-tier banking 
system96 was 
established  
- The decision No 10 
on rights farming 
households to use 
their agriculture land 
was promulgated 
 
• The first foreign joint venture was 
approved 
• Total export  valued reached 1 billion 
USD 
1989 - The dual pricing system97  
was ebolished 
- Goods limitation were 
discarded, except for 10 
export items and 14 export 
items 
-The exchange rate system 
was unified  
• Vietnam became the world’s third best 
rice exporter  
• High inflation was controlled 
1990 - The foreign 
investment law was 
emended 
- Ordinance on central 
bank and state 
owned commercial 
• GDP growth stood at 8.3% 
• Over 20 million tons of food was 
produced 
• Over 2 million tones of crude oil was 
exported 
• FDI capital registered reached more 
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 Farmers in Vietnam were obliged to participate in Hợp Tác Xã (Coperatives). “Khoan 100” (Contract 
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banks, credit 
organizations took 
effect 
- Corporate law came 
into practice, creating 
foundation for limited 
liability companies 
and joint ventures   
than 1 billion USD 
1991 - Private companies 
were allowed to 
handle direct import 
and export activities  
• Industrial sector grew at 9% 
1992 - New Constitution was 
promulgated. Multi-
sectored economy 
was officially 
recognized by the 
Constitution  
- Pilot equitization of 
enterprises was done 
• The total registered FDI stood at 5 
billion USD 
• The literacy race of the population 
was over 86.6% 
• The number of SOEs (State owned 
Enterprises)  decreased, the number 
of private enterprises rose sharply  
1993 - Land law was 
amended  
- Law on bankruptcy 
and environment was 
issued  
- The US embargo 
against Vietnam 
was removed  
• Relationship with international donors 
was established  
1994 - Labour law was 
issued  
- Export licenses were 
removed for almost 
all types of export 
good, except for rice, 
wood and crude oil  
• Total registered FDI was 10 billion 
USD 
 
1995 - Law on SOEs came 
into effect  
- The number of 
imported goods 
previously managed 
by quotas was 
reduced to 7 types  
• Vietnam became an ASEAN member 
• GDP Growth rate hit the highest ever 
peak f 9.54% 
• Vietnam became AFTA member 
• Normalization relationship with the 
USA 
1996 - Regulation on 
industrial property 
protection 
- Large scale 
equitization of SOEs 
was carried out  
• GDP rose by 9.34% 
• Total registered FDI reached 27 billion 
USD 
1997 - All domestic rice 
trade limitations were 
ridded  
- Private economic 
sector was allowed to 
• Three million tons of rice was 
exported  
• Exported crude oil stood at 10 million 
tons  
 74 
make direct rice 
export  
1999 - The Directive No 37 
came into force, 
giving enterprises to 
make import or export 
- The exchange rate 
was adjusted 
according to market 
development   
• 4.5 million tons of rice was exported 
• The growth rate was lowest in the 
1990s (4.85%) 
2000 - Enterprises law was 
promulgated and 
enforced  
- The State bank 
controls interest rates 
according to “basic 
interest rates” 
• 13.5000 new enterprises were 
established, creating nearly 300.000 
jobs 
• The growth rate was restored to 
6.75% 
 
All in all, the economy of Vietnam has gained significant achievement during ðổi mới 
process. People in Vietnam at the beginning of 1990s did not anymore suffer from 
Hunger. The reform has lifted the country out of economic crisis. The two important 
progresses have been made through ðổi mới are: 1, improved the economic 
structure and 2, changes in economic operation mechanism. 98 After more than 20 
years of ðổi mới, Vietnam has been noted with profound economic development and 
especially with its impressing economic growth rate at 8%. Despite of economic crisis 
since 2008, Vietnam’ economic growth rate still maintains 5,3% 99. 
 
Figures by the General statistics Office below shows us some main economic 
development during ðổi mới process 1989-2000 (%)100:  
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
GDP 
Growth 
4.7 5.1 5.9 8.6 8.1 8.8 9.5 9.3 8.1 5.8 4.8 6.7 
Export 
Growth 
67.4 23.5 -13.2 23.7 15.7 35.8 34.6 33.1 23.3 1.9 23.3 24.0 
Import 
Growth 
-6.9 7.3 -15.0 8.7 54.4 48.5 40.0 36.7 5.4 -0.8 1.1 31.0 
Inflation  34.7 67.5 67.6 17.5 5.2 14.4 12.7 4.5 3.6 9.2 0.1 -0.6 
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 Le Huu Tang & Luu Han Yue (2006). Economic reform in Vietnam and China: A comparative study. 
Hanoi: The Gioi Publisher. p.121 
99
 World Bank report http://www.worldbank.org.vn/publication/pub_pdf/VDR2001v.pdf 
 or in  http://www.iseas.edu.sg/rof06/rof06am1.pdf 
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 Souce: General Statistics Office, see http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=491 Also cited in 
Le Huu Tang & Lui Han Yue (2006:121) 
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After decades of hard working and commitments, ðổi mới launched by the 
Vietnamese Government since 1986 has transformed Vietnam into one of the most 
dynamic emerging markets in the world. Vietnam’s growth domestic product (GDP) 
growth is expected to reach 8.5% in 2007, making it the second fastest growing 
economy in Asia after China.101.  
The Resolution of the Sixth Party Congress of the CPV in 1986 was not limited to the 
economic reform; it also emphasized the importance of the entire party and state 
apparatus. As described in the political report adopted by the congress, the leadership 
had failed to renew itself. The organs of the state as well as the party had been growing 
“too big” and “overlapping”. So, for many scholars, talking about political reform in 
Vietnam it means more about administrative reform. For others, the important political 
implication to be drawn out from their economic reform is that the legitimacy of the 
political system has shifted. Koh (2000) has viewed the shift in the legitimacy in 
Vietnam as follows:  
Previous values of legitimacy  Present values of legitimacy  
-  Marxism-Leninism 
- Nationalism based on some 
xenophobia tied to long history of 
foreign invasion  
- State role in economy predominant, 
followed by collective’s role. Private 
sector actively discouraged. 
 
- Ho Chi Minh Thought - it is actually 
nationalism originating from national 
liberation, with sprinkle of Marxism-
Leninism 
- Role of market economy without 
conceding totally the state's role  
- Private economy encouraged together 
with collective economy, state role in 
production still evolving. 
 
Like the big brother China, who went ahead with open-door policy, Vietnam advocated 
carrying out economic reform first, followed by “gradual political reform” latter. This was 
very different from Russia and some Eastern European countries, which carried out 
administrative political and institutional reform while a new economic model was not 
existing. With its own historical suffering a very long time under many fierce wars, 
Vietnam was more demanding for “first food, then democracy”102. 
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 See Cheah King Yoong,. “ðổi mới transforms Vietnam” available at   
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/11/26/business/19558548&sec=business 
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 See Tam Pham (2007).  “First food , then democracy for Vietnam”, in: Asia Times online, at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IH17Ae02.html 
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ðổi mới is very well-known for its achievement of bringing Vietnam to get out of crisis, a 
stable social-economic development and political stability. And most of all the quality of 
the people has been significantly improved. Why did it work in Vietnam?. I would like to 
conclude this part by pointing out some main reasons why this reform program has 
been successfully carried out:  
 
Firstly, reform of thinking, especially economic thinking, was the most important 
step which made ðổi mới possible. It is actually a struggle between new and old in 
many areas, but first and for most is in economy. It is also a very hard struggle between 
progressiveness and backwardness, a struggle against conservative thinking which 
advocated a return to the old familiar mechanism. The reality has been recognized by 
the CPV and Vietnamese people themselves is that: Vietnam was falling behind and it 
has to try to catch up with other countries in the region. And national independence 
should be absolutely separated with national building and sustainable development. 
The core point focuses on change from absolute ownership of State and collective 
mechanism to multi-sector economy with diversified ownership and forms of distribution 
(democratizing economy). State, at the same time, play important role of flexible 
management.  
 
Secondly, the reform started from grassroots. The reform started first of all in 
agriculture with Land law. Vietnam's agriculture accounts for more than 80% of the 
workforce. Therefore, economic reform had to start first from households to 
households.  
 
Thirdly, the basic legal system has been increasingly improved to build a law-
governed state. And this legal system facilitates foreign investments.  
 
Fourthly, ðổi mới also attempts to change the view of the world and the regions 
towards Vietnam. It means Vietnam itself had to change its perception in considering its 
path for integration into the region and world economy. And one of the most important 
tasks was to get out of isolation and embargo. Opening policy (Chính sách mở cửa) 
was a consequence of long discussions. 
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Fifthly, Vietnam started economic reform ten years after China, and other Eastern 
European countries. Experiences have been carefully scrutinized. For Vietnam, 
learning lessons and avoiding previous mistakes are advantages during 
implementation of economic reform process. 
 
To sum up, I would like to quote an assessment by Mr. Vu Khoan, Deputy Prime 
Minister of Vietnam (2002-2006) about the success of ðổi mới as “Great attention has 
been paid to maintaining harmony between economic and social development and 
political and social stability, between economic development and social equity, between 
market mechanism transformation and state regulation at the macro level, and between 
internal resource maximization and international cooperation. Thanks to these 
principles, Vietnam has recorded great achievements, both internally and externally.”103 
 
5.3. Problems brought up by ðổi mới 
 
Obviously, lives of Vietnamese people have been improved after ðổi mới. 
Nevertheless, Vietnam has to confront with problems followed this policy such as104: 
 
• Corruption 
• Environmental pollution 
• Increasing gab between the Rich and the Poor 
• Greater competition regionally and internationally 
• Public administration reform 
• Social security issues 
• Need to invest in science and technology and keep current with market needs in 
education and training 
• Land disputes, inadequate legal and judicial reform 
• Human trafficking, labor migration and strikes (more than a million new workers 
annually) 
 
In practice, Vietnam ought to face with contradiction between rapid growth and 
sustainable development; between money and ideology. Guo (2006:6) is partly 
correct when he remarks about the choice of policy in the Asian countries, including 
Vietnam : “In Asian communist countries, the choice of reform policy have been largely 
constrained by the leadership’s perception of the necessity for economic growth and 
the need for maintenance of the communist party’s power and preservation of party- 
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available at…. 
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state interests, and therefore it has been the interplay between politics and economics 
or state and market that had led these Asian countries to adopt gradualist approaches 
to their reforms”.  
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Chapter 6: Vietnam’s Foreign policy since 1986: a 
great shift 
 
Domestic-international linkage is one of the most important paradigms in the field of 
foreign policy making (Zhao, 2005: 123). The above analysis has demonstrated the 
great domestic strategy-ðổi mới which focuses much on the economic reform, in other 
words, a gradual liberation of national economy. But the reform was not only limited in 
economic packages, the success of ðổi mới subordinates to radical changes in foreign 
policy. Taking the theory of policy analysis (mentioned in Chapter 2, part 2) as a basis, 
this part aims to answer the two main questions: What are determinants for changes in 
Vietnamese foreign policy since 1986; What are main contents in Vietnamese foreign 
policy adjustments? Who are the decision-makers?  
 
6.1. Determinants leading to changes in Vietnam’s foreign 
policy  
 
Entering a new era of globalization, each state has to face with new challenges in 
finding a plausible developmental strategy. In this part, I would like to point out some 
external factors, importantly trigger adjustment of Vietnamese foreign policy. 
 
6.1.1. Influence of international environment  
 
 
Firstly, the collapse of Soviet Union by the end of 1991 was a historical event, 
marking a turning point for all the Communist countries. This event, like many other 
western scholars called as “a stunning metamorphosis” for the Communists. It was the 
demise of the traditional west-versus-east antagonism. “Our jaws can not drop any 
lower”105showed the shocks of many observers. The upheaval has ended the Cold War 
and affected every aspect of international politics and the international system. 
Numbers of lessons have been drawn for those who were ever on the side of the 
Soviet Union. But the first lesson above all is learning to “stand on their own feet”-
relying on their domestic strength. At the same time, they must also well conceive how 
to deal with other great nations in globalization time. Among those who have to adjust 
their foreign policy, Vietnam is not an exclusive case.  
                                                 
105
 The saying by Ronald Linden of Radio Free Europe, quoted in “The collapse of Communism” edited 
by Bernard Gwertzman and Michael T. Kaufman (1990). Times Book-Random House 
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Secondly, in the post-era Cold War, Globalization process has a very strong impact 
on adjustment of most nation-state’s foreign policy. Some argues that new trends in 
international relations such as peace, stability, cooperation and sustainable 
development are essential desires of most of nations. Followed up are the topics of 
human rights, freedom and peace, welfare and security, democracy and rule of law, 
solidarity and justice. 
 
However, Kirt (2006:251) notes that the world system in the post-Cold War era is very 
fragile and it also operates with full susceptibility which also contains many violent 
conflicts. Multi-polarity replaces the bipolarity means the increase of local liberalization 
movements, and upsurge of local and regional crises. Breakthroughs in science and 
technology in the era of globalization bring individuals and nations closer. Along with 
that, global issues can not be tackled by one state, thus, require responsibility and 
multilateral approaches of many nations and international actors. Globalization means 
also “economization” and as a result, it increases the interdependence among 
nations. We have witnessed a strong growing of regionalism in every part of the world 
(the United Nations, the European Union, the ASEAN, WTO, IMF, LAS (League of 
Arap States), AU (African Union) etc). Apparently, for nation states and international 
actors, the question of adjustment of grand strategy and foreign policy is put at the 
center, because a state has to adapt with new changing environment. It has to evolve. 
Evolvement means mostly “reform”. Why I say “mostly” but not “every” because if we 
look at North Korea then this assessment seems not to really make sense. Then, a 
question is raised: does it make sense for the case of Vietnam? The answer will be 
“yes” and “not yet”. “Yes” because there have been significant changes in perception of 
the governing elites106. And ðổi mới is a grand strategy, as a result of this new 
perception. “Not yet” because ðổi mới concentrates much on reform of economic, 
juridical and administration. Political reform is a question which is still on discussion. 
This is due to the fact that Vietnam, for many decades, has been once prone to opinion 
that “the political independence of the country is depends largely on its economic 
independence”107 
 
                                                 
106 See Vuving (2005). Shaping of Foreign Policy: Vietnamese grand strategy after the cold war   
107
 Dang, Duc Nam  et. al. (ed.) (1991). Some aspects of the economic reform in Vietnam. Also quoted in 
Dahn, H. (1995). “Vietnam foreign policy and its implication for ðổi mới”, in: Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Asienkunde. No. 56. pp. 29-54 
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Thirdly, For foreign policy makers, changing policy behaviors of great powers toward 
each other and their interactions after the Cold War can not be underestimated. “The 
fight for power in the world has changed from the political-military field to a race for 
economic and technological power. Vietnam needs to improve its external relations and 
re-integrate into the world community”108  
 
After the Cold War, much have been discussed that the United States is the only 
superpower in international system. Nevertheless, the last decades illustrates that the 
involvement of the U.S in Afghanistan and Iraq plus the negative pokes of financial 
crisis which accretes an image of “declined” America. Meanwhile, the rising of China 
and its ambitious strategy withdraw much world’s attention. Though China tries to paint 
a “benign power”, we have seen that China’s role and influence in international arena 
has been increasingly affirmed. A “rising power” makes the U.S and others act with 
vigilance. The European Union substantially “run on its marathon” of integration but 
accumulate its strength with both economic and political influences. Nowadays, Europe 
is highly admired by its good images of welfare, a strong and stable social security 
system for the developing world. Looking at other continents, one can not deny 
significant roles of the Japan, Russia and India in international relations. Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh remarks:  
 
The end of the Cold War, increasing global inter-dependence and the trans-
border nature of many threats have made strategic concepts developed in a bi-
polar world somewhat irrelevant. The United States is today the dominant 
economic, military, technological and cultural power. However, it can be 
anticipated that the European Union, Russia, China, Japan and India will 
consolidate their individual positions to play a global role. We must evolve a new 
paradigm of security cooperation relevant to an emerging multi-polar world in 
which global threats obtain global responses.109 
 
If standing on perception of multi-polarity order, a state, regardless small, medium and 
great powers, has to decide how should it behave to the others, a strategic 
partnership, a strategic ally, a competitor or a cooperative one? As a 
consequence, each state has to conform itself to meet the new challenges of the new 
era, both domestically and externally. 
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“Vietnam is a tragic land”110 who once was caught in an “intra-power struggle” and 
power competition of the big powers (Nguyen Hong Thach, 2000). The historical 
experience has taught the country’s policy-makers political acumen and the lesson that: 
the interplay between nation states, especially the great powers, and international 
organizations shows the fact that national foreign policy has to adopt more cooperative 
and integrative approaches. Multilateralism or working in a multilateral frame work have 
become principal aims of national foreign policy and practically create favorable 
conditions contributing to national interest. Reconciling national interest and 
international responsibility is a very fundamental task of national foreign policy.  
 
6.1.2. Influence of domestic environment  
 
Romain Kirt convincingly states that: 
 
Foreign policy operates on the international level, but its agenda is grounded in 
the realm of domestic interests. 
  
 (Kirt, 2006:247)  
 
Some scholars111 argue that external assistance seems to play limited roles for the 
success of ðổi mới. Vietnam’s economic renovation is only partly determined by 
external factors. ðổi mới is in fact a product of domestic development. Therefore, 
foreign policy changes are mostly because of the changes in grand strategy which 
stem from new perception of the world view. But for the case of Vietnam, it is 
necessary to note that changes in Vietnamese foreign policy are due to combination 
of domestic, regional and international changes and domestic status was more 
dominant than the others112.  
 
This argument will be clarified by the following reasons:  
 
Firstly, critical domestic situation in Vietnam in the 1980s of was initial 
determination. Coming back with the 1980s, we see that Vietnam suffered largely from 
international isolation. This reaction was partly due to “Vietnamese invasion”113 in 
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understanding, sending troops to Cambodia originated from security reason for both Cambodia and 
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Cambodia from 1979 until 1989. Vietnam depended much on relationship with the 
Soviet Union and its allies. Latter on Vietnam itself witnessed the collapse of the USSR, 
the Soviet-Chinese rapprochement and the political and economic reforms in the 
Eastern Europe, the economic open door policy of China and not less important is the 
signs of U.S in peaceful co-existence with China. Meanwhile, Vietnamese occupation in 
Cambodia became more “costly” for itself. Economic crisis situation of the country 
occurred and brought along much of burdens and depts. The Communists faced 
directly the questions from its own people: “what is the meaning of Victory? We have 
achieved national liberation but we are not liberated from hunger and poverty.”114 
Those are encouraging factors to the CPV in adjusting their foreign policy in 
adaptability to international changes and getting out of its regional and international 
isolation. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has expressed that “Nowadays, a closed 
door foreign policy is suicide, and opening doors is one of the necessary conditions for 
economic development”115 
In order to get out of long-standing economic problems, Vietnam had no other choice 
rather than broadening foreign relations. Apparently, the country, more than ever, 
needs a peaceful environment, a broader access to sources of financial investment, 
technical supports and know-how of other countries and international institutions.  
 
Secondly, the changes in foreign policy of Vietnam since 1986 are due to a new self-
perception and new assessment about the worldview of the ruling elites in Vietnam. 
This is the main presentation by Alexader Vuving (2006). He further argues that the 
decision of Vietnamese grand strategy is determined by two-camps which he calls the 
“anti-imperialists” and the “modernizers”. Therefore, the impact on changes in 
Vietnamese foreign policy-making since 1986 is basically due to the compromise, 
struggle or conciliation of the two camps.  
The “modernizer” support Vietnam’s open door policy and integration to international 
community and global economy. This come from a perception of the group of 
Vietnamese leaders (most notably, such as Phan Chau Trinh, Vo Van Kiet, Nguyen Co 
Thach, Vo Nguyen Giap). For them the worldview is seen in a direction of national 
interest, interdependence and multi-polarity. In such a world situation Vietnam was 
backward and legged behind many nations. Vietnam, thus, had to launch the policy of 
                                                                                                                                                         
Vietnam, more specifically, to root out the Pol Pot regime and the rescued Cambodian people from 
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modernization and industrialization. National foreign policy, as a result serves for this 
cause.  
 
The “anti-imperialism” (most representatives are Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Van Linh, Le 
Duan, Doi Muoi, Le Kha Phieu, Nong Duc Manh) still maintain suspect about the 
United States. The perceived that the U.S, through its “peaceful evolution, still has 
intention of overthrowing socialist regime of Vietnam. The U.S other Western 
approaches, for them, mainly concentrate on the label of promoting democracy, 
human rights and religious freedom. 
 
Due to ruling elites’ different worldview and self-perception, foreign policy of Vietnam 
has been accordingly adjusted since the end of 1980s. There can be a period of time 
the “modernizers” were more dominant than the others, but there was also times 
where the camp of “anti-imperialists” was taken advantages, especially in the cause 
of national liberation and national defense. Also according to Vuving (2006), radical 
changes in foreign policy, in favour of industrialization and modernization, was largely 
due to the a strong personalities of the leaders. Nguyen Co Thach and Vo Van Kiet 
were the two prominent for their both theory and strategy supporting modernization in 
Vietnam.  
 
Thirdly, for the last 5 years, civil society, intellectuals, think-tanks and internet 
perform positive functions in the formulation of Vietnamese foreign policy-making. For 
the Western societies, intellectuals and think tanks play significant role in their national 
foreign policy directions. In Vietnam, through ðổi mới, the country underwent an open 
door policy and at the same time witnessed the emerging of civil society. With the 
science technological evolution, internet help intellectuals and think tanks express their 
opinion openly than before. They also have opportunities access to different sources, 
their assessments about worldview are, therefore not any more obsolete. On one hand, 
it is a challenge for Vietnamese state’s censorship. On the other hand, it creates a 
more open viewpoints and criticism about socio-economic and political issues of the 
country. One example is the electronic newspaper “Vietnamnet”, a very popular forum 
where many scholars and journalists express their opinions more open than the other 
electronic newspapers controlled by the Party and Government. They have been 
gradually put great influence on foreign policy-making in Vietnam. Much attention has 
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been paid to the growth of civil society by different papers by of both Vietnamese and 
foreign scholars116. 
 
Not like the term “mass organizations” (Các tổ chức quần chúng)117, those are very 
close to the state, the term civil society (xã hội dân sự) is officially known not long ago 
in Vietnamese society and academic discourse. According to Salemink (2003:2-3), it 
has two distinct meanings in Vietnamese context. One includes economical meaning 
where civil society more refers to international benefactors and the other meaning 
refers to promotion of liberal democracy. Thayer (2008) points out some roles of civil 
society possibly challenge to the one-party rule, such as public criticism of Vietnam’s 
one-party state for not permitting political and religious freedom as well as human 
rights; and opening for more debates, for example, and encouraging the multi sites of 
contestation in National Assembly which, in reality, has been proceeding since 2005. 
According to Ủy ban Công tác về các tổ chức phi chính phủ nước ngoài (Committee 
for Foreign NGOs in Vietnam), there are more than 600 foreign NGOs operating in 
Vietnam. Those entities have been contributing not only to the socio-economic 
development but also to enhance international contacts, breaking the monopoly of the 
Department for Foreign Affairs  of the CPV and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in dealing 
with foreign policy issues.  
  
In Vietnam, intellectuals and think tanks are regarded as a part of periphery of policy 
making because in general, the making of foreign policy is largely in the hands of the 
Communist Party and State. Abuza (1997:310) notes that “Vietnamese foreign policy is 
decided by handful of senior Politburo officials”. Furthermore, Abuza (1997:329) points 
out that beside these officials, we find a proliferation of think tanks, institutes and 
research departments, with the Foreign Ministry and the connected Institute of 
International Relations providing effective input. Borrowing the analysis by Quansheng 
Zhao (2005). I would like to highlight the contribution of the intellectuals and think tanks 
in Vietnamese foreign policy-making through different channels as follows:  
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Diagram 4: Contribution of channels from civil society, Intellectuals and Think tanks in 
Vietnamese Foreign policy-making  
 
Remaining with certain limitations, these channels are not the decisive policy inputs in 
Vietnamese foreign policy-making, they are rather like formal and informal consultation 
entities. The fact is that there is still an inefficient use of resources provided by these 
institutes because of non-existence of comprehensive information sharing system 
between institutes and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that they provide decision makers advice on possible 
results of various causes of action; the nature of inter-linkages between issues and 
defining the self-interest of a state or the factions within it (Zhao, 2005:135). During its 
international integration, Vietnam’s foreign policy is surely not only limited in political, 
economic, security and strategic but also concerning issues such as culture, human 
rights, democracy and international institutions. Those various channels have been 
assisting the bureaucrats with profound contribution. Học viện Chính trị Quốc gia Hồ 
Chí Minh (Ho Chi Minh National Institute of Administration and Politics)118 under 
direction of Communist Party of Vietnam, there are also numbers of institutes which 
focusing on studies on different regional and international issues 119. 
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6.1.3. Summary  
 
In sum, a foreign policy analyst can not ignore to the influences of both domestic and 
international factors. Likewise, domestic-international linkage is conventionally an 
important paradigm in examining adjustment and changes in foreign policy making of  
Vietnam. It is important to note that Vietnam is one of few countries who still maintain 
authoritarian state, but with orientation of “soft authoritarian” since the rising influence 
of the civil societies and contribution of the think thanks and intellectuals groups. 
Vietnamese foreign policy making is, nevertheless, still partly based on historical 
experience. My argument is prone to the traditional accounts which affirm that the 
continuity and changes in Vietnamese foreign policy making are the result of traditional 
combination of different factors: economic development, regime security and 
consensus of Vietnam’s leaders120. This will be more indicated in the Chapter 7 of 
my thesis.  
 
6.2. Main adjustments in Vietnam’s foreign policy from 6th 
Party Congress to 10th Party Congress 
 
“The success of ðổi mới would largely depend on radical change in foreign policy” 
(Dorsch &Ta Minh Tuan, 2004). How has Vietnamese foreign policy changed over time 
to adapt to new environment? This part attempts to make an overview on main 
contents of Vietnamese foreign policy which have been set forth since 6th Congress of 
Vietnamese Communist Party to present. I try to examine the significant changes in 
foreign policy of Vietnam in different periods. This part hopes to shed light into the 
forthcoming Chapter in analysis of Vietnamese policy behaviors to the great powers.  
 
• Period 1986-1991: The 6th Congress of the CPV 
Like mentioned above fundamental economic reform requires a new foreign policy 
outlook in Vietnam. The country at the time had to confront with challenges of severe 
economic crisis and international isolation, most notably, was the US-embargo which 
prohibited not only development aid but also cut all trade relations with capitalist 
countries. Though the fear of “peaceful evolution” was still there, the leaders of the CPV 
one hand decided to launch ðổi mới, the other side, Vietnam endeavored to step out of 
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isolation by its withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, from Laos in 1990 and signed the 
Paris Peace Accords in Cambodia in 1991. The following tasks stated clearly in the 
Political report of the 5th Central Committee to Congress of the CPV : 
In the coming years, the tasks of our Party and State in the field of external 
affairs are to strive to combine the strength of the nation with that of the epoch, 
firmly maintain peace in Indochina, contribute actively to the firm maintenance of 
peace in Southeast Asia ant the world, strengthening the special relationship 
between the three Indochinese countries, strengthen the relations of friendship 
and all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries in the 
socialist community, secure favorable international conditions for the cause of 
building socialism and defending the Homeland, and at the same time, make an 
active contribution to the common struggle of the people of the world for peace, 
national independence, democracy and socialism.121  
 
Before ðổi mới, Vietnam considered relationship with the Soviet Union as a 
“cornerstone” and chasing a policy of “leaning on one side”. These kind of expression 
has not been repeated in the 6th Party Congress. Instead, Hanoi stressed the 
importance of the internal “strength of nation” - the idea of independence at first. 
“Vietnam has made clear that it will avoid being dependent on any one particular 
country for economic and military aid. This has been one of the painful lessons it has 
learnt from hitching itself to the Soviet Union from 1978.” (Yeong, 1992:263).  
 
However, as a country with socialist ideology, the CPV has to raise their rhetoric anti-
imperialism voice and the theme of proletarian internationalism plans an important role. 
Now with new intention of shaking hands with the capitalist countries, Hanoi has to find 
the way to express their inward presentation and outward attitude.  
 
In a discussion about changing directions of Vietnamese foreign policy,  Dosch and Ta 
Minh Tuan (2004:199) comment that “confront with mounting international pressure and 
a deep internal economic crisis, Vietnam decided to change its foreign policy. Now it 
needed peace more than ever. When ðổi mới was inaugurated in 1986, the 
Vietnamese leaders initiated a new “peace of cooperation” policy, reflecting an 
apparent realization that only cooperation and equality in international relations could 
bring about lasting peace and stability.” Accordingly, Vietnam no longer considers USA 
as a fundamental and long-term foe and China as an imminent and dangerous enemy.  
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Basically, a concrete foreign policy was defined as “diversification” (ña phương hóa) 
and “multilateralisation” (ña dạng hóa) which was outlined in the Resolution No.13 of 
May 1988 Politburo of the CPV. This determined policy has been expressing their 
usefulness Vietnamese foreign relations with not only the great powers but also 
international organizations.  
 
• Period 1991-1996: The 7th Congress of the CPV 
 
This period witnessed a wide open door foreign policy when Vietnam solemnly 
declared “Vietnam wishes to befriend with all countries in the world 
community”122. This new principle has been even adopted in the Art.14 of 1992 
Constitution. Obviously, Vietnam attempts to maximize its relationship with every 
country regardless of ideology. It was stated clearly in the Political report in the 7th Party 
Congress that: “We stand for equal and mutual beneficial cooperation with all countries 
regardless of different socio-political systems and on the basis of the principle of 
peaceful co-existence”123 Regarding domestic policy, Vietnam started to implement the 
“Strategy for Socio-economic stabilization and development 1991-2000” 
The main characters of Hanoi’s open door foreign policy can be summarized as 
follows:  
 
• Improve economic and political situation and social justice at the same time, to 
break up the state of economic embargo and diplomatic isolation and to secure a 
peaceful and stable international environment for “socialist construction”. 
 
• To diversify and multi-lateralize economic relations with all countries and economic 
organizations on the principle of respect for independence, sovereignty, equality 
and mutual benefit. These included attraction of foreign direct investment. 
  
• To integrate Vietnam into regional and international organizations.124 
 
It is noteworthy that the priority of Vietnamese grand strategy following up with its 
foreign policy stressed by the shift from political and military strength to economic 
development. Hanoi has also realized that the demise of economic support from the 
former CMEA125 states meant that the country has to seek for new sources of foreign 
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Congress (2005). Hanoi: The Gioi Publisher. p.847 
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 75 years of the Communist Party of Vietnam, 1930-2005. Selection documents from nine Party 
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 Also noted in Dosch and Ta Minh Tuan (2004).p197 
125
 CMEA stands for Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
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assistance. One of the most important requirements for this principle is a “stable 
relations with the big economic powers”. Therefore, the guidance in relations with 
China, the U.S and the Soviet Union was apparently adjusted126: 
 
• Towards China: “….to promote the process of normalization of relations with China, 
gradually expend Vietnamese-Chinese cooperation, and solve problems pending 
between two countries through negotiation” 
• Towards the U.S and other Western European countries: “ to expand equal and 
mutual beneficial cooperation with northern and Western European countries. To 
promote the process of normalization of relation with the United States”  
• To the Soviet Union: “… to consistently strengthen solidarity and cooperation with 
the Soviet Union, to renew the mode and improve the efficiency of Vietnamese-
Soviet cooperation in order to meet the interests of each country”. 
 
• Period 1996-2001: The 8th Congress of the CPV 
 
After 15 years applying new direction in foreign policy of multilateralism and open 
friendly relationship to all countries, Vietnam gradually stepped out of international 
isolation and economic crisis. Besides being member of the United Nations, Vietnam 
became full members of more than thirty international institutions, most notably, the 
shift on a higher level when Vietnam was accepted to be full member of ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asia Nations), IMF (International Monetary Fund) and ILO 
(International Labour Organization).   
 
In the Political Report of the 8th Party Congress, the statement of openness and 
multilateralism in foreign policy has been reaffirmed:  
To continue with our foreign policy of independence, sovereignty, openness, 
diversification and multi-lateralization of foreign relations, in the sprit that 
Vietnam wishes to be friend of all nations in the world community, striving for 
peace, independence and development. To effect multifaceted, bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with all countries and international and regional 
organizations on the principle of respect for one another’s independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal 
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 Communist Party of Vietnam, Political Report to the 7th Party Congress, 1991, in 75 years of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam, 1930-2005. Selection documents from nine Party Congress (2005). 
Hanoi: The Gioi Publisher. p.884 
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affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and settlement of remaining problems and 
disputes by means of negotiations.127  
 
A new additional feature of Vietnamese foreign policy direction in this period was that 
Hanoi also attempted to broaden their ties with non-government organizations and 
international friendship organizations, namely people-to-people diplomacy. This new 
task was also added in the Political report of the 8th Party Congress as follows:  
To expand external people-to-people relations and relations with foreign non-
governmental organizations, secure broad-based sympathy and, support from 
other peoples, and contribute to promoting the trend for peace, cooperation and 
development. 128 
 
So far, one of the most active institutions working effectively in this field is the Vietnam 
Union of Friendship organization129. This institution operates with fundamental aims 
to strengthen the economic, cultural and scientific cooperation between Vietnamese 
people and the people around the world.  
 
• Period 2001-2006: The 9th and 10th Congress of the CPV 
 
The 9th Party Congress was regarded as great significant one since the country entered 
the 21st century with experience of 10 years of execution of the “Strategy for Socio-
economic stabilization a development”, 15 years of implementation of ðổi mới.  
 
In adjustment of the domestic policy, a very popular slogan of “bringing into play the 
entire nation’s strength”130 was raised. This is due to the fact that Vietnamese 
economic development relies much on foreign investment and markets. The Political 
Report to the 9th Party Congress figured out four main “dangers”131 (Nguy cơ): 1. 
“Peaceful evolution” (Diễn biến hòa bình); 2. Further backwardness in economic 
development (Tụt hậu xa hơn về kinh tế); 3. Corruption (Tham nhũng) ; 4. Degradation 
in political ideology (Chệch hướng Chủ nghĩa xã hội). Among those, corruption is 
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considered as the biggest challenge to legitimacy of the CPV. The Congress also 
outlined the “Strategy for Socio-economic Development 2001-2010”132 and later on 
pointed out the other challenges such as: “other side of market economy” and 
challenge of increasing gap between Rich and Poor.”.  
 
In the process of international integration, Vietnam has been aware of challenges of 
competition in economic integration and the negative side of market economy. 
Therefore, Hanoi toned up to the international community that it is not only “befriend” 
but also has to be a “reliable partner” in the world community: “To constantly 
implement the foreign policy of independence, sovereignty, openness, multi-
lateralization and diversification of international relations, Vietnam is prepared to be a 
friend and reliable partner of all countries in the international community, striving for 
peace, independence, and development”133  
 
Beside the above general guidelines, Hanoi also set an important task in the new time 
of globalization which is “enhancing the wills of self-reliance, maintaining national 
identity in the process of international integration” and striving for “wealthy people, 
prosperous nation, democratic and civilized society”134  
 
What was new in the 10th Party Congress in 2006 about foreign policy orientation was 
that Hanoi stressed the two most fundamental objectives in foreign relations, namely 
“development”, “security” and “promoting Vietnamese position in regional and 
international arena135. In doing so, “Vietnam has to actively participate in international 
economic integration”, accordingly, achieving a strong and stable economic 
development contributes to national security. Hanoi also implies “to be ready in opening 
dialogues with other nations and international institutions about human right issues” but 
at the same time, reaffirming the leading role of the Communist Party and centralism 
principle of state in foreign policy-making136. 
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Most notably, enhancing relations toward the great powers (nước lớn) is clearly 
emphasized in the Resolution of 8th Plenum of the Communist Party. A very concrete 
Moto of foreign relations (phương châm ñối ngoại) are considered new and significant 
for the cause of industrialization and modernization137:  
• Ensure national interest; 
• Maintain independence and self-reliance together with a diversification and mulit-
lateralization in foreign relations; 
• Good perception of cooperation (hợp tác) and struggle (ñấu tranh) approaches in 
international relations (application of these two approaches should be pursuant to 
actors, situation, issues and period, strongly focus on promotion of cooperation, 
struggle approach is served for cooperation, avoiding direct confrontation and falling 
in isolation situation); 
• Promote cooperation with regional countries and especially broadening relations 
with great powers; 
• Actively join and integrate into regional and international organizations. 
 
6.3. Summary  
Through investigation of Vietnamese foreign policy in different Party Congresses of the 
CPV since 1986, some features should be highlighted which I call “reform of thinking” in 
foreign policy-making: 
1. Reform of thinking in perception of the outside world  
2. Reform of thinking in perception of security, development, national interest 
3. Reform of thinking of foreign policy approaches  
4. Reform of thinking in identifying “friend and foe” 
5. Reform of thinking about different contributing channels to foreign policy-making  
Those components were actually affirmed previously in traditional Asian approaches -
“dialectic materialism” namely “ngũ tri” (five “Knows”) which Ho Chi Minh flexibly 
practiced during his term: “biết mình, biết người, biết thời thế, biết dừng và biết biến” 
“know yourself, know the others, know the world situation, know to stop and know the 
variables”. 
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Significant changes in Vietnamese foreign policy since 1986 will be summarized in the 
following table138:  
 
 Before ðổi mới (1964-1986) From ðổi mới to present  
 
Worldview  • Two-camps: Capitalists and 
Socialists 
• “Three  revolutionary 
currents”139 
• Multi-polarity and 
interdependence 
• Globalization and Scientific-
technological Revolution 
Ideology  • Marxism-Leninism 
orientation  
• “socialism”  
• Marginalization of Ideology: 
Pragmatism under the 
rhetoric slogan “orthodox of 
Marxism-Leninism and Ho 
Chi Minh thought” and 
“socialism construction”  
Grand strategy  • National liberation and 
National Unification  
• Modernization and 
Industrialization  
 
Interests  
 
Primacy of class interest:  
 
• Class struggle: 
 “who will win” 
 
 
 
Primacy of national interest: 
 
• prone to  peaceful 
cooperation;  
• Economic development and 
national security: economic 
security and sovereignty 
security, protection of national 
identity etc.     
Ambition  
 
• Communist victory on a 
global scale 
• Revolution export (to Laos, 
Cambodia, Thailand) 
• “Wealthy people, strong 
nation and democratic, and 
civilized society”  
 
• Identifying: “Who is friend 
who is foe?” 
• Anti-imperialism  
• Vietnamese revolution was 
part of “World revolution” 
• “Open door policy”  
• Multilateralization and 
Diversification: “befriend with 
all nations and a reliable 
partner”  
„begging for aid“  Self-reliance and integration to 
international community  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign policy 
directions  • USSR as “cornerstone”  
Socialist bloc  
• Alliance with China and 
Opposition to the United 
States 
 
• Close ties with the West 
• Integration to Asia-Pacific 
     and ASEAN 
• Strategic partnership and 
cooperative partnership with 
the great powers 
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 This summary has been formulated with the reference of the Thesis from Vuving (2006). The shaping 
foreign policy: Vietnamese grand strategy after the cold war 
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 See Chapter 4, part 4.1 
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Diplomacy 
approaches  
• Diplomacy regarded as a 
front serving military front  
• „Antagonism diplomacy“ 
• “Economic diplomacy” 
• People-to-people diplomacy 
(track-two diplomacy)  
• Using intellectuals, think 
tanks and contribution of 
NGOs  as a consultation 
sources  
Consequences  • Isolation  
• Trade embargo  
• Economic crisis and 
unstable society  
• Diplomatic relations with 172 
countries  
• Trade agreements with 76 
countries  
• Vietnam as an influent 
member in ASEAN  
• Non-permanent member of 
the UN Security Council 
(2008-2009) 
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Chapter 7: Vietnam’s strategic approaches toward 
the Great Powers (1986 to present) 
 
Strategic approaches to international relations which are also called by Vuving (2006) 
as “Foreign policy pathways”140. Nguyen Vu Tung (2002) comments that “mainstream 
approaches of international theory have yet convincingly to demonstrate their 
usefulness in explaining regionalism and foreign relation patterns in Southeast Asia”. 
Contrasting this assessment, this Chapter attempts to investigate the configuration of 
the Vietnamese foreign relations with the great powers since 1986 by applying basic 
assumptions of Western international theories: realism and liberalism; neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism. The great powers mentioned in this thesis included: the U.S.A, China, 
Russia, The European Union, Japan and India141  
 
Like mentioned in the part 2.3, the debate about realism and liberalism has dominated 
mainstream in western international relations. They share many assumptions about 
actors, values, issues and power arrangements in the international system. Neo-
realists and neo-liberals study different worlds. Neo-realists study security issues and 
are concerned with issues of power and survival. Neo-liberals study political economy 
and focus in cooperation and institutions.  
 
My argument is that the Vietnamese relation towards the great powers since 1986 is a 
combination of both theoretical paradigms: realism and liberalism. It would be a very 
heavy assignment if looking in details of the whole Vietnamese foreign relations with 
the great powers since 1986. Therefore, in each part I will only look at Vietnamese 
main policy behaviour towards a great power, and then point out which kind of strategic 
approaches Vietnam has preferred in different phases, and I estimate different 
scenarios of Vietnamese relations with the great powers in the medium term.  
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 In his paper about Strategy and evolution of Vietnam’s China policy, Vuving (2006) explains that each 
strategic approach operates within a paradigm of international relations, for example, “balancing” and 
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7.1. Vietnam’ U.S policy 
 
Since Vietnam launched ðổi mới policy, the country’s policy towards the USA has been 
radically adjusted through different period of times. Hanoi started to reconsider the 
position of the USA in its foreign strategy and possible benefits of its relations with 
America in serving the grand strategy of “economic development”. Vietnam’s intention 
was to adjust its policy toward the U.S from “confrontation” to “struggle for peaceful 
co-existence”142. It was fully aware of harmful impact originated from U.S trade 
embargo (prohibiting trade in goods, services and financial transactions) which the U.S 
government implemented since 1964. Until 3th February 1994 (also the birthday of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam), the trade embargo was released. This event opened a 
new page for a future of bilateral cooperative and strategic relations, but what 
happened in history still left much suspicion (nghi ngai) and precaution (de phong) for 
both sides. It can be briefly said that the relationship between Vietnam and the U.S is 
characterized as a mixture of both “cooperation” and “struggle”. Vuving (2006) calls 
Vietnam’s attitude toward America as “ambivalent” - both admiration and hostility. 
Vietnam has chosen different strategic approaches in dealing with the U.S since 1986, 
but the two most notable approaches are: “balancing” (external and internal 
balancing) and “appeasement”. 
 
• Period 1986-1994: From hostile behaviour to endeavours of lifting the trade 
embargo against Vietnam and preparing for normalization process  
 
In 30 April 1975, the decade-lasting image of the undefeated army of superpower- U.S 
was crumbled, when the two tanks of the North Army of Vietnam broke down the gate 
of Independence Palace in Saigon. The hostile attitudes of the U.S administration 
against Vietnam were expressed not only by implementation of  trade embargo to 
entire Vietnam but also freezing over 150 million US dollars of Vietnamese assets in 
America. President Ford vetoed Vietnam's membership in the UN and prohibited any 
foreign aid to Vietnam and tightening the procedures for legal immigration. 
 
In the year 1978, the first negotiation of the normalization between Vietnam and the 
U.S came to complete failure due to different national interests set by two sides: The 
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U.S and the West considers Vietnamese occupation was an intention of regional 
hegemony in Indochina. At that time, Vietnam was still a very close ally of the Soviet 
Union, thus, the Soviet’s influence (through Hanoi) in the Indochina region would be a 
threat for both U.S and China. Vietnam’s position about Cambodia was “just to help the 
Cambodian revolutionary force to eliminate the Polpot’s genocide”, and this reaction 
was considered as necessity, not only for Cambodia security but also for Vietnamese 
national security.  
 
After 1988, a remarkable change in Vietnamese policy toward the U.S should be taken 
into account was that Vietnam has no longer considered the U.S as a “basic and long-
term enemy” and started to discuss about approaches “…to promote the process of 
normalization of relations with the United States”143. This period can be seen as 
breaking “the ice” and coming to preparation for normalization. The rationales for both 
sides oriented on normalization of relationship due to calculation of national interest 
and changes in perceptions toward each other, mainly summed up as follows: 
 
For Vietnam:  
 
• Vietnam’s new perception about the U.S:  
The end of Cold War witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, U.S becomes the “center of world power” with much 
superiority and strong influences (political, economic, military and culture). 
• Political interest:  
Normalization with U.S is the primary topic in Vietnamese foreign 
relations. A normalized relationship with America regarded as a link and 
contribution to promote normalization and better relationship with other 
great powers. This also consolidated Vietnam’s foreign policy direction of 
“diversification and multi-lateralization” with all other nation states. 
Furthermore, Vietnam also could enhance its relation with regional and 
international financial institutions in order to access to international aid 
and loans. Vietnam, therefore, could promote its position in regional and 
international arena.  
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Vietnam set up a strategy of “external balancing” when normalizing 
relationship with the U.S. It was well aware of the rising of China, the 
importance and economic influence of Japan and Europe in the Asia-
pacific region. Dahm (1995:35) notes that “The open “door” policy is trying 
to balance potential and actual rivals against one another so that Vietnam 
can benefit as a middleman”. 
• Economic interest: 
Hanoi also expected to access a huge market of consumption, advanced 
technology and know-how in the United States. Opportunities of exporting 
agricultural products to America and attracting foreign investments not 
only the U.S but also international institutions like World Bank, 
International Monetary Bank where the U.S takes much accounts and 
possesses a very “decisive” vote.  
There are almost 2 million Vietnamese living in the United States144. 
Though reactions and attitudes towards the Vietnamese Communists are 
different and contradictory but many of Vietnamese in oversea 
communities have been silently offered investment of support to 
economic development of the homeland-Vietnam. 
• Security interest:  
A normalization relation with the U.S was also important to Vietnam in 
improvement of a peaceful and cooperation environment in the region. 
This would contribute to effective execution of “economic development” 
strategy and at the same time, it was also an implication of balancing the 
rising China.  
• Other interests included advantages in education exchanges and vocational 
training, especially, higher education in the U.S.  
 
For the United States: 
 
In the post-Cold War era, Vietnam has not been one of primary policies in the U.S 
global strategy, but playing an increasingly important role in American regional strategy 
in Southeast Asia. The changing behavior of the U.S toward Vietnam is part of the U.S 
adjustment in foreign policy in Asia Pacific. Bill Clinton replaced George H. W. Bush by 
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his convincing “engagement and enlargement” strategy which promoted economic 
reform, large investment in informatics and technology, fostering talks and bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, searching new foreign markets etc. Behaviors toward Vietnam 
was later underlined by Bill Clinton that the normalization and communication 
exchanges between American and Vietnamese would advance the cause of freedom 
(liberalization process) in Vietnam like it has happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Economic stability in Vietnam, a free and peaceful Vietnam would serve US 
interest in a stable and peaceful Asia145  
 
The U.S has been aware of declining influence of Russia and constant efforts rising 
power of China and Japan in mobilizing allies and promoting bilateral relations with the 
Southeast Asian nations. America, thus attempted to improve its relationship with the 
core allies such as Thailand, Philippines, Australia and South Korea. Vietnamese geo-
political position, especially Cam Ranh bay, has drawn mostly U.S attention. This bay is 
an open connection from Pacific Ocean to Indian Ocean and from South Pacific Ocean 
to East Asia.  
 
Last but not least, one of the important factors leading to change of the U.S behaviors 
to Vietnam is economic interest. The American business interest groups have made 
constant efforts to encourage U.S Administration to normalize relationship with 
Vietnam. The estimated the dynamics and demand of a market with almost 80 millions 
inhabitants146. Heinz C. Prechter, Senior Consultant to White House remarked that in 
the near future, America will loose its competitive markets in Southeast Asia if it does 
not start to lift the trade embargo against Vietnam147. Together with a good sign by 
Vietnamese open foreign policy and positive effects of implementation of ðổi mới, the 
George Bush Senior’s administration presented Vietnam in April 1991 with conditions, 
so called “road map” for lifting the embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations.  
 
After gradually lifting some economic sanctions, and allowing US and foreign 
investment and trading in Vietnam, finally the embargo was released on 3th Februar 
1994 after the US Senate passed the resolution of urging for lifting the embargo. The 
release of the trade embargo was mostly due to positive reactions of Hanoi in 
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withdrawing its final troops from Cambodia in 1989 and ensuring the self-determination 
of Cambodians by launching an election for a new Cambodian government in 1991. 
 
• Period 1995-2005: Normalization of diplomatic relations, from “appeasement” to 
“conformation” 
Through much efforts from both sides for lifting the embargo against Vietnam, the news 
has actually did not draw much attention of  Vietnamese government because for 
Hanoi, “the embargo was far less important than the restoration of full diplomatic ties 
and the granting of several trade privileges, including ‘Most Favored Nation Status’ and 
‘Generalized System of Preferences’148. Hanoi’s ambition to urge further step in 
normalized relationship with the superpower, once was “basic and long-term strategic 
enemy” of Vietnam.  
 
One of the serious impediments in Vietnam-U.S relations was the POW/MIA149 issue. 
The U.S, under strong pressures and obsessions of the Vietnam War, has ranked this 
issue as highest significance since they have to keep faith with the families of these 
missing servicemen. It means “Vietnam has to wait until all the questions concerning 
missing Americans will be answered, before full diplomatic relations will be established” 
(Dahm, 1995:37). For Vietnam, it is also very sensitive issue since domestic reaction of 
frequent questions raised by many Vietnamese: What about more than 3 millions 
Vietnamese citizens who were dead in a war that none of us wanted to it to happen and 
none of us tries to provoke. What about thousands of Vietnamese solders would have 
never been found again? What about the effects of Agent Orange which many victims 
suffer in generations?  
 
Vietnam government, though confronting with thorny problem, expressed its 
concessions and considered POW/MIA as “humanitarian issue”. Hanoi’s willingness to 
actively cooperate with the U.S in solving this problem and numbers of different 
delegations were allowed to enter Vietnam and realize their missions. As a 
consequence, a crucial event in history of Vietnam-U.S relation took place. It was in 
17th July 1995 when Bill Clinton announced about normalization of diplomatic relations 
with Vietnam. After more than two decades of “hostility” and “blocking”, a new page in 
history of bilateral relations has been open.  
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The relations of the two countries developed substantially further and marked by the 
Bilateral Trade Agreement signed on 10th December 2001. This agreement is regarded 
as good framework for cooperation in many aspects. Coincidently, it implied a “hefty 
internal struggle” between the two camps of modernizers and anti-imperialist inside 
Vietnam150 In reaching this step, Vietnam has to accept numbers of conditions set by 
the U.S. Though Washington has withdrawn its “stick” but would not offer “carrot” if 
Hanoi was not pledged to improve its human rights record, “the warmth of relationship 
depended partly on Vietnam’s human rights performance”151. Following this 
requirement, Vietnam was obliged with a transformation of its administrative and legal 
system152. An official visit of U.S President Bill Clinton in the year 2000 made a 
landmark in history of Vietnam-U.S relations when BBC commented that it was the first 
official visit ever by the U.S President to independent and unified Vietnam153.  
The period from 2001-2005 witnessed bilateral diplomatic visits of high-ranking 
governmental delegations, mostly concerning with following features: Firstly, the 
relations between two countries was largely affected by U.S gathering forces in anti-
terrorist campaign; Secondly, economic cooperation and resolving trade disputes were 
the dominant topics in different agendas. Thirdly, Human rights and religious freedom 
are still concerned as obstacles in promoting bilateral relations154.  
 
• From 2006 to present: “tacit external balancing” and promoting economic 
cooperation  
 
Vietnam decided to join “new rules of game” in its path to international economic 
integration when the country was accepted as 150th member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2007. This achievement has shown enormous efforts by Hanoi 
in many aspects except political pluralism. The U.S has been often associating the 
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issues of human rights and religious freedom with trade and investment relations. In 
October 2005, the United States Department of State listed Vietnam in CPC (Country 
of Particular Concern) which indicated Vietnam’ particularly severe violation of religious 
freedom under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998 (H.R. 2431). 
Nevertheless, until 2004, the trading volume between two countries reached 6.4 billions 
US dollars and almost 8.0 billions dollars in 2007. The FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) 
of the United States accounted 2.3 billions US Dollars in 2007155. 
During the implementation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement, Vietnam and the U.S 
business group experienced some trade disputes, most notably was the Basa (Catfish) 
case. CFA (Catfish Farmer of America) has sued to Vietnam VASEP (Vietnam 
Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers) for dumping prices in American 
markets. Vietnam later on has to cover a very high anti-dumping tariffs ranging from 
36.84% to 63.88%. As a result, many of Vietnamese fishery exporters were not able to 
export catfish to America due to low benefit. Vietnam has also learnt a lesson that the 
American trade protectionism in practice in still very strong, the “new rule of game” in a 
competitive globalization is sometimes not really fair for developing countries. Joining 
WTO is not all, and the next step to do is till on the search of the almost 90 millions 
inhabitant country. 
 
Nonetheless, both countries have achieved numbers of agreements for bilateral benefit 
in economic cooperation such as PNTR (Permanent normal Trade Relations) in 2007, 
TIFA (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement) and many agreements and 
exchanges on training and higher education.   
 
The years in the first decade of 21stcentury witnessed both broad and substantial 
relations of the two countries when number exchanges of high-ranking delegations 
headed by Prime Ministers and Presidents. Behind all those events emerged a feature 
of further bilateral military and security cooperation between Vietnam and the U.S. I 
would prefer to have a close look into two most notable events in order to identify the 
strategic approach “tacit external balancing” expressed by Hanoi in dealing with 
Washington and Beijing.  
 
The first notable event was the official visit by Predident Nguyễn Minh Triết in July 
2007 to the White House, focusing on cooperation in the areas of economics and trade. 
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However, for some assessments, this was a visit with “less success in fulfilling 
economic objective and failed in realizing political goals” (ít thành công về kinh tế 
nhưng thất bại về chính trị)156. Shortly before the planned visit to Washington, 
President Triet had to rush for a courtesy call to Chinese General Secretary Hu Jingtao, 
implying that Hanoi was in search for a strategic economic partner-U.S but not allowed 
to forget the giant neighboring power-China. It is also a “traditional habit” which Beijing 
has been attempting to maintain with Vietnamese leaders, and the Vietnamese have 
yet dared to step out of “Chinese shade”- a traditional fear of Chinese threat157. 
President Triet’s decision to visit China shortly before his tour to the U.S mitigated the 
strong pressure of conservative camp in Vietnam’s Politburo whose perception still 
associated with “regime security” under protection of Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
However, Hanoi’s “clumsy diplomatic action” has caused Washing’s irritation and 
discontent158. By unofficial announcement of cancelling Triet’s trip to America and at 
the same time it hosted a discussion with four Vietnamese human right and democracy 
activists. Though uneasy incidents, Hanoi still decided to send President Triet to 
Washington and this reaction showed its own independence in dealing with China and 
the U.S.  
 
The second remarkable event was official visit of General Phùng Quang Thanh, 
Minister of National Defense, People’s Army of Vietnam to the United State159. Before 
landing Washington, General Phung Quang Thanh paid tour to Hickcam Air Force 
Base in Hawaii and the training facilities at the Naval Submarine Training Center 
Pacific. This visit has sent an message to Beijing that Hanoi will seek a “tacit external 
balancing” and “defense itself” after numbers of incidents happened in Eastern sea (In 
2005, nine Vietnamese fishermen were shot dead by Chinese Navy and in 2007 one 
Vietnamese ship was again shot and then sank.160) These incidents all happened due 
to China-Vietnam territorial disputes in East Sea. This visit by General Thanh also 
implied that Vietnam is interested in buying U.S. weapons and Hanoi also expressed its 
worries about the East sea disputes with China. It tries to make balancing to protect 
national independence and not be swallowed up by China. The main concern 
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expressed in different dialogues with Washington “China’s increasing economic 
influence and military presence in Asia”161 
 
Vietnam and the U.S also strengthen the relationship between two Armies, especially 
the American navy ship to Da Nang in 2009. Hanoi and Washington started to launch 
the first annual strategic dialogue on politics and defense - an indication that Hanoi is 
ready to promote bilateral military relations with Washington.162 
 
One characteristic in the Vietnam-U.S relations should be taken into account is the 
Vietnamese diaspora in America. Approximately, two millions Vietnamese living in the 
United States, most of them left Vietnam after 1975. Their attitudes toward Vietnam 
and Vietnam-U.S relations are quite different: Group 1. hostile behaviors and seek 
ways to criticize Vietnam’s regime, protesting and determent to the U.S normalization 
with Vietnam (most of those were once worked for the old regime of Ngo Dinh Diem 
and . Group 2. seeking opportunities to promote contacts with Vietnam. Group 3. no 
concrete political opinions or complicated attitudes, called as “silent group”, mostly 
involved in earning living and business development. This group is easily induced by 
Group 1. Others than these groups are the young second Vietnamese generation who 
grow up abroad and have little knowledge about Vietnam163.  
In sum, Vietnam’s U.S policy has indicated significant changes both in directions and 
approaches. If Hanoi’s past policy behaviors prone to ideological difference and ant-
imperialist, its policy is now much flexible and diversified in different period of time, 
leaning on pursuit of its national interest: economic development and stable security.  
Though there are still existing certain impediments in the relationship, mostly due to the 
difference in political institutions and obsession of Vietnam War but all in all Vietnam-
U.S has both adjusted their strategies and behaviors toward each other. Nevertheless, 
Vietnam’s leaders are well aware of China’s position and influence, particularly, in the 
periphery countries. Hanoi’s Politburo is dominant by two different cams: conservatives 
and modernizers. Continuity of external balancing has been practically Hanoi’s familiar 
strategic approach in dealing with the both great powers. Meanwhile, constant efforts 
on strengthening itself through economic development will be set as priority.  
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Some scenarios can be seen in the future of Vietnam-U.S relations: 1. continue to be a 
strategic partners. 2. Vietnam becomes strategic ally. 3. Under China’s pressure, 
Vietnam-U.S relations mainly focus on economic cooperation 4. Increasing differences 
and shoals lead to tensions, possible economic sanctions. Among those, the first 
scenario is more feasible, the third and fourth will happen sometimes and the second 
one is in the long-term impossible.  
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7.2. Vietnam’s China policy  
 
Numerous papers and several books about Sino-Vietnam relations164 after Cold War 
has been published, and among those, Womack’s book about “China and Vietnam: the 
Politics of Asymmetry” is one of the significant contributions to understand historical 
and contemporary Sino-Vietnam asymmetric China-Vietnam relationship. There should 
be no neglect about the importance of asymmetry in theory of international relations. 
One overview about history of China-Vietnam relationship in this book is valuable to 
take into account: 
In their three thousand years of interaction, China and Vietnam have been 
through a full range of relationships. Twenty years ago they were one another’s 
worst enemy; fifty years ago they were the closest of comrades. Five hundreds 
years ago they each saw themselves as Confucian empires… 
 (Womack, 2006) 
 
Remarking about Vietnamese strategic approaches, Vuving (2006) concludes that 
Vietnam’s China policy has been informed by a changing mixture of four concrete 
pathways: balancing, deference, solidarity and enmeshment165 This part of my thesis is 
not an ambition of going through the diplomatic activities in history of the bilateral 
relationship, but rather, based on the analysis of the two scholars, mainly illuminating 
the dynamics of the Vietnam-China relations and highlight significant adjustment in 
Vietnam’s policy behaviors toward the “giant neighbor”-China since 1986 to present. 
My assessment is that changes and tendency of Vietnam’s China policy are prone to 
approaches of geopolitical consideration and the perflexity of bandwagoning, 
balancing (searching for counterweight) and deference. 
 
• Period 1986-1991: from hostile and direct confrontation to normalization  
If in the period (1950-1978), the relationship of Vietnam and China was regarded as 
“strategic allies” in the struggle against imperialism, sharing similar ideology-a typical 
“give and take” relationship of the countries in the socialist bloc in the Cold War, the 
period (1979-1986) witnessed a range of military clashes accompanied with hostile 
                                                 
164
 Womack (2006), Thayer (1999, 2008), Vuving (2005), Amer (2004), Dahm (1995), Guan (1998), 
Qiang Zhai (2000)  
165
 Vuving, A.L. (2006). „Strategy and evolution of Vietnam’s China policy“, in: Asian Survey -A Bimonthly 
review of Contemporary Asian Affairs. Vol. XLVI. No.6.pp.805-824 
 108 
behaviors and direct confrontation166. Both Vietnam and China after 1986 attempted to 
adjust policy behaviors of orientation for a normalized relationship. 
 
For Vietnam: The document of the 6th Vietnamese Party Congress in 1986 identified a 
clear attitude that “Once again, we officially declare that: Vietnam is ready to negotiate 
with China at anytime, any level and anywhere in order to achieve normalization in 
bilateral relationship for the interest of the two peoples and for peace in the Southeast 
Asian region and in the world” 167 The Resolution 13 of the CPV (1988) again affirmed 
Vietnam’s striving for a normalization with China. This reaction was under the guidance 
of a foreign policy direction of “more friends and less foe” in 1986. Not to neglect that 
Vietnam was still suffered strongly from international isolation due to Cambodia issue 
and being enmeshed in severely domestic economic crisis.  
For China, the end of 1980s, though its appearance with significant economic 
achievements and high economic growth rate, Beijing also had to face with challenges 
brought by radical changes in market economy and experienced with political 
instability, one evidence was the Tiananmen Square upheaval. After this incident, 
China had to confront with isolation triggered by U.S and many other Western 
European countries. Diplomatic relations with number of nations were, consequently, 
cut off. Beijing started to make adjustment in, on one hand, its policy toward the 
neighboring countries which China calls as “periphery countries” policy (chính sách với 
các nước ngoại biên. On the other hand, China concentrated on economic and trading 
development of coastal and borders areas.  
 
Despite of turbulence in the relationship happened in 1988 (Chinese army occupied six 
rock yards in the Spratly Island controlled by Vietnam and later on fired shot three 
transport ships and killed 70 sailors of Vietnam’s navy)168, apparently, both Vietnam 
and China, derived form internal demands, have been encouraged to strive for a 
peaceful environment and stable security serving for national economic development. 
This is also the main trends of international relations in the post-Cold War era. For 
Vietnam, a normalcy with China plays a very crucial role because of historical and 
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geopolitical factors. Through historical experience in dealing with the giant northern 
neighbor, the Vietnamese have drawn up for themselves an old proverb “bán anh em 
xa mua láng giềng gần” (selling out-of-sight brothers away to buying neighbors anigh). 
After more than ten years of “estrangement”, despite of numbers of on-going disputes, 
Vietnam and China came to normalization status declared in the Vietnam-China Joint 
Statement in 1991. 
 
• Period 1991-2006: partner relationship with the moto of “16-golden words” and 
“four good” spirit - territorial disputes as  shoals forcing Hanoi to search for 
“balancing” 
  
Dealing with Hanoi is part of Chinese foreign policy toward the Southeast Asian 
nations which described by Sutter and Huang (2006) as “promoting strategic 
partnership” in order to expand its influence in the region; and to serve its economic and 
security benefits. Faced with China’s double strategy, Hanoi’s willingness to become 
full member of ASEAN, and it expected to fulfill a two-fold purpose: 1. to pull Vietnam 
out of the Chinese orbit; 2. to “balance against China”, engaged China with ASEAN 
structure and informal alliance. Hanoi estimated that Beijing would not risk its 
domestic reform program and therefore would moderate policy behavior toward the 
similar ideological sharing neighbor-Vietnam.  
 
In the normalization of relationship, both Vietnamese and Chinese leaders attempted to 
inaugurate codification for political relations and defense cooperation. Numbers of 
Agreements have been signed by the two countries’ leader. Most notable was “Joint 
Statement Vietnam-China 2001” which defines “both sides will refrain from taking any 
action that might complicate and escalate disputes, resorting to force or making 
threats with force”169. The two sides set up annual agenda for high-level political 
delegations exchanges, various discussions of experts on territorial disputes. As a 
result, Vietnam and China have achieved a further step in economic cooperation 
signing a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century (2000).  
 
In 2001, the bilateral relationship reached higher level expressed in the moto of “16-
golden words”: “ðoàn kết, hữu nghị, hợp tác toàn diện, ổn ñịnh lâu dài, hướng tới 
tương lai” (Friendly neighborliness, comprehensive cooperation, long-lasting stability 
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and looking toward the future) and the “Bốn tốt” “four-good” spirit” (Good neighbors, 
good friends, good comrades and good partners)170 
 
In terms of territorial disputes in South China seas, China has signed six different 
agreements with six Southeast Asian countries on security cooperation, but there was 
no defense clause included in the Sino-Vietnamese agreement (Thayer, 2008).  
Obviously, China is always aware of its position, its strength of a great power and the 
situation of the region in applying its strategy. 
 
Hanoi, though fascinated by Chinese shining example in economic boom and 
development, looking at China as a “Model” for reform process, trying to copy its 
patterns, but it is still always hard for Hanoi to find a solution for a hard crux, which 
concerned closely to its security issue, the territorial disputes with the “giant 
neighbor”171. The long lasting mistrusts between the two Asian countries still exist. 
The evidence was that in 2005, nine Vietnamese fishermen were shot dead by 
Chinese navy. Hanoi startled about the news but preferred to deal with China with 
diplomatic negotiations rather than taking military countermeasures. Many 
Vietnamese all over have strongly protested and condemned this violent reaction by 
Chinese navy, also in front of the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi. However, Beijing 
insisted that this incident will not harm the bilateral relationship. Meanwhile Hanoi did 
not intend to make tensions but tries to search a “tacit balancing” approach in dealing 
with the U.S172 and seek alliance and support from other ASEAN countries, since 
those nations have the same asymmetric relationship with China. This incident, 
however, resulted in Vietnamese leaders’ orientation of “deference” approach toward 
China. Inside Vietnam’s Politburo, there were certainly hefty discussions between the 
two camps: modernizers and conservatives. Vuving (2006:159) remarks that due to 
its expediency and the asymmetry of power vis-à-vis China, both camps have to 
conclude its “deference” toward China.  
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• Period 2006 to present: Mistrusts and applying mixture approach of “tacit 
balancing”, omni-enmeshment and “internal balancing” 
 
Which strategic approach should Vietnam pursuit toward China? What should 
Vietnam do to defense itself? Those are constant questions posed not only to Hanoi’s 
leaders, but also cost many researches by Vietnamese scholars and catch special 
attention of the Vietnamese people. I argue that, basically, Hanoi still endeavors to 
pursuit a mixture between “tacit balancing” and omni-enmeshment and engagement. 
Each period of time Vietnam’s leaders manage to make compromise in choosing a 
final strategy. Nguyen Hong Thach, a foreign ministry officer notes about the strategy 
of engagement that:   
 
Sino-Vietnamese relations will be meshed within the much larger regional 
network of interlocking economic and political interests. It is an arrangement 
whereby anybody wanting to violate Vietnam’s sovereignty would be violating 
the interest of other countries as well173. 
 
Since 2006, besides the numbers of annual exchange meetings of high-level political 
delegations between Hanoi and Beijing, there have been still violent reactions from 
Chinese navy toward Vietnamese fishery ship (incident in 2007, another Vietnamese 
ship shit sank and three were dead). Through historical background, China has three 
times sent its troops to attack Vietnam174. From those happenings, much enquiries 
have been raised: Weather the historical rule repeats that China would “hit” Vietnam 
some time once again? In a long-term this questions is hard to respond, but in short-
term, this reaction will be rather remote. According to Womack (2006:252), the era of 
normalcy between Vietnam and China still dominate due to such factors as 
geopolitics consideration (sovereignty is the underlying fact of the relationship, 
Vietnam, through historical experience, is aware of its losses in keeping hostility 
toward China from 1979 to 1990), context (the expansion of ASEAN and diplomatic 
respect and recognition of this regional organization from other great powers, 
inclusive China. China other than that, still pursues its regional “good neighbors” 
policy) and leadership (the two leaderships share similar fundamental ideological 
resonance. Both are bide with the communist states and have to stand together to 
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resist against the pressures on political pluralism, but both are also meanwhile 
encouraged to strive for building rule of law. Above all, Vietnam and China orient its 
strategies on economic reform and international integration.) 
 
In sum, Vietnam’s policy behavior to China is not a “strategic ally” but rather a 
“strategic partner”. This is because Vietnam regards China as a socialist state in a 
time where both Hanoi and Beijing assess that it is a decline of international 
communist. Vietnam, thus, views China as “comrades plus brothers” but in reality 
China is for Vietnam both “a Model and a Threat”. Dealing with China in a  traditional 
way of “deference” and a new way of “engagement” brings Hanoi with calculation of 
“regime security”. At the same time Hanoi can learn from Chinese experience in 
economic and political reform process. Though China has been since then trying to 
paint its “benign power” face, on-going mistrusts together with major territorial 
disputes between the two communist countries still remain as challenges to bilateral 
relationship. Thus, Vietnamese strategy of omni-enmeshment is still regarded as 
prominent features. However, Hanoi’s leaders, especially, the modernizers still search 
a way for political counterweight. The mid-term future scenario is that Vietnam will 
not choose to be China’s “strategic ally”, rather it will seek way to enhance the 
cooperative relationship for mutual benefit, and reducing dissidents by negotiations.  
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7.3. Vietnam’s Russia policy  
 
In spite of geographical distance, the Soviet Union was once regarded as “cornerstone” 
in VFP in the 1970s and the 1980s, and also leader of the Socialist bloc. Besides 
economic and political advantages, many of Vietnamese intellectuals were once trained 
in the Soviet Union time. For The Soviet Union, Vietnam was a very close ally in the 
Cold War time. The USSR, in the Cold War time, always tried to avoid direct military 
confrontation with the U.S. Korean War and Vietnam War has been seen as a “proxy 
wars” where both these superpowers indirectly showed its strength.  
 
With the demise of the Soviet Union and Socialist bloc in Eastern Europe in 1989, 
Vietnam, however, lost its core allies. Vietnamese leader at the time were very worried 
because for more than 20 years, Vietnam was strongly dependent on the Soviet Union 
not only politically, economically but also military. Hanoi was very worried about its 
ideological orientation. The Soviet Union’s collapse meant also that it would loose 
almost its traditional markets and financial aids from the communist allies. According to 
Vietnam News,(13th March 1994) “the aid of the Soviet Union, as the main donor of 
ODA to Vietnam, has declined from 600 million rubles in 1989 to 200 million rubles in 
1990. In 1993, Russia promised to lend Vietnam 40 million US dollars but the loans has 
not been granted”175. Vietnam- the USSR relations started to show its stalemate at the 
beginning of 1990s. Not to mention that, Vietnam until the end of 1980s had hostile 
behavior to China.  
 
After 1994, both sides have been managed to maintain the political and economic 
relations. Numbers of political delegations have been exchanged. However, intil 2001, 
the bilateral relation has been refreshed with the official visit of President Vladimir 
Putin. The result of the visit was that both Russia and Vietnam signed “Joint Statement 
for a strategic partnership between Vietnam and Russia”176. 
 
For Vietnam, Russia today still plays an important role in Vietnamese foreign policy 
because “Russia is still a great power in contemporary international politics”177- Russia 
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is one of the permanent members in the Security Council of the United Nations and 
Vietnam still needs Russian voice in supporting its accession to the international 
institutions. Vietnam hold high regards on traditional friendship and multifaceted 
cooperation with Russia. In the political report of the Central Committee of the VCP, it 
was again affirmed that wished to consolidate the relation with Russia178 
 
But why Vietnam underlies the relationship with Russia as a “strategic relationship” 
but not a “strategic ally” like in the past? Responding this question, I would like to point 
out some following assessments:  
 
Firstly, regarding the concept of “strategic”, in the past “strategic relationship” was 
understood more about the cooperation in military and security, but in nowadays 
international politics, “strategic” not only refers to military but also equality and mutual 
benefit in economic cooperation. In “strategic relationship”, the military cooperation is 
either possible or not but it is not compulsory to become a strategic ally. If looking at the 
grand strategy of Vietnam since 1986, the Vietnamese diplomatic principle which Hanoi 
pursues is a “foreign policy to serve for domestic economic development”. The 
last ten years, Vietnam has adjusted its foreign policy motive to readiness for multi-
lateral relationship and for an equal, mutual benefit, non-interference in internal affairs. 
All those principles are subordination to modernization and industrialization process.  
 
Secondly, It should be taken into consideration that when Putin came to power, 
Moscow has set forth different four objectives: 1. foreign policy has its priority task of 
serving to domestic economic development, 2. protection of national security; 3. 
strengthening leadership role in the post-Soviet Union era; 4. promoting a multi-polarity 
new world order.179 Basically, both Vietnam and Russia emphasize the importance of 
economic cooperation. Russia, in a new time, is interested in promoting traditional 
relationship but based on the domestic demand of the both sides, military cooperation 
between Vietnam and Russia will not be served to be against the third adversary.   
  
Thirdly, in the relationship with Russia, Vietnam also pays much attention to Chinese 
international reactions, the historical experience which made Vietnam drawn numbers 
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of valuation lesson. Vietnam looks at Chinese behaviors to other great powers which 
engaged with “three No’s” principle - No ally, No confrontation and No give-up. 
Therefore, a “strategic ally” with Russia is for Vietnam not a priority.  
 
Fourthly, Vietnam- Russia strategic relationship is also due to the fact that thousands 
of Vietnamese who are living Russia through the labor exchange contract between 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Vietnamese diaspora in Moscow is mostly 
doing small and medium business. Furthermore, Vietnam is very interested in Russian 
market as it exports oil and other agriculture and textile products. On the other side, 
Vietnam can import Russian technical machines and material for industrial production.  
Practically, in Vietnam’s foreign policy towards the great powers, Russia’s position does 
not anymore account a priority in its foreign policy strategy. Likewise, Russian priority in 
foreign relations is prone to promotion of relations with the SNG countries 
(Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv, means Commonwealth of Independent 
States), and second is the European countries and then the U.S and the last is the East 
Asian countries.  
 
To sum up, Vietnam-Russia relations, though has reached positive refreshment in 
comparison with the 1990s, mutual efforts have been made by two sides on 
consolidation relationship but not reaching the full range. In a long-term, tensions and 
confrontation between two countries can be excluded but also very less likely move to 
a higher level of strategic allies. A Free Trade Agreement between Vietnam and Russia 
should be the next step needed to take into account.  
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7.4. Vietnam’s EU policy  
 
Debating about foreign policy of a state toward the European Union is assumed to be 
quite confusing because the European Union (27 members) today is surely different 
from the European Community in the past. Should other states deal with the EU as a 
single large bloc or with individual states separately? In the limited framework of this 
part, I would like to open a general discussion on Vietnam’s policy behavior toward 
the EU as a whole.  
 
One of the European Community (EC) countries have a very long-standing relation 
with Vietnam is the former colonial power France. This country had over 100 years of 
occupation and exploitation in Indochina. Its defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954 had put 
an end for its century of domination not only in Indochina but also in Africa.  
 
Being part of “breaking isolation and embargo” policy, Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy 
after 1986, set goals of normalization with all EC countries. After withdrawing its 
military troops in Cambodia in 1989, many European countries reestablished 
diplomatic relations with Vietnam and largely ignored any American pressure to stick 
to embargo180. Several visits of European Foreign ministers and finally the visit of 
President Mitterand in 1993 had ended Vietnam’s long international isolation and 
promoted its further integration into the world economy181. The highlight of Vietnam-
EC relationship was the Framework Cooperation Agreement between Vietnam and 
EC signed in July 1995182. Nevertheless, Hanoi has been so far disappointed with 
limited economic assistance form European countries. Due to the “burdens” which the 
EC had to face with the Eastern Europe, EC’s aid was exceptionally modest. 
According to Vietnam Investment Review (August, 1994:14), Vietnam received only 
18 million US dollars for programs of developing five key sectors and accustom to 
market economy, 127 million US dollars for projects of creating jobs opportunity and 
for returning economic asylum-seekers, known as “boat people”.  
Enlargement of the European Union, later on, is considered as “the most ambitious 
project” which will help to achieve the dream to make Europe whole and free”183. 
Though EU enlargement brings both challenges and advantages for its self, standing 
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in front of this project, both EU and other countries in different continents have to 
adjust its behaviors to meet requirements of the new condition.  
 
Cardini (2004) comments that “Southeast Asian Countries such as Vietnam should 
see European Union enlargement as an opportunity rather than a threat”. He 
suggests five reasons why Southeast Asian countries will benefit from EU 
enlargement: 1. possibility to access to a larger market than before (500 million 
inhabitans, GDP around 9.200 billion Euro, EU accounts for more than 19% of world 
trade and will be the source of 46% of world outward FDI); 2. EU- a single set of rules 
for business; 3. EU is a very open economy with a high standard of rules; 4. An 
extension of the Generalized System of Preferences; 5. and Trade disruption and 
trade diversion are unlikely for ASEAN countries.  
 
In Vietnam’s perception, Hanoi considers relations with the EU as important partner, 
not only in economic development but also through the EU, Vietnam can enhance its 
international position. In fact, the EU absorbs on average about 22% of Vietnam’s 
exports (4.6 billion Euro in 2001). The EU is also the largest trading partner of Vietnam. 
Vietnam benefits not only in relations with the EU as a whole but also mutual relations 
with individual EU member states. For EU’s perception, “Vietnam is a key partner 
country within ASEAN and has acted as ASEAN facilitator in ongoing EU-ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) talks”. Therefore, “the EU is seeking to broaden and diversify 
the agenda of its relationship with Vietnam, beyond development co-operation and 
trade, to increased political co-operation on issues of global concern”.184 
 
Regarding Vietnam’s strategic approach toward the European Union as a whole, 
there are two features should not be neglected:  
 
Firstly, Vietnam calculated that its relation with the EU is part of “external balancing” 
strategy in dealing with other great powers, especially China and Japan. By signing of 
“the Framework Cooperation Agreement, 1995”185, Vietnam achieved two-fold 
benefits: Vietnam, after almost more than one decade of isolation, first time was 
recognized as a “equal partner” of the EU in economic cooperation; Other than that, 
                                                 
184
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this Agreement provides Vietnam with broad and multilateral relations with each 
individual EU member states, and, thus, practically reduce political dependence on 
China and economic sticking with Japan.  
 
In its relations with the great powers, Vietnam is fully aware of China’s direct and 
sensitive influence, meanwhile Vietnam-US relations still has to confront with certain 
political and diplomatic obstacles. Therefore, a substantial and understanding 
relationship with the EU would be an important strategic partnership, and at the same 
time, “balancing” the pressures of the other powers.  
 
Secondly, on its path to international economic integration, Vietnam certainly needs 
numbers of “votes” and positive “voices” of the EU whose some members have seats 
in the United Nation Security Council. Vietnam got a “ticket” to join in WTO was 
thanks to great support of the EU members.  
 
In short, it is very clear that in terms of economic cooperation, Vietnam applies its 
pragmatic approaches in dealing with the EU as a whole by main motive so call 
“taking advantages” (tranh thủ) as it considers the EU as a “strategic market”. But at 
the same time, Vietnam is also aware of its complicated legal system which is even 
more so since its enlargement. Furthermore, Vietnamese exported products still have 
to face with strong restrictions and trade protectionism from many European 
countries. Another issues attract EU concerns is the human right situation in Vietnam. 
Beside its strategic approach of “external balancing”, it is more important than all, 
Vietnam should learn from many of the EU member states in building a strong and 
stable social security, while dealing with economic boom and the negative 
consequences left by market economy. 
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7.5. Vietnam’s Japan policy  
 
Memories of the Vietnamese about a brutal Japanese fascism from 1940-1945, 
causing massive hunger and killing almost 2 million people, are pushed back to the 
past. They have been gradually replaced by a image of new Japan - one of the most 
powerful economies, the biggest ODA provider in the world and a great power in the 
region.   
 
Though Japan reestablished its normalization with Vietnam after 1975, Tokyo was still 
one of industrialized countries followed the American embargo until the end. Tokyo’s 
cautious behavior to Hanoi was due to the fear that it would disappoint and endanger 
its relationship with the U.S.  
 
If in the Cold War, Vietnam-Japan relations were mostly dominated by two camps-the 
U.S and the USSR, the post-Cold War era witnessed a warm-up relationship of the 
two countries. Japan changed its view and has a good impression about Vietnam’s 
ðổi mới. After the Cambodian settlement, Japan took aims at helping establish a 
politically stability and prosperity of the whole Asian region, especially Southeast 
Asian region. Tokyo also calculates that a prosperous Vietnam would be a valuable 
balance to the growing Chinese political, economic and military influence in the 
region186. Thus, Japan attempted to play more active and independent political role in 
the region by promoting closer cooperation with ASEAN and Indochina187. This is also 
part of Tokyo’s intention of redeeming mistakes which Japanese fascism made in the 
second Wolrd War to the South East Asian peoples. 
 
Already in 1986, the 6th Communist Party Congress, Vietnam figured out the capitalist 
countries for financial support, these countries included France, Austria, Sweden and 
Japan.188 Vietnam considers Japan as a priority investor in the ðổi mới era and in the 
modernization and industrialization process. Only in 1992, Japan has granted loans 
aid of 380 million USD, and around 15 million USD of grant aid for Hanoi in building 
infrastructure, and cultural projects189. The Vietnam Investment reviews has post the 
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 Corin, Richard (1992). Japan, the United States and prospect of the Asia-Pacific century. Singpore: 
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 See Documemt of 6th Party Congress (1986).p.57  
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remarkable aid by Japan to South East Asian economies, which reached 1.4 billion 
USD190. Tourism and education become later on as the focusing important projects 
for both sides  
 
Beside economical and technical supports, Hanoi also sees Japan with great admire 
and a possible model for its own development191. Notably, Vietnam and Japan are 
both Asian countries share many cultural values. Not like the U.S and the Western 
European countries who often set issues of human rights and democratization as a 
conditions for investment, Tokyo expresses its sympathy and recognizes the risk of 
political pluralism which could create political instability, and thus threatening the 
economic reform process in Vietnam. Nonetheless, Vietnam has also worries that a 
too strong dependent to economic imperative of Japan would affect Chinese view of 
influence in South East Asia region.  
 
Though strategic partnership is perceived by both sides, Vietnam and Japan also 
experienced some incidents. The PCI corruption scandal is an example, in 2009 
Japanese government claimed that Vietnamese officials in a state company192 have 
received bribery from a Japanese company (Nexus Technologies). This case has 
triggered a strong mistrust of Tokyo and made Japanese government suspended aid 
loan to Vietnam until this case is clarified. Consequently, in 2008, the main FDI of 
Japan flows to Vietnam accounts only about 8.0 million USD193. 
 
To sum up, Vietnam-Japan relations moves from a “cold phase” and disruption to a 
multi-faceted relationship. Both Vietnam and Japan calculate their own benefits in the 
mutual relations: firstly is a “balancing” against the emerging power of China and 
secondly is comprehensive economic cooperation. Above all, Vietnam is grateful for 
Japan’s full ranged assistance in its execution of Doi noi policy but not provoking 
factors which challenge the legitimacy of the Vietnamese Communist Party in the new 
process of modernization and industrialization.  
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7.6. Vietnam’s India policy   
 
The cordial friendship between Vietnam and India has been built up by the former 
leader generations, Ho Chi Minh and J. Nehru since the new establishments of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of India. India actively supported 
Vietnam in both persistent struggles against the French colonialist and American 
aggression in the Vietnam War. Later on, the bilateral relationship has been tight up 
with a number of official visits paid by high-ranking political leaders in 1990s. 
Entering globalization time, both Vietnam and India have been managing to achieve a 
fair degree of success. Both have a very impressive economic growth rates and efforts 
in reducing poverty and striving for building social justice. While the size of the two 
economies is different (India's GDP in 2007 is projected at $1,132 billion and Vietnam's 
at $71 billion), the per capita income ($946 for India and $822 for Vietnam) are 
similar194. 
Moreover, Vietnam and India share cultural linkages and many characters both for 
advantages and challenges (a huge young population providing a active and dynamic 
labor forces, an overwhelming proportion of populations involved on agriculture with 
low incomes, a rapid urbanizations, and increasing gab between the Rich and the 
Poor). The adoption of ðổi mới of Vietnam and the “the ‘Look East Policy’195 of India  
imbued with the economic element, marked an important turn in India–Vietnam economic 
relations. 196 
Vietnam is in the last decade largely interested in three potentials provided by India: 
1. development and support in the sphere of Informatics and Technology; 2. trading 
markets, 3. improvement of military strength by purchasing defense equipment with 
moderate prices.  
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Vietnam is also well informed by the new strategy of India in the post-Cold War era. 
Remarking about India’s foreign policy toward other great powers, Brawley (2004) 
writes that:  
 
During the Cold War, India cast about for possible allies to balance American 
power. Since India currently may reckon that China is more of a threat to its 
interests than the U.S, it has very few potential allies to draw on. The Soviet 
Union was previously available as available as a balancer against China and 
the United States, but Russia may not be of much assistance today. India, 
therefore, would probably to try to pursue internal methods to balance against 
local threats, while seeking to appease the United States for the time being. 
India’s only realistic option at this moment is to devote its energies to build up 
its internal economic capacities.  
 
      (Brawley, 2004:96) 
 
Basically, China is not only the main concern of Vietnam or India but for most other 
states in the Asia - Pacific region. But like many other States in Asia, both India and 
Vietnam set priority on building up internal economic capacities. Practically, both India 
and China attempt to pursue their “tacit balancing” since they both share parallel 
interests in politics (influence) and economy (markets) in the Asia-pacific region. 
 
Having an increasing role in ASEAN, “Vietnam is a country with immense economic 
and strategic potential”197. Thus, the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 
2007 indicates the new contours of India-Vietnam relations. This event is seen as a 
success in bilateral cooperation not only in economic field but also in security reason. In 
2009, India has granted market economy status to Vietnam at the same time, the 
substantive cooperation is further enhanced in higher education, science and 
technology. 
 
One of the most notable events was when the Vietnamese Defense Minister, General 
Phung Quang Thanh paid a visit to India in November 2009 (prior his visit to the U.S). 
This event is also seen by many observers as a reaction which “withstood post Cold 
War strategic permutations”.198 The most important message in the dialogue with 
Indian Army was that: Vietnam needs Indian assistance in upgrading its outdated 
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defense equipment and other military hardware. An often practice of Vietnamese 
navy in the South China Sea under assistance of Indian navy would be appreciated. 
This also means that Vietnam is pursuing its “external balancing” if necessary when 
dealing with both China and India for the sake of safeguarding its territory.  
To sum up, despite of recently busy bilateral trades between Vietnam and India, there 
still much potentials which both side should effective exploit such as tourism and 
technology.  Both Hanoi and New Delhi so far have reached a further step in terms of 
security interest due to the Vietnamese requirement of military improvement. Hanoi is 
aware that the outdated quantity of military hardware in the past will not mean much in 
the today era of high informatics and technology. Nevertheless, a comprehensive 
mutual cooperation still needs attention of the strategic policy makers in Vietnam.  
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Conclusion 
 
From a near starvation to the world’s second largest rice exporter, from a country, 
more than two decades ago, did not even have the vocabulary of trade, legal system, 
the vocabulary of economics and central banking system199, Vietnam turns to be one 
of the most dynamic and growth-rate economies in the region and achieves 
significant changes in economic management. From a country under years of 
isolation and blockage, Vietnam scored a multiple diplomatic success by having 
established relations with 170 countries, having trade links with 224 out of 255 
nations and territories200, being an active member of regional and international 
institutions. 
  
Discussing about Vietnam, it is a necessity to have a close look at ðổi mới, an 
economic reform program launched in the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (1986). By adoption of market-based economic mechanism “under socialist 
orientation”201, Vietnam recognizes the free flow of goods and services, household 
economies and the private sectors. Along with this strategy, Vietnam continues to 
improve its legal framework for supporting the business sectors. Hanoi with its “open 
door” policy (chính sách mở cửa) and significant achievements in implementation of 
ðổi mới, has its confidence in its integrating path into world economy. 
 
Kirt (2006:247) states that “foreign policy operates on the international level, but its 
agenda is grounded in the realm of domestic interests”. Likewise, essential changes of 
Vietnamese foreign policy solemnly derives its momentum from domestic requirement 
but apparently, at the same time, radical changes of foreign policy has also made a 
great contribution to success of ðổi mới. Main task of Vietnam’s foreign policy at the 
beginning  ðổi mới era were aim to help the country step out of isolation, normalization 
with the great powers, “ready to befriend with all other nations in the world” and 
attracting foreign investment. For Hanoi leaders’ perception, “economic growth, in turn, 
is seen as a way to provide Vietnam with national security, since Vietnam is regarded 
as living ‘in a region surrounded by tigers and dragon, the continued backwardness of 
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the country is the biggest security threat to the nation’ (Goodman, 1996: 596). Like 
Hoang (1994) remarks “a poor country is not a strong country”. 
 
Generally, it can be noted that during the Cold War, Vietnamese Foreign Policy was 
determined by ideological standpoint. National interest was set by priority objectives 
such as national defence, national liberation and reunification. Since the adoption of 
ðổi mới, Vietnam has shifted from pursuing a limited number of external relationships, 
primarily within the socialist bloc, and over dependent on Soviet Union to a foreign 
policy based on “diversification” and “multi-lateralization” approaches. In other 
words, it has been undergone with a much pragmatic way to serve for the cause of 
industrialization and modernization process, associated with protection of national 
sovereignty and improving Vietnam’s position in regional and international arena.  
 
Identifying the main determinants leading to this “shift” of Vietnam’s foreign policy, it 
can be explained by both international and domestic factors. 
 
Regarding International influences, they should be included the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the socialist bloc; the demand of economic reform (ðổi mới) strongly 
motivated by the Perestroika in Russia, Economic reform in China, and other Eastern 
European countries;  the impact of globalization and “economization” process and most 
notably the changing behaviors of present day-great powers toward each others202.  
 
Concerning Domestic factors, I emphasized the importance of “reform of thinking” in 
foreign policy makers: 
 
1. Reform of thinking in perception of the outside world  
2. Reform of thinking in perception of security, development, national interest 
3. Reform of thinking of foreign policy approaches  
4. Reform of thinking in identifying “friend and foe” 
5. Reform of thinking about different contributing channels to foreign policy-making  
 
I agree partly with an assessment by Vuving (2005) that strategic culture of the state 
and its ruling/governing elites still play a central role in Vietnamese foreign policy-
making. Grand strategy and foreign policy options are strongly influenced by 
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“concessions“ or “struggling” of two camps of ruling elites which are divided into two 
groups: the anti-imperialists (conservatives) and the modernizers. Vietnam’s foreign 
policy is much depending on perception about world view of these two groups. This is 
very noticeable in the Vietnamese case but I just share my partly agreeing with this 
essessent because I still insist to underline the importance of the international influence 
like already mentioned above. Last but not least, one of not less important factor which 
might be more even essentially important in the future, which is the increasing role of 
civil society, intellectuals and think tanks in the Vietnamese foreign policy-making 
process.  
  
From my own investigation and with a reference to the analysis by Vuving (2005), I 
would like to sum up again the significant changes in Vietnam’s foreign policy since 
1986 to present: 
 
 Before ðổi mới (1964-1986) From ðổi mới to present  
 
Worldview  • Two-camps: Capitalists and 
Socialists 
• “Three  revolutionary 
currents”203 
• Multi-polarity and 
interdependence 
• Globalization and Scientific-
technological Revolution 
Ideology  • Marxism-Leninism 
orientation  
• “socialism”  
• Marginalization of Ideology: 
Pragmatism under the 
rhetoric slogan “orthodox of 
Marxism-Leninism and Ho 
Chi Minh thought” and 
“socialism construction”  
Grand strategy  • National liberation and 
National Unification  
• Modernization and 
Industrialization  
 
Interests  
 
Primacy of class interest:  
 
• Class struggle: 
 “who will win” 
 
 
 
Primacy of national interest: 
 
• prone to  peaceful 
cooperation;  
• Economic development and 
national security: economic 
security and sovereignty 
security, protection of national 
identity etc.     
Ambition  
 
• Communist victory on a 
global scale 
• Revolution export (to Laos, 
• “Wealthy people, strong 
nation and democratic, and 
civilized society”  
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Cambodia, Thailand) 
• Identifying: “Who is friend 
who is foe?” 
• Anti-imperialism  
• Vietnamese revolution was 
part of “World revolution” 
• “Open door policy”  
• Multilateralization and 
Diversification: “befriend with 
all nations and a reliable 
partner”  
„begging for aid“  Self-reliance and integration to 
international community  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign policy 
directions  • USSR as “cornerstone”  
Socialist bloc  
• Alliance with China and 
Opposition to the United 
States 
 
• Close ties with the West 
• Integration to Asia-Pacific 
     and ASEAN 
• Strategic partnership and 
cooperative partnership with 
the great powers 
Diplomacy 
approaches  
• Diplomacy regarded as a 
front serving military front  
• „Antagonism diplomacy“ 
• “Economic diplomacy” 
• People-to-people diplomacy 
(track-two diplomacy)  
• Using intellectuals, think 
tanks and contribution of 
NGOs  as a consultation 
sources  
Consequences  • Isolation  
• Trade embargo  
• Economic crisis and 
unstable society  
• Diplomatic relations with 172 
countries  
• Trade agreements with 76 
countries  
• Vietnam as an influent 
member in ASEAN  
• Non-permanent member of 
the UN Security Council 
(2008-2009) 
 
I have argued that the pattern of Vietnamese foreign relations toward the great powers 
since 1986 is a combination of both theoretical paradigms: realism and liberalism. It 
has been proved in my thesis that: 
 
• Vietnam’s U.S policy is explained by approaches of “external and internal 
balancing” and appeasement which correspond to realism theory;  
• Vietnam’s China policy is realized by “deference” approach (asymmetry paradigm), 
“both external and internal balancing” which correspond to realism; the pathways 
involved are “engagement” and “omni-enmeshment” (liberalism) 
• Vietnam’s Russia policy is more prone to “solidarity” approach which refers to 
socialist internationalism 
• Vietnam’s the European Union is more described by “pragmatism” and liberalism 
stressed by “taking advantages” approach  
• Vietnam deals with Japan and India as counterweight to China (realism) 
 128 
 
It can be also clear to see that the changes in Vietnamese foreign policy after 1986 
does not affect the country’s behaviour of maintaining statue-quo power of the 
Communist Party but it also can not be denied that the CPV’s significant role in 
contribution to national liberation, struggle for independence and national construction. 
 
Dahm (1995) has posed a question that “The conclusion about Vietnam’s future 
depends on whether one takes an optimistic or pessimistic view, whether ðổi mới is 
the beginning of substantial changes or just a matter of buying time before the final 
collapse of the system?” After 15 years, having seen the country’s significant changes 
and achievements, Dahm might get now a pessimistic answer.  
 
I might conclude my thesis by recommending the next step:  
 
Vietnam’s vision of 2020 is to become “an industrialized country”204 how to achieve 
this goals depends certainly much on its strategic approach of a flexible foreign 
policy. Avoiding a lame comparison by using a metaphor that “Vietnam - a tiger riding 
bicycle”, it can be suggested by a gradual introduction of democracy with increasing 
role of civil society, learning how to build a strong and stable social security, for 
example, like what Prime Minister Bruno Kreisky has done in Austria in the 1970s. 
This might be an initial solution for Hanoi’s task in balancing between market 
economy and ideology.  
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